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Abstract 
 
 
This study examines the relationship between displacement and state-formation in Uganda, a 
country that has hosted some of the largest refugee populations on the African continent since 
the late 1950s. Specifically, it explores the place-making work of Rwandan migrants and 
refugees who came to Uganda during the momentous middle decades of the twentieth century 
seeking work, relief, and political refuge. Rejecting neat chronologies and categories of the state, 
I trace continuities of mobility and governance to demonstrate connections between colonial 
state formation and postcolonial refugee management. Colonial authorities, I argue, possessed 
neither the capacity nor the political will to make migrant populations “legible.” In the absence 
of central oversight and support, administrative responsibilities for migrants fell to low-level 
chiefs, employers, and landlords, who became the country’s de facto gatekeepers. Decentralized 
governance facilitated migration and encouraged many Rwandans to resettle permanently in 
Uganda, but it also blurred the boundaries between “natives” and “settlers.” When Rwanda 
erupted in revolutionary war in 1959, driving nearly 70,000 people to seek asylum in Uganda, 
the Uganda government responded by introducing laws and building camps to separate 
“refugees” from “citizens.” New administrative techniques, however, could not undo decades of 
unregulated Rwandan migration and settlement. This dissertation explores how members of the 
Rwandan diaspora navigated these shifting lines of political exclusion over time, moving in and 
out of bureaucratic categories as they sought to make their homes in Uganda.  
1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
I am sitting in the compound of an elderly Munyarwanda man named Yonah Kahima, who has 
lived in southwestern Uganda since 1959.1 “I was chased,” he says, “by the Hutu.” He and his 
parents were living in northern Rwanda at the start of the Revolution, a conflict that brought 
about the end of Belgian colonial rule in Ruanda-Urundi and drove over 150,000 people—
predominantly Tutsi—into neighboring Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and Congo. Yet when I ask 
Yonah to describe his life as a “refugee,” he is quick to dismiss the label: “I told you I was 
chased—my neighbors know that. That doesn’t make me empungye [refugee].” Gesturing to his 
wife, who is bouncing their grandchild on her knee, he exclaims, “My life is here!”2 
Yonah’s refusal of the refugee label complicates the premise, foundational to 
international law, that refugees constitute problems to be first identified (through the 
standardized collection of reliable population data) and then solved (through the reestablishment 
of the citizen-state bond).3 Violently displaced at the age of ten, he and his family sought asylum 
in Uganda three years before national independence, when domestic refugee and citizenship laws 
                                                 
1 “Yonah,” whose real name I have withheld for privacy concerns, self-identifies as “Munyarwanda.” Munyarwanda 
(pl., Banyarwanda) is a complicated ethnic label typically used in Uganda to indicate a person of Rwandan origins. I 
unpack this term in the pages that follow. 
2 Yonah Kahima, Kabale, March 28, 2013. 
3 Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher (eds), Refugees in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011); Guy Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, Third Edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007); James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005); David Kennedy, “International Refugee Protection,” Human Rights Quarterly 8 
(1986): 1-69; A. Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, vol. 2 (Leyden: AW Sijthoff, 1972).   
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did not yet exist. The British Protectorate government, responding to wars in both Rwanda and 
Congo, passed the Control of Alien Refugees Act (CARA) the following year, in 1960, at which 
point local authorities reclassified Yonah and his parents as “refugees.” Despite this relabeling, 
the family did not go to live in a refugee settlement (as it had not been built), but remained in 
southwestern Uganda as tenant farmers on rented land. Fifty-five years later, Yonah no longer 
considers himself “displaced,” having spent his entire adolescence and adult life in “exile.” 
Nonetheless, he is also not a citizen—CARA, which remained on the books until 2006, expressly 
withheld from refugees the right to naturalize.4 Yonah’s lack of legal recognition as either citizen 
or refugee leaves him vulnerable to harassment, even deportation, yet he remains in Uganda for 
reasons both simple and profound: his life is now here—it is no longer there.  
This dissertation is about the contingency of home and nation in East Africa, told at the 
crossroads of displacement and state formation. Specifically, it follows the experiences of a large 
and diverse diaspora known in Uganda as the “Banyarwanda,” a capacious ethnonym of colonial 
vintage meaning literally, “people of Rwanda.” Made up of migrants, refugees, and persons of 
Rwandan descent, this diaspora comprises multiple histories of displacement and relocation 
going back to the foundations of the colonial state. Indeed, when the British acquired the Uganda 
Protectorate in 1900, Kinyarwanda-speaking people were already an important part of the 
southern border region.5 After World War I, Uganda emerged as a regional hub for seasonal 
labor migrants, who traveled from all corners of east Africa to find work in the Protectorate’s 
cotton, coffee, and sugar plantations. Rwandans formed the largest of these migrant groups, for 
reasons that had as much to do with ecological crises and poor governance in Belgian Ruanda as 
                                                 
4 Uganda Control of Alien Refugees Act, Laws of Uganda, Chapter 62, 1960 (1964). 
5 Donald Denoon, ed., A History of Kigezi in Southwestern Uganda (Kampala: Uganda Press Trust, 1977). 
3 
 
they did with economic opportunities in British Uganda.6 Over the next forty years, hundreds of 
thousands of Rwandan men and women would journey to Uganda to escape famine, forced labor, 
and high taxes in Belgian territory. Annual migration rates are difficult to calculate, but colonial 
sources suggest that on average more than 75,000 found their way to Uganda every year during 
the 1940s and 1950s, with dramatic spikes in times of famine (1928-30, 1942-44) and war (1959-
64). While many repatriated, others remained, forming new attachments to people and place. 
They took up land and learned language; they built houses and reputations; they found partners 
and had children. They negotiated new networks of patronage and enmeshed themselves in new 
social worlds. And in so doing, they transformed Uganda. 
In the chapters that follow, I treat the social history of Rwandan displacement as a lens 
through which to explore the makings of the Ugandan state in the twentieth century.7 Migrant 
and refugee journeys serve as guides, directing us through the social, political, and administrative 
processes that structure the possibilities for “belonging” in (post)colonial contexts. They help us 
push beyond state categories like “citizen” and “refugee” to discern, in the words of Clare 
Anderson, “the way in which the lines of inclusion and exclusion shifted across time and 
space.”8 Yonah’s indeterminate legal status is neither unique nor surprising when understood 
within a longer history of migration and state formation. While international organizations have 
long lamented the postcolonial state’s “failure” to identify refugees and provide them with legal 
                                                 
6 G. Powesland, “The History of the Migration in Uganda,” in Economic Development and Tribal Change: A Study 
of Immigrant Labour in Buganda, ed. Audrey Richards (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd, 1954). 
7 As Peter Gatrell observes in his global history of refugees, “states make refugees, but…refugees also make states.” 
Peter Gatrell, The Making of the Modern Refugee (Oxford: Oxford University Press): vii. For a parallel argument on 
the relationship between mobility and state-formation in Africa, see Darshan Vigneswaran and Joel Quirk, eds, 
Mobility Makes States: Migration and Power in Africa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). 
8 Clare Anderson, Subaltern Lives: Biographies of Colonialism in the Indian Ocean World, 1790-1920 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012): 8. 
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protections, I argue that such indeterminacy is a product of colonial governance. As many 
historians of Africa have shown, the colonial state was never designed to know its subjects. 
Operating “on a shoestring,” colonial officials possessed neither the infrastructure nor the 
manpower needed to fix individuals into permanent political categories.9 Yet the relative 
blindness of the colonial state had as much to do with desire as it did with capacity, at least when 
in it came to managing African migration. The state was not simply unable to distinguish 
“native” from “settler”: I argue that it actively chose not to for most of its history. The 
Protectorate economy turned on peasant production, specifically on the work of private African 
farmers growing small plots of inexpensive cotton for sale on the world market. Rwandan 
migrants, for reasons that will be explored in Chapters Two and Three, provided the manual 
labor needed to run the larger farms, while migrants-turned-settlers grew their own cash crops 
for export. In neighboring Kenya, powerful European planters worked in tense cooperation with 
government to exploit African land and labor.10 In sharp contrast, Protectorate officials were 
convinced that their financial success depended on Africans having access to land and enjoying 
relative freedom of mobility. They were therefore reticent to impose restrictions on African 
migrants, fearing that the introduction of pass systems, identity cards, migrant quotas, and 
registries would threaten the country’s primary labor source.  
Migrant illegibility, in other words, served the economic interests of the colonial state, 
even as it undermined the state’s capacity to organize populations. Indeed, the colonial 
administration evinced little interest in “seeing like a state,” as James Scott dubs it, when it came 
                                                 
9 Sara Berry, No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 24. 
10 Anthony Clayton and Donald C. Savage, Government and Labour in Kenya, 1895-1963 (London: F. Cass, 1974). 
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to African immigration. Instead, they pursued the more modest aim of “channeling” migrants 
towards centers of agricultural production in central Uganda.11 Leveling roads, constructing 
transit camps, and providing basic healthcare, the British sought to facilitate Rwandan mobility 
along preferred highways. These activities enabled a certain degree of surveillance over routes, 
but they did not ultimately make migrants more legible in the eyes of state actors. Upon leaving 
the road, most migrants sought employment with private African farmers, where they 
disappeared from government oversight.  
The Uganda state’s open-door approach to Rwandan migration had profound 
consequences for the country’s bureaucratic infrastructure and the distribution of political 
authority at the local level. As Fred Cooper argues, the colonial state in Africa was a “gate-
keeping” state. Its primary source of power was its ability to control the intersection between the 
colony and the outside world. Although rarely able to organize the “social and cultural realm” of 
its subjects, colonial states could collect customs duties, oversee the export of valuable resources, 
and reinforce their political claims through recourse to metropolitan armies. In the case of 
Uganda, Protectorate officials effectively handed this gate-keeping function over to chiefs, 
landlords, and employers when they refused to intervene on questions of migrant settlement.12 
With no centralized means of recognizing migrants, the government became dependent on low-
level chiefs to take on the added administrative responsibilities of identifying, taxing, and 
                                                 
11 James Scott has famously argued that the modern state does violence to local communities in its efforts to 
simplify and “make legible” complex social realities. See James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes 
to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Historians of Africa, 
however, counter that colonial and postcolonial states in Africa were (and are) extremely limited in their ability to 
“see” populations. See for example Erik Bähre and Baz Lecocq, “The Drama of Development: The Skirmishes 
Behind High Modernist Schemes in Africa,” African Studies 66, no. 1 (2007): 1-8.  
12 Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
156-190. 
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policing new arrivals. And because the Protectorate’s unique land tenure system afforded 
migrant tenants with remarkable protections against eviction (Chapter Two), landlords became 
the de facto arbiters of legal residence for Rwandans. Rwandan migrants, unsurprisingly, quickly 
overwhelmed this decentralized system of control, resulting in the further obfuscation of 
individuals in the eyes of the state. 
The introduction of CARA in 1960, then, initiated what would become a dramatic 
reversal of statecraft. For the first time, the government proposed to document a large subset of 
cross-border African migrants, despite the fact that they lacked the bureaucratic machinery 
necessary for such a colossal task and had no intention of investing in it. But in the minds of 
British officials, long-term investment would not be necessary, because they assumed that the 
refugee crisis was temporary. They had, after all, closed their borders for brief periods of time in 
the past, either to prevent the spread of disease (Chapter One) or to deter famine victims from 
seeking aid in the Protectorate (Chapter Three). The 1960 law was a similar stop-gap measure, 
designed to address an emergency situation.13 In 1961, to assist with the distribution of aid, the 
Protectorate began construction on refugee settlements in remote corners across the Western and 
Northern Provinces. The settlements proved flimsy shelters, built as they were on marginal, 
tsetse-fly infested land, but the government, again, believed that they would not be needed for 
more than a couple of years. However, as weeks turned into months, and months into years, the 
                                                 
13 The Protectorate attempted, in 1945, to impose a temporary blockade on half-starved Rwandans who were seeking 
famine relief in southern Uganda. The British justified the decision on the grounds that these “famine refugees,” as 
they were then called, could threaten the country’s own limited food supply. The blockade was eventually lifted, not 
on humanitarian grounds, but because European and Asian businesses had complained so vociferously about their 
loss of migrant labor (see Chapter Three). Fifteen years later, Protectorate authorities again tried to block Rwandans 
from entering Uganda, this time on the grounds that these “refugees” might draw Uganda into the Rwandan 
revolution. However, their early attempts at repatriating ’59ers resulted in significant public outcry in a way that the 
1940s famine never had. Many Ugandan politicians, with their eyes on independence, used the refugee crisis as an 
opportunity to critique British colonial rule. What had been politically possible for the colonial state in 1945 was no 
longer possible in 1960. Chapter Four traces this transformation in greater detail. 
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decolonizing government slowly realized that their refugee situation had no obvious horizon. 
After a particularly violent episode in late 1963, in which an armed militia of Rwandan refugees 
in Uganda invaded Rwanda, state authorities decided that all refugees, regardless of need, must 
be moved to the settlements indefinitely (Chapter Five). 
The government’s attempt to exclude refugees through mandatory encampment was an 
improbable solution given the history of the Ugandan state. Authorities had no means of 
systematically registering refugees or tracking them over time. Most people who went to the 
settlements eventually left on their own accord, choosing instead to live as private residents 
across southwestern and central Uganda, just as generations of migrants before them had done. 
This was not a symptom of the postcolonial state’s ineptitude, I argue, but was rather a logical 
outcome of colonial state formation. The state was not designed to know its subjects, and new 
political circumstances did little to change this. By the late 1960s, officials estimated that 
perhaps as many as two-thirds of all refugees in Uganda were “self-settled,” meaning that they 
lived privately as undocumented migrants.14  Like those who had come before them, they found 
employment, rented land, paid their taxes, and sent their children to school. Without government 
protection, their ability to remain in Uganda depended on their relationships with other migrants, 
with Ugandan family and friends, and with local authorities, landlords, and employers. The key 
difference now was that the state had created a new category of exclusion, one that many people 
managed to evade, but that still changed the tenor of political debate about belonging in Uganda.  
 
 
                                                 
14 L.W. Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time—The Work of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 1951-1972, v. 2 (Meutchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, Ltd, 1975), 1212. 
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Contingency of “Home” 
Stephen Lubkemann has observed that, in many instances of war-time displacement in 
Africa, areas that produce refugees often have longer histories of labor migration. Scholars rarely 
interrogate this history, however, and this prevents us from “consider[ing] whether or how social 
processes or patterns of migrancy that predate conflict might bear on war-time behavior and 
movement.”15 Indeed, during my own fieldwork in southwestern and central Uganda, people I 
spoke with often felt compelled to preface their discussion of refugees with comments about 
earlier migrations and the artificiality of colonial borders. These introductory notes, meant for 
my edification, were generally trite, but their repetition was significant: My interlocutors, 
regardless of nationality or legal status, connected older histories of migration to more recent 
war-time displacement, using the former to help explain the reception and distribution of the 
latter. This may seem like an obvious point, but it is one that has received far too little analytical 
attention from scholars and policy makers.  
Lubkemann suggests that part of the reason for this disconnect may have to do with the 
way scholars historicize mobility. “[L]abor migration,” he writes, “tends to be studied as a 
deeply historical process that develops and changes over time,” while “the movement of refugees 
in war-time is almost invariably described in ahistorical terms.”16 The denial of history to 
refugees may also be tied to the way we attribute agency to mobile subjects: Migrants, framed as 
individuals who choose to travel in search of economic opportunities, are understood to be 
historical actors, while refugees are depicted as unthinking victims of emergency situations. Both 
                                                 
15 Stephen C. Lubkemann, Culture in chaos: an anthropology of the social condition in war (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), 45. See also Cecilia Ruthstrom-Ruin, Beyond Europe: the globalization of refugee aid (Lund: 
Lund University Press, 1993). Ruthstrom-Ruin noted the connection between Algerian displacement during the war 
(1954-1962) and earlier histories of labor migration to Tunisia, Morocco, and France—see especially pp. 80-84. 
16 Lubkemann, Culture in Chaos, 45. 
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tropes—the intrepid migrant, the terrified refugee—depict figures who are socially disembedded, 
unmoored from the very relations that constitute them as actors. As Harri Englund argues, 
“actors…are neither ‘individuals’ nor ‘communities’ but relations of varying scale, from 
personal relationships to transnational relations of power.”17 Situating migrants in social time 
and space was important to the people I interviewed, and so it became important to me.  
Rejecting neat divisions between colonialism and independence, war and peace, migrant 
and refugee, and native and foreigner, this dissertation explores the messy and non-contiguous 
transition between colonial and postcolonial state through a social history of displacement. 
Framing migrant illegibility as a product of colonial state formation, I write a history of 
displacement that spans the colonial/postcolonial divide and connects earlier generations of 
Rwandan migrants to those who fled the revolution in 1959 (the so-called “’59ers”). Bridging 
these temporal (colonial/postcolonial) and conceptual (migrant/refugee) divides is necessary if 
we are to understand twentieth century displacement in Africa in its proper historical context. 
How have multiple generations of Rwandans managed to build homes for themselves in Uganda, 
and how have they navigated shifting borders of political, social, and material exclusion over 
time? How and why did certain migrants become saddled with the refugee label? How and why 
did others appropriate this label voluntarily, and to what end? Similarly, how did people like 
Yonah manage to shed their refugee status, and with what success? In raising these questions, 
my primary aim is to move beyond the legal and administrative categories that have, to date, 
truncated the study of forced migration in central Africa and instead follow the lives of migrants 
themselves.  
                                                 
17 Harri Englund, From War to Peace on the Mozambique-Malawi Borderland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2001), 27. 
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This shift in perspective—from the study of state categories to the social histories of 
people on the move—troubles the conclusions reached by Mahmood Mamdani and Liisa Malkki, 
two scholars who have written influential studies of Rwandan and Burundian displacement in 
central Africa. Mamdani, writing in a constructivist vein, traces the history of the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide to the colonial state’s imposition of new categorical orders. First, he argues, European 
administrations divided their government into two separate spheres: civic and customary. White 
and Asian settlers were subject to civil laws, while Africans were governed by state-appointed 
“customary” authorities. Customary authorities, most often glossed as “chiefs,” were charged 
with collecting taxes, allocating putatively “communal” land, organizing household petty 
commodity production for colonial markets, and conscripting labor for the colonial state 
(including soldiers for World War I and II). This policy of “indirect” rule produced a bifurcated 
state in which racial membership determined citizenship status. With few exceptions, only 
Europeans were accorded full citizenship rights, while Africans were ruled as colonial subjects, 
according to ‘customary laws’ and other exceptional legal instruments.18 At independence, 
African governments removed the racial barriers to citizenship, but did not disassemble colonial 
constructions of ethnicity. Ethnicity continued to structure people’s relationship to the state, 
preventing the creation of “an undivided civic authority” or a “single and unified citizenship.”19 
To these two axes of political membership, Mamdani adds a third: that of indigeneity. 
The colonial state divided Africans into “native” and “foreign” ethnic groups according to 
                                                 
18 An exception to this bifurcation existed in colonial Senegal, where a small number of permanent residents of 
Senegal’s coastal cities were considered colonial citizens. M. Diouf, ‘Assimilation colonial et identité religieuses de 
la civilité des originaires des Quatre Communes (Sénégal)’, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 34 (1999), 565-
87. As Gregory Mann argues, not all laws that applied exclusively to African subjects were cloaked in the guise of 
custom. G. Mann, ‘”What was the indigénat? The “empire of law” in French West Africa’, Journal of African 
History, 50 (2009), 331-53.  
19 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 30. 
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arbitrary colonial timelines: “those who were present on native soil at the time of colonization” 
were considered indigenous, “while all others considered nonindigenous.”20 It is this third axis, 
he claims, that lies at the heart of autochthonous violence in the postcolonial state today. The 
colonial state, by fixing populations into political categories determined by dates of colonial 
conquest, lay the groundwork for postcolonial struggles over the meaning and distribution of 
citizenship.  
Importantly, Mamdani’s argument is an attempt to make sense of the Rwandan genocide 
without resorting to primordial explanations of ethnicity. However, he mistakes the political 
categories produced by the colonial and post-colonial state for social reality. The colonial state 
did not have the power to categorize populations in the way that he claims it did. Mamdani 
assumes that “[i]f the law recognizes you as member of an ethnicity…then you become an ethnic 
being legally and institutionally,” but it is precisely the work of recognition that he leaves 
unexplored.21 The ability of the state to recognize an individual as a legal entity depends first on 
its ability to locate, identify, and register that individual into a reliable database. Yet registration, 
or the systematic recording of vital events (births, deaths, marriages), is a difficult, expensive, 
and time-consuming process, one that few colonial states were willing or able to carry out. 
Furthermore, political anthropologists and historians of demography have shown registration to 
be a highly subjective process that is anything but automatic. Keith Breckenridge and Simon 
Szreter observe that even today, despite the seeming centrality of registration to the modern state 
project, “perhaps as many as half of the global population…live out their lives unrecorded by 
                                                 
20 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 30. 
21 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 22.  
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any state system of civil registration.”22 This glaring deficit, they argue, owes much to the legacy 
of the colonial state in Africa and South Asia, where European authorities, governing on the 
cheap, failed to invest in the administrative infrastructure that registration work requires.23 Civic 
registration in the Uganda Protectorate was comparatively better than it was in other African 
colonies, but higher registration rates did not translate into permanent civic identities. Shane 
Doyle has shown that Africans in Uganda regularly changed their names to reflect new and 
evolving forms of identification. His analysis of thousands of Catholic baptismal records reveals 
that immigrant parents, in particular, frequently sought to re-assign their children’s ethnic and 
national identities through flexible naming practices.24 A baby born to Rwandan parents, for 
example, might be given a Ganda name; other times, an immigrant parent might adopt a local 
clan name first before passing it on to their child (see also Paulo Kabano’s story, Chapter Two). 
The “mutability and multiplicity of names” in Uganda undermined the state’s limited 
administrative infrastructure and prevented government authorities from tracking an individual 
beyond an initial registration event.25   
If Uganda officials were unable to fix individuals to state categories of ethnicity, they 
were even less capable of determining indigeneity. The question was particularly complicated in 
border regions, where centuries of migration tied people to regional networks of trade, culture, 
                                                 
22 Keith Breckenridge and Simon Szreter (eds), Registration and Recognition: Documenting the Person in World 
History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1. 
23 Breckenride and Szreter, Registration, 2. 
24 On name conversions in post-slavery West Africa, see Gregory Mann, “What’s in an Alias: Family Names, 
Individual Histories, and Historical Method in the Western Sudan,” History of Africa, Vol. 29 (2005): 309-320; see 
also Mike McGovern, Unmasking the State: Making Guinea Modern (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2012). 
25 Shane Doyle, “Parish Baptism Registers, Vital Registration and Fixing Identities in Uganda,” in Registration and 
Recognition: Documenting the Person in World History, ed. Keith Breckenridge and Simon Szreter (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 278. 
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and social exchange. Kinyarwanda-speaking people, as noted earlier, were part of territorial 
Uganda from the very beginning. The precolonial Rwandan kingdom had, during the late 1800s, 
extended its imperial reach into what is today Bufumbira, in southwestern Uganda. Tutsi nobles 
and their followers, sent to govern these remote borders of the kingdom, took up permanent 
residence in Uganda following the demarcation of the border in 1911. The kingdom’s violent 
expansion, meanwhile, had also forced other Kinyarwanda-speakers to flee northwards. This 
latter group, frequently referred to as “Hutu” or “Kiga” in European sources but who often 
identified according to their clan, was fiercely independent and resented the political ambitions 
of the Rwandan (Tutsi) king. They found asylum in the Kigezi region of southern Uganda, or 
what is today Kabale District. There they settled alongside Bakiga, many of whom spoke the 
related language of Rukiga-Runyankole. Consequently, the line between “settler” and “native” 
was already blurred by the outbreak of WWI (Chapter One). 
Over the next half-century, the Uganda-Rwanda border remained open to cross-border 
migration and settlement, and the colonial administration never attempted to distinguish new 
arrivals from the general populace. The government initially tried to regulate the movement of 
livestock during the 1920s and ‘30s, but apart from this it made no concerted effort to check 
human mobility. In the mid- to late-1920s, a series of regional famines beset Ruanda-Urundi and 
encouraged an increase in migration to Uganda; after the famines, the Belgians introduced new 
forced labor quotas under the guise of preventing future famines.26 It was also at this time that 
the Belgians, in an attempt to coopt the Tutsi royal court, sought to institutionalize ethnic 
divisions between Hutu and Tutsi through the distribution of identity cards. With these cards 
                                                 
26 Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015); David Newbury, “The Rwakayihura famine of 1928-29: A nexus of colonial rule in Rwanda,” in 
Histoire sociale de l'Afrique de l'Est, 269-277 (Paris: Karthala, 1991). 
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came new requisitions: Those identified as “Hutu” were obliged to give additional days of 
unpaid manual labor to government projects, under a forced labor scheme known as ubureetwa. 
It was during this time that migration from Ruanda-Urundi began in earnest. 
Before proceeding, it is important to pause here and offer some clarifications on the 
history of ethnicity in Ruanda-Urundi. Mamdani locates the origins of Hutu/Tutsi animosity in 
the Belgian colonial state, but this reading ignores a much deeper history of social and political 
organization. The Belgians, it is true, helped cement long-standing divisions between Hutu and 
Tutsi when they recognized these identities as political categories. Colonial authorities further 
enhanced notions of racial difference through their elaboration of the Hamitic Thesis, which 
supported the idea that Tutsi constituted a superior alien “race” that had conquered the inferior 
Hutu centuries earlier. The Belgians, however, did not invent these categories or the power 
relations that underlay them. The ethnonyms “Tutsi” and “Hutu” had existed for centuries prior 
to the arrival of the Belgians.27 The Belgians revived and reinforced the practice of ubureetwa, 
but it, too, had existed before; King Rwabugiri (r. 1867-1896) had been the first to 
institutionalize it in the 1870s. The Belgians reinforced these divisions and lent tremendous 
political power to the Tutsi nobility, who were the benefactors of this forced labor system. They 
denied Hutu children opportunities for social advancement through education, ensuring that the 
socio-economic gap between Hutu and Tutsi would only grow wider over the course of the 
twentieth century. Even so, it would be erroneous to think that the Belgians invented the 
Hutu/Tutsi division, or that the precolonial period was one of social harmony and cohesion.28 It 
                                                 
27 Jan Vansina, Antecedents to modern Rwanda the Nyiginya Kingdom (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
2004). 
28 Catharine Newbury, The cohesion of oppression: clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1988); Claudine Vidal, “Le Rwanda des anthropologues ou le fétichisme de la vache,” 
Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines 9:3 (1969): 384-401. 
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would likewise be wrong to imagine that Hutu/Tutsi divisions were contiguous with the colonial 
territory of Rwanda. The heart of the Rwandan kingdom lay in Nduga, in what is now south-
central Rwanda. Its expansion northwards during the nineteenth century was met with 
tremendous opposition from northern “Hutu,” many of whom rejected the Hutu label as an 
epithet. Political labels, in other words, were historically contingent and open to contestation. 
And for many Rwandans, migrating to Uganda became a primary means of challenging abusive 
categories and the structural violence they referenced. 
If Mamdani overestimates the power of the state to organize populations, refugee studies 
scholars have made parallel moves in their analyses of the nation-state and the refugee category. 
In her classic ethnographic study of Burundian Hutu refugees in Tanzania, Liisa Malkki argues 
that refugees constitute a problem for the modern state because they subvert an assumed 
“national order of things.”29  They thus become the subjects of state and humanitarian 
interventions designed to return displaced people to their essentialized “homelands.” Malkki’s 
major contribution to refugee studies literature is to show how refugees both inhabit these 
imposed categories while simultaneously contesting them. Comparing the experiences of two 
different groups—refugees who resided in the government camp of Mishamo, and those who had 
self-settled in nearby Kigoma township—she found that only the former expressed a pronounced 
sense of Burundian identity. “Camp refugees,” as she called them, “were continually engaged in 
an impassioned construction and reconstruction of their history as ‘a people’,” while “town                                                                         
refugees” tried to assimilate into the life of Kigoma.30 Camp refugees insisted that they were the 
                                                 
29 Liisa Malkki, “Refugees and exile: from ‘refugee studies’ to the national order of things,” Annual Review of 
Anthropology 24 (1995b): 495-523. 
30 Liisa Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995): 3. 
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true natives (autochthones) and rightful inhabitants of Burundi, and that they had been expelled 
from their homeland by foreign Tutsi interlopers. Town refugees, meanwhile, inhabited 
“multiple, shifting identities…derived or ‘borrowed’ from the social context of the township.”  
Malkki’s research stresses the agency of displaced persons in the discursive production of 
“nationness,” yet her overall analysis remains focused on the power of categories, narratives, and 
“mythico-histories.”31 In so doing, her work often loses sight of the ways that individuals 
regularly moved between camp and town and across conceptual barriers. While acknowledging 
camp and town refugees were “routinely” in touch through “kin ties and trade networks,” she 
downplays the importance of these connections on the grounds that they “did not appear in the 
imagery that either locale wove of the other.”32 These practical linkages, however, point to the 
limitations of categorical orders—whether those orders are imposed by colonial states, 
humanitarian agents or refugees themselves. Mundane social histories can illuminate the tension 
between imagined purity and lived experience, and are therefore worth exploring. Importantly, a 
turn to social history subverts the patriarchal assumptions embedded in state categories by 
showing how displaced women and girls, for the sake of survival, reordered their relationships to 
people across space.33 If Malkki was concerned with the difference between “camp” and “town,” 
this dissertation focuses on the relationship between the two and the colonial histories of both.  
                                                 
31 For a more recent study on the relationship between refugees, international aid, and the formation of imagined 
national identities, see Jill Rosenthal, “From ‘Migrants’ to ‘Refugees’: Identity, Aid, and Decolonization in Ngara 
District, Tanzania,” Journal of African History 56, no. 2 (2015): 261-279.  
32 Malkki, Purity and Exile, 198, 199. 
33 Andrew Apter, “Matrilineal Motives: Kinship, Witchcraft, and Repatriation among Congolese Refugees,” Journal 
of the Royal Anthropological Institute 18, no. 1 (2012): 22-44; Mike McGovern, "Life during wartime: aspirational 
kinship and the management of insecurity," The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 18:4 (2012): 735-
752. 
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In summary, both Mamdani and Malkki fail to account for the ways that people move in 
and out of state categories over time, categories that are themselves historical and unstable. 
Allowing these categories to frame the terms of inquiry only results in their further reification.34 
Recent scholars, fortunately, have demonstrated alternative approaches to the history of the state, 
often by shifting the focus of analysis to the perspectives of those who find themselves at the 
margins of classificatory regimes.35 Dorothy Hodgson and Jan Bender Shetler, for example, have 
called attention to the androcentric assumptions embedded in much of the literature on ethnicity 
in Africa—assumptions that render women as “passive victims of an absence.”36 Viewing gender 
and ethnicity, not as natural categories but as questions to be explored, they seek to understand 
the ways in which both are mutually constituted over time.37 In a similar vein, Derek Peterson, 
following John Lonsdale, treats ethnicity as “a forum for argument, not an invented tradition to 
which people were obliged to conform.”38 Colonial East Africa, he shows, was awash in 
conservative ethnic movements in which patriarchal men, in the name of personal and collective 
honor, sought to canonize their collective histories, preserve their vernacular languages, and 
police the reproductive labors of “their” women. These “patriots” sought to stir a renewed sense 
of loyalty, pride, and devotion amongst their ethnic compatriots, but as Peterson shows, not 
                                                 
34 On “identity” as “category of analysis,” see Frederick Cooper with Rogers Brubaker, “Identity,” in Colonialism in 
Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005): 59-90. 
35 Aidan Stonehouse, “Peripheral Identities in an African State: A History of Ethnicity in the Kingdom of Buganda 
Since 1884” (PhD diss., University of Leeds, 2012), 15. 
36 Jan Bender Shetler, “Introduction: Women’s Alternative Practices of Ethnicity in Africa,” in Gendering Ethnicity 
in African Women’s Lives, eds. Jan Bender Shetler and Dorothy Hodgson (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
2015): 4. 
37 Shetler, “Introduction,” 5. 
38 Derek Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival: A History of Dissent, c. 1935-1972 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3. 
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everyone was prepared to comply. Cosmopolitan Christian revivalists, believing the end was 
near, rejected the inward-looking conservatism of their peers, and instead sought to reimagine 
themselves and their community as part of a global Christian witness. By paying attention to 
dissent, Peterson is able to rethink the boundaries and practices of ethnic belonging.  
Given the fraught, sometimes explosive history of identification and identity politics in 
central Africa, I turn to the work of Hodgson, Shetler, and Peterson, as well as the deep regional 
histories of Jan Vansina and David and Catharine Newbury as I attempt to make sense of how 
Rwandan women, men, and children moved across borders, navigated ethnicity, and established 
new homes in the flux of colonial state-formation. Contrary to Mamdani’s account, the Belgian 
colonial state in Ruanda-Urundi could not force people into Hutu/Tutsi and native/settler 
binaries, nor could the British organize African populations into groups of “ethnic natives” and 
“ethnic strangers.” Women migrants, already accustomed to a life of mobility given the 
expectations of patriarchal and patrilocal society, were the first to tell me about their strategies of 
social survival when famine, war, or male volition forced them from their natal homes. For them, 
displacement across borders—whether by marriage or violence (or, in the case of one woman, 
both—see Chapter Three)—did not amount to irretrievable identity loss. It was, instead, a 
rupture that forced the reconfiguration of her relationship to social space.39 I have included some 
of their stories in Chapters Three and Five.  
In a similar vein, centering the lives of migrants reveals that, even in times of heightened 
ethnic consciousness and dangerously brittle identity politics, people still did not experience 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in precisely the same way—as Mamdani’s administrative 
                                                 
39 I draw my understanding of social space from Doreen Massey, who conceptualizes social space “in terms of the 
articulation of social relations which necessarily have a spatial form in their interactions with one another.” Doreen 
Massey, Space, Place, and Gender (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994): 120. 
19 
 
categories would suggest. Chapter Two explores how Rwandan labor migrants struggled to 
relocate to Buganda Kingdom in central Uganda during the 1940s and ‘50s, a period of rising 
xenophobia against persons deemed “non-Ganda.” Their ability to access material and social 
resources often depended on how well they managed relationships with landlords, chiefs, and 
employers. While some scholars have concluded that Rwandan migrants resettled in Buganda 
with remarkable ease, thanks to the lack of central government oversight, my analysis calls 
attention to both the opportunities and vulnerabilities that migrants faced in the absence of state 
protections.  
While the colonial state was largely uninterested in registering “migrants,” it did try to 
identify “refugees” from 1960 onwards. Central Protectorate authorities were resolute that 
African refugees in Uganda be barred from pathways to citizenship, but their exclusionary aims 
depended on their ability to systematically determine the refugee status of individuals. Archival 
records from the 1960s in London and Uganda are replete with frustrated messages between 
central and local authorities and the Colonial Office over refugee identification and 
documentation. CARA provided no detailed criteria for evaluating individual asylum claims, 
since refugee status was assigned to select groups by ministerial decree. The central government 
would declare that a certain group qualified for asylum, and then local authorities would be 
expected to distribute permits to all individuals who could demonstrate membership to that 
group. Chapters Four and Five explore this bureaucratic work in detail, but for the moment it is 
useful to return to Yonah’s story as an example of how this process worked (or failed to work). 
Yonah’s father, Alonso, claimed to be a Munyarwanda of Ugandan origin when he first 
arrived in Kabale in 1959, on the grounds that he had been born in the Ugandan saza (county) of 
Bufumbira. Bufumbira, located on the border of Rwanda and Congo, had historically high 
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populations of Kinyarwanda-speaking residents who identified as “Banyarwanda” but 
understood their home to be Uganda. Alonso had left Uganda as a young man to take a job with 
the Ruanda Mission, where he and his wife made their home for many years; all of their children 
were born in Rwanda. The Revolution forced the family to evacuate in November 1959, at which 
point they returned to southern Uganda. Neither Alonso nor his wife had birth certificates to 
prove their Ugandan origins, however, and so relied on chiefs and clergy to vouch for their 
identity. Initially, the testament of an elderly chief and pastor had been sufficient evidence for 
local government officials, but within two years Alonso and his family appeared in the District 
Office’s refugee registries. Still, they remained in Kabale on land they had acquired through their 
Anglican church connections, and Alonso sent Yonah to school. After living as documented 
refugees in Kabale for two years, however, the central government in Entebbe decided that the 
Kahima family needed to be relocated to the new refugee settlement that the government had just 
installed in the neighboring district of Ankole. It is difficult to know how long the family 
remained in Oruchinga, as I only have records of the bus manifest that supposedly carried the 
family to Ankole, but I do know that their stay was temporary. The Kahimas eventually returned 
to Kabale and resumed their lives as subsistence farmers. Yonah today remains on the rented 
land that his late father left him, and he does not consider himself to be a refugee any longer. It 
was a temporary period of his life, not a permanent identity. 
Method 
This dissertation is the culmination of eighteen months of archival and oral history 
research that I conducted primarily in Uganda (June-August 2011, January-November 2013, July 
2015), the U.K. (July 2012, December 2015), and Geneva (February 2015). I originally proposed 
to study the history of the post-1959 Rwandan refugee diaspora in Uganda, building on earlier 
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case studies by Mahmood Mamdani, Ogenga Otunnu, and Liisa Malkki. I thought I would 
devote only one chapter to the colonial period, offering a brief history of the border and 
Rwandan labor migration. This chapter would provide the historical background for my primary 
chapters, which would focus on the experiences of displaced Rwandans who settled in Uganda 
between the 1959 Revolution and the 1990 RPF invasion. What I have produced, instead, is a 
history of Rwandan mobility and migration governance during the colonial period and the first 
years of independence. My focus is therefore not on the ‘59ers per se, but on the relationships 
between, and continuities of, migration, settlement practices, and state-formation in Uganda both 
before and after independence. 
Oral History 
I decided to focus my life history collection in two areas known to have historically high 
rates of Rwandan migration and settlement: Kabale District, in southwestern Uganda, and 
Mukono District, in eastern Buganda. I then identified twenty long-term residents from each 
District who could talk about the history of settlement in their community. I organized my 
questions around the work of building and maintaining a home: How did people come to settle in 
this place? How did one go about accessing land and work? How did people in this area build 
their houses, and how did occupants distribute chores? When it came time to marry, who did one 
marry? Had marriage practices changed over the years? What did it mean to be a good or 
honorable person? These questions allowed me to ask questions about the work of settling in a 
new place without ever asking my interlocutor about their origins or identity. Oftentimes, 
however, people would freely volunteer this information after several meetings with me. I have 
featured some of these life histories in the chapters that follow.  
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This approach to oral history, while time-consuming, facilitated my research in important 
ways.40 It allowed me to learn about migration and settlement without putting individuals in 
compromising positions, and this removed the pressure from our conversations and allowed us to 
build trust slowly, over the course of multiple interviews. Also significant, it opened up 
conversations with elderly women. As Jan Shetler has noted, conducting oral histories with 
women in East Africa can be difficult, because “history” is widely believed to be the purview of 
men.41 This is not because women do not know history, but because their knowledge of the past 
is often very different from men’s by virtue of their social and spatial positions.42 Women often 
tried to redirect me to men when I asked them to tell me the history of their village, but were 
quite pleased to talk about the differences between their childhood homes and current 
households. Because of this, I was able to interview roughly the same number of men and 
women in both locations.43  
Refocusing my research around earlier histories of migration allowed me to make better 
use of Uganda’s rich archival landscape, which provided some of my most illuminating sources. 
The Uganda National Archives, newly catalogued during my graduate years, shed light on the 
                                                 
40 Each interview consisted of an initial visit to discuss the topic and explain the interviewee’s rights, followed by 
one, two, and sometimes three return visits, each of which might last an hour to a half-day. Kabale and Mukono are 
large districts, and most of the people I interviewed lived in rural areas far from one another, which added to the 
amount of time I spent on interviews. 
41 Liisa Malkki was largely frustrated in her attempts to interview women: “...women seemed to be less accustomed, 
and to feel less of an entitlement, to assume authorship of narrative expression—perhaps particularly in the presence 
of an outsider like myself. Women were visibly frightened by my presence...and even when more familiar with me, 
they readily referred me to their husbands, fathers, brothers, or other men.” Malkki, Purity and Exile, 50. 
42 Jan Bender Shetler, “The gendered spaces of historical knowledge: women's knowledge and extraordinary women 
in the Serengeti District, Tanzania,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 36:2 (2003), 283-307. 
43 In addition to these forty life-histories, I also conducted thirty interviews with retired chiefs, camp commandants, 
lawyers, police officers, aid workers, and clergy who could tell me about their work with Rwandan migrants during 
the 1950s and early ‘60s. These interviews were particularly important for my research on refugee settlements, since 
most refugees and staff who reside in the settlements today are fairly recent (post-1994) arrivals. 
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central administration’s changing views on migration, particularly for the period between 1958 
and 1962, when the decolonizing administration was constructing camps and drafting legislation. 
These files, read in conjunction with the recently released FCO papers at the British National 
Archives (the infamous “Hanslope Park” files), reveal a government with no long-term 
objectives when it came to border management and African migration. For decades, colonial and 
postcolonial administrations addressed border crises as they arose. Scholars have called attention 
to the ad-hoc nature of postcolonial refugee governance, but it is important to realize that the 
Uganda state had a longer history of operating in crisis-mode when it came to border 
management. CARA was short-sighted and ill-conceived in part because its authors operated 
within institutional frameworks that encouraged adhocracy and quick fixes.   
For a detailed view of the border, however, I had to travel to the provincial districts of 
Kabale and Kabarole in southwestern Uganda. Here, local government archives document nearly 
a century of border management, providing unparalleled insights into the everyday work of the 
chiefs, clerks, and District officers who manned the upcountry provinces. These collections 
allowed me to examine how “the state”—embodied in low-level bureaucrats—interpreted 
Rwandan migrants and their connection to Uganda over time. They allowed me to identify and 
trace what Ann Stoler calls “social etymologies,” or “the career of words and the political 
practices that new categories mark or that new membership in old categories signals,” which in 
turn allow us to “index how social kinds were produced and what kinds of social relations were 
construed as plausible evidence of membership.”44 
                                                 
44 Ann Stoler, Along the archival grain: epistemic anxieties and colonial common sense. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009), 35. 
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The national and district archives were also the best resource for the history of refugee 
settlements. The government has, over the past sixty years, shifted responsibility for refugee 
affairs between numerous ministries, rendering archival research particularly challenging. 
During my fieldwork, I made repeated visits to the UNHCR and several government ministries 
in Kampala, hoping that someone might be able to tell me whether a separate repository existed 
for refugee issues, but these trips proved exhausting and circuitous.45  Visits to the settlements 
themselves, meanwhile, proved interesting but not particularly fruitful. During my visits to the 
settlements, which were admittedly brief, I was struck by the seeming amnesia of the place. 
Indeed, the regular flow of people, paper, policies, and funding through Uganda’s refugee regime 
works against memory, and the capacity to forget seemed to be built into the settlement’s 
administrative structures and material landscape. For starters, nearly all government and 
international staff are relative newcomers to the settlements. To prevent corruption, the 
government forbids the settlement’s head officer, the camp commandant, to serve for more than 
three years at any one settlement. This may have been helpful in preventing graft and the 
creation of personality cults, but it also meant that few officers I met could remember anything 
that happened before the early 2000s. The rapid cycle of government staff paralleled the cycle of 
non-government implementing partners, which provided financial and logistical assistance to the 
Uganda Government. Apart from the administrative offices located at the settlement’s “base 
camp,” most of the structures in Nakivale are made of temporary materials—mud brick, plastic 
tarps, and thatch. I was told by numerous administrators that refugees were “not allowed” to 
                                                 
45 More than one person suggested that the Ministry of Local Government, which formerly oversaw refugee matters, 
might have pertinent files, but I was never able to gain access during my visits. 
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build permanent houses, since they were not (in theory) supposed to remain in Uganda long-
term.   
This does not mean, of course, that a history of a place like Oruchinga or Nakivale is 
impossible, or that sources do not exist inside the settlement—they do—but a focused biography 
of the settlements would require time, access, and relationships that I simply did not have during 
my year of dedicated fieldwork. An ethnographic history of the settlements would be a real asset 
to the history of displacement in Africa, since Oruchinga and Nakivale are the oldest refugee 
settlements on the continent to still be in operation today. My fifth chapter offers a starting point 
for this history, and I hope that, in the future, either I or someone else has a chance to take up this 
challenge. At the time of my fieldwork, however, this was simply not possible.  
Biography as method 
Finally, I turn to biography as a method for illuminating the many different kinds of 
relational pathways that span Uganda and Rwanda. In the pages that follow, I offer biographical 
accounts of men and women not because I believe they are representative of common migrant 
experiences, but because they highlight, like dye through a vein, the diverse relationships and 
spatial connections that tie the region together. Biography, in short, helps me to illuminate the 
border-as-process. People move in and out of marginal spaces, making their marginal status 
contingent on historical context.  
Adopting biography as method was also a way for me to sift through the endless stacks of 
archival materials, what Jake Hodder calls the “disorienting, overwhelming, bewildering volume 
of presence.”46 Biography, writes Hodder, “acts as a connective device, allowing one to plot a 
path through abundant archives without compromising on conceptual or theoretical 
                                                 
46 Jake Hodder, “On absence and abundance: biography as method in archival research,” Area 49, no. 4 (2017), 453. 
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ambition…”47 Without claiming to be representative of common migrant experiences, then, the 
biographies included here illuminate different cross-border networks. The story of a disgraced 
Tutsi noble named Nyirimbirima, in Chapter One, for example, highlights the delicate political 
relations between Tutsi nobles who lived on either side of the Uganda-Rwanda border in the 
early twentieth century. Chapter Two, meanwhile, features the journey of fifteen-year-old boy 
who first left Rwanda in 1945 to seek his fortunes in Uganda; he eventually married a Ugandan 
woman, adopted a Ganda clan, and settled down in Buganda kingdom. Chapters Three and Five 
feature multiple biographies of women migrants, whose passage across geopolitical borders often 
required creative negotiations of male expectations and patriarchal norms. Women found 
pathways to permanent residency in Uganda via marriage, or through diffuse networks of female 
relatives who traveled to Uganda for marriage before them. 
Chapter Summaries 
My history of the Uganda-Rwanda border begins with early contests between Rwandan 
nobles, colonial veterinarians, and political rebels over the movement of cattle across the 
Uganda-Rwanda frontier during the first thirty years of the twentieth century. The power to 
distribute and confiscate cattle underwrote Rwandan political authority, and the networks of 
cattle and clients structured the kingdom’s political territory. The Rwandan mwami exercised 
authority across the space of his kingdom through the distribution of cattle to his nobles, who in 
turn used their wealth in livestock to accrue loyal clients. Conversely, Rwandan nobles who fell 
out of favor with the royal court, the colonial administration, or both, sought to leverage what 
remaining political power they had by relocating their herds beyond the effective reach of the 
kingdom. Notables who left with their cattle did not travel alone, but were followed by their 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 456-457. 
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clients, whose dependency was tied to their patron's cattle. In these struggles between king and 
client, the boundaries of the kingdom contracted and expanded over time.  
Chapter One, “Building a Border,” analyzes two key developments that confounded the 
play of Rwandan frontier politics during the early colonial period. The first was the proliferation 
of rebel movements in the uncertain decades following the death of King Rwabugiri (1895) and 
the violent succession dispute that ultimately brought his infant son to power. The most famous 
of these rebel movements—that of Muhumusa, a revered medium of the Nyabingi cult—sought 
to undermine the power of the Rwandan court, not only through violent intervention, but also by 
disrupting and redirecting the flow of cattle tributes. The second development was the colonial 
imposition of new veterinary measures designed to prevent the spread of rinderpest, a terrifying 
epizootic that had the potential to decimate cattle populations. These measures took the form of 
militarized border control between Uganda and Rwanda, disrupting the political maneuverings of 
both exiled nobles and rebel leaders who organized their followers through the distribution of 
cattle across space. The political saliency of the border initially emerged through this many-sided 
contest between people, cattle, and viruses.  
At the same time that Ugandan government officials were struggling to restrict the flow 
of cattle across their borders, they were also becoming aware of the country’s need for an extra-
territorial labor source. Their efforts to create a domestic labor market had largely failed by the 
end of WWI, due to the fact that African farmers could earn more money by growing cotton on 
their own land than they could working for government or commercial planters. Unable to craft a 
reliable workforce at home, either through coercion or incentives, the Uganda Protectorate 
became increasingly dependent on African labor from Belgian territory. Chapters Two and Three 
explore the rise of a new and unprecedented migrant circuit in central Africa, one that was 
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propelled by the dynamic tension between Protectorate labor needs, deteriorating conditions in 
Ruanda-Urundi, and the desires of Rwandan migrants to find (or forge) better alternatives in 
Uganda.  
Chapter Two, “Migrant Nation,” explores the settlement work of Rwandan migrants in 
Buganda Kingdom, Uganda’s economic and political heartland, during the 1940s and ‘50s. This 
was a time of heightened nativist anxieties amongst Ganda residents, who had watched their 
Kingdom’s population expand by nearly fifty percent in less than a generation.48 Chapter Two 
first considers the efforts of British officials, local government, and private interests to harness 
Rwandan labor power for their respective ends. It then turns to the everyday work of settling in 
Buganda, and the strategies that migrants employed to secure work, housing, spouses, and 
patrons. They were aided in their resettlement efforts by the changing sexual mores and social 
liberties of young Baganda men and women, who demonstrated an increasing willingness to 
partner and raise children with migrants. Yet, while numerous scholars have lauded the ability of 
Rwandans to assimilate into Ganda society despite mounting xenophobia, I argue that we must 
not go too far in celebrating the fluidity of migrant identities. Migrants made life work in Uganda 
because they felt they had to: life in Belgian Ruanda was getting worse, politically and 
materially, and migration offered one of the only escapes for most peasant families. 
Intermarriage, land, and clan adoption provided anchors of asylum in uncertain times, a point 
that can be lost in colonial narratives of “labor migration.” Rwandans were rejecting their natal 
homes long before the outbreak of revolutionary violence. 
                                                 
48 J.M. Fortt, “Distribution of the Immigrant and Ganda Population,” in Economic Development and Tribal Change: 
A Study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda, ed. Audrey Richards (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons Ltd., 1954), 77, 
116. 
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A fascinating if widely ignored characteristic of this new migrant circuit was the high 
number of women and girls who made the journey. While a sizeable literature exists on the 
history of male Banyarwanda labor migrants (Ellis 1938, Uganda 1942, Ross and Sofer 1950, 
Richards 1952, Powesland 1957, Mamdani 2001, Mushemeza 2007), this work has virtually 
ignored the experiences and contributions of migrant women, despite the fact that women and 
girls accounted for nearly half of the diaspora population. Chapter Three, “Women’s Work,” 
traces the journeys of three migrant women who made their way from Ruanda-Urundi to Uganda 
between 1928 and 1945. During this period, cyclical famine and repressive colonial policies in 
Belgian Ruanda-Urundi forced hundreds of thousands of people to seek food, asylum, and cash 
wages in the more prosperous British Protectorate to the north. By centering women’s stories and 
perspectives, this chapter serves as an important corrective to androcentric histories of ethnicity 
and migration in East and Central Africa. It challenges the assumption, proffered by colonial 
sources and contemporary scholars alike, that women were simply the objects of men’s ethnicity 
projects. Instead, I argue that women migrants were active participants in the work of imagining 
Banyarwanda identities in diaspora. Given their comparatively weaker social position, their 
approach to ethnicity was generally more flexible than that of their male counterparts—a 
flexibility that is too often read as passive resignation, rather than creative adaptation. 
By the late Protectorate period, Uganda was home to hundreds of thousands of African 
settlers from east and central Africa, many of whom had left their homelands under duress. 
Migration to Uganda continued throughout the independence period, spurred in part by 
anticolonial violence and civil war in Ruanda, Congo, and the Sudan. Many scholars and 
policymakers have framed this as a new moment in Uganda’s demographic and political history, 
in which forced migrants ceased to be a desirable resource and instead become a humanitarian 
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burden. This dissertation takes a different view: Uganda was already, by the late 1950s, an 
important host state for the region’s displaced. What changed at independence was not the 
numbers of people crossing the borders, but the state’s valuation of migrants’ productive 
capacity and assimilability. In 1960, the late Protectorate government introduced one of the first 
pieces of refugee legislation in Africa: The Control of Alien Refugees Act. The new law 
represented the government’s first concerted effort to filter human migration into Uganda and 
identify migrants on an individual or family basis. Successful implementation, however, proved 
elusive, because the Protectorate lacked the bureaucratic infrastructure to enforce registration. 
Chiefs and District administrations, acting with minimal guidance and material support from 
central authorities, bore the overwhelming responsibility for identifying, documenting, and 
assisting a new category of cross-border migrant: the “refugee.” This new category, critically, 
did not reflect an essentialized identity or experience, but instead signaled the state’s changing 
view of mobility and borders. 
Chapters Four and Five examine the process and consequences of applying this new label 
to individuals, families, and populations during the 1960s. The postcolonial refugee was not a 
fixed identity, but a category that had to be produced over time. Chapter Four, “The Making of a 
Refugee Family,” investigates this refugeeing process by tracing the histories of two Tutsi 
families who fled to Uganda during the 1959 Rwandan Revolution. The Kahima and Sabune 
families had straddled the Uganda-Rwanda border for generations, employing migration as a 
strategy to navigate the region’s shifting political, ecological, and spiritual landscape. The 
Revolution in Rwanda and new refugee laws in Uganda disrupted how these families could relate 
to the border, but only one family—the Kahima family—became saddled with the refugee label. 
This chapter demonstrates the ways in which class and gender guided colonial officials’ 
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application of the refugee label.  My interest here is the selective mutability of the border and the 
economic and gendered implications of Uganda’s nascent refugee regime.  
Finally, Chapter Five, “Biography of a Camp,” traces the conceptual, physical, and social 
evolution of Oruchinga Refugee Settlement in southern Uganda, the first African refugee camp 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Established in 1961 under the auspices of an exiting British Protectorate 
administration, Oruchinga was originally intended to provide humanitarian aid to persons 
displaced by the Rwandan Revolution and to ensure that refugees were neither harmed by, nor 
participants in, cross-border violence with their home state. Framing African displacement as a 
“problem” to be “solved,” national and international agents devised the camp as a suitable—and 
presumably temporary—solution. Yet the decision to build Oruchinga was neither easy nor 
obvious, for any of the parties involved. Questioning the naturalization of camps as a solution to 
refugee ‘problems,’ this chapter asks: Why did the Ugandan government, the British Colonial 
Office, and the United Nations decide to construct refugee settlements in response to Rwandan 
displacement? What determined the settlements’ physical location, material composition, and 
social membership? Why, and in what ways, did refugees participate in the construction process? 
In Refugee Studies, camps are heavily theorized, yet rarely historicized. This is a problem, 
because all camps are the products of particular power relations with specific histories. Locating 
the camp in time and space—an approach I term “camp biography”—is crucial to our 
understanding of what it means to be a refugee in a given place, because it illuminates how the 
boundaries of inclusion within the settlement change over time. This chapter traces the first 
decade of Oruchinga’s existence (1961-71), and is divided into three parts. In part one, I 
highlight three principal histories that informed the Ugandan state’s approach to refugee 
settlement: the history of Polish refugee settlements in Uganda; the Bakiga Resettlement project; 
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and Europe’s own post-war refugee crisis. Weaving these strands together, I show how different 
actors brought competing expectations to the table concerning what the settlement was and what 
purpose it should serve. Was it a development project? A humanitarian intervention? A carceral 
device? A place for political organizing, a welcomed refuge, or a place to be avoided? Part two 
turns to the actual work of constructing the physical site, and here I foreground the experiences 
and contributions of refugees themselves, who played a central role in the creation of Oruchinga. 
Finally, in part three, I highlight the “usefulness” of the settlement, demonstrating how different 
people—government officials, aid workers, local residents, and refugees—sought to utilize 
Oruchinga for their own ends.49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 On the usefulness of camps, see Bram J. Jansen, “‘Digging Aid,’: The Camp as an Option in East and the Horn of 
Africa,” Journal of Refugee Studies 29, no. 2 (2016): 149-165. 
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Chapter 1: Building a Border: Prophets, Pathogens, and Run-Aways in Southwest Uganda 
 
 
In March 1920, the Chief Veterinary Surgeon for Belgian Ruanda-Urundi confirmed that cattle 
from southern Uganda had introduced Rinderpest, the dreaded “cattle plague,” to herds in 
northern Rwanda.1 The animals shared a common watering hole on the banks of the Kakitumba 
river, which runs along the Uganda-Rwanda frontier. It was through this daily contact that herds 
belonging to two Bahima pastoralists came into contact with healthy cattle on the Rwandan side 
of the border. Within six days, nearly three thousand cattle had been exposed to the virus, with 
many showing signs of infection: excessive salivation and mucus production, elevated 
temperatures, acute gastrointestinal distress, and severe dehydration. By early April, the outbreak 
had engulfed the Belgian veterinarian research station in Mutara, eastern Rwanda, and from there 
continued its southward course towards Kigali.2 The outbreak was so severe that the mwami 
(king), whose sacred obligation it was to protect the kingdom’s herds, took the extraordinary step 
of allowing Belgian veterinarians to initiate a mandatory inoculation campaign. Despite these 
interventions, the virus killed on average sixty percent of all Rwandan cattle it infected.3 
The introduction of Rinderpest to Belgian territory had significant ramifications for 
Uganda, as well. For nearly a decade, the British administration in Uganda had worked diligently 
                                                 
1 KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B. "Veterinary," 1919-1920. 
2 M. Carlier, “La Lutte contre la Peste bovine au Ruanda,” Bulletin Agricole du Congo Belge 11:3 (1920), 191-93. 
3 Alison des Forges and David S. Newbury, Defeat Is the Only Bad News: Rwanda under Musinga, 1896 -1931 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011 [1972]), 171-72. 
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to contain the epizootic, employing quarantines, permit systems, mandatory inoculation 
programs, and stiff penalties for non-compliance, but to no avail. Between 1912 and 1920, the 
Protectorate lost an estimated 320,000 cattle across Buganda Kingdom and Western Province, 
out of a total of 541,000 animals.4 The spread of the virus into Rwanda magnified the crisis, not 
only in terms of numbers, but also in terms of governance. Now two colonial governments—one 
British, one Belgian—were responsible for managing it, with two different veterinary 
departments, in two different imperial languages, across two different territories united by one 
common border. Even if Protectorate authorities succeeded in eradicating the disease from their 
territory, their Belgian colleagues (with their assumed inferior veterinary skills) might not, and 
the cycle of infection would continue. To guard against the possibility of future cross-border 
contamination, Uganda officials devised a host of new technologies to help them manage their 
170-kilometer frontier with Rwanda. Between 1920 and 1931, they introduced veterinary 
ordinances, cattle brands, permit systems, quarantine camps, armed border patrols, frontier 
tribunals, and extradition agreements, all of which aimed at wresting control over the movement 
of livestock and the diseases they carried.  
The movement of cattle, however, could not be disentangled from the movements and 
motivations of their human caretakers. Livestock were central to the colonial vision of economic 
development, leading Protectorate agents to value animals only in terms of their monetary worth. 
Yet cattle represented something far more important than money in the eyes of most borderland 
residents: they were a medium of social and political exchange. In Rwanda especially, the 
                                                 
4 These figures are based on Blue Book estimates quoted in the Veterinary Report for 1921. They are not adjusted 
for losses and gains arising from immigration and natural population growth, nor do they differentiate on the basis of 
cause of death. However, they do point to significant losses across much of the Protectorate for this period, and 
corroborate eyewitness accounts. 
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transfer of cattle was central to patron-client relationships and marriages. It was also central to 
state-society relations. The Rwandan Mwami (King), who was said to own all of the cattle in his 
kingdom, loaned cattle to his chiefs and notables as a way of securing loyalty—particularly from 
those in the distant provinces. Disrupting the flow of cattle across borders therefore constituted a 
disruption of people’s social and political lives.  
Colonial responses to the 1919-20 Rinderpest epizootic signaled a watershed in the 
history of border management between Uganda and Rwanda. Before state administrators sought 
to regulate the movement of people across borders, they created laws, infrastructure, and 
practices to control the passage of livestock. Anti-Rinderpest measures obliged the colonial state 
to strive for a level of territorial control that had hitherto been unimaginable, but this does not 
mean that the results were linear. This chapter weaves together a multi-species history of disease 
and mobility to craft a “border biography” of the Uganda-Rwanda frontier, a historical study 
exploring “how specific boundaries materialize, rematerialize, and dematerialize in different 
ways, in different contexts, at different scales and at different times.”5  
This chapter is divided into five parts. Part one provides a brief overview of the history of 
cattle-keeping and its relevance to conceptions of political space and identity in the Great Lakes 
region. Part two turns to the construction of colonial borders during the first decade of the 
twentieth century, emphasizing the continued importance of political allegiances over and above 
careful observance of political territory. A narrative of the 1919-20 Rinderpest outbreak in 
southern Uganda and northern Rwanda forms the basis of part three, in which I demonstrate how 
the introduction of new laws, practices, and infrastructure—all introduced in the interest of 
                                                 
5 Nick Megoran, “‘B/ordering’ and Biopolitics in Central Asia,” in A Companion to Border Studies, edited by 
Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan, (Wiley Blackwell, 2016), 492. 
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controlling a deadly epizootic outbreak—had significant consequences for human mobility at the 
border. The (veterinary) medicalization of the border was inherently political, because it 
disrupted how borderland residents conducted and conceived of their political lives. Part four 
examines the afterlives of the 1919-20 epizootic and how its spread into Rwanda served as a 
catalyst for a new and unprecedented focus on border control. Part five, finally, documents the 
ways that the evolving cattle migration controls worked to prevent patrons and peasants alike 
from crossing the border.  
Part I: Cattle, Territory, Identity  
A history of colonial borders in interlacustrine Africa must begin with a discussion about cattle, 
for cattle have long played a critical role in defining the contours and relational content of social 
and political space. Archaeological evidence dates the domestication of cattle in the region to the 
third century CE, with some findings suggesting the presence of cattle as early as the first 
millennium BCE.6 Changing climate and falling water tables, phenomena likely spurred by 
widespread forest-clearing that accompanied the rise in iron-smelting, transformed the tropical 
woodland into drier savannah, creating conditions that favored the expansion of pastoral 
society.7 The proliferation of terms describing the shape and size of cattle horns and the color of 
their hides points to the growing political and social currency of cattle from 500 CE onwards, 
despite the continued primacy of grain crops to basic survival.8  
                                                 
6 Jean-Pierre Chrétien, The great lakes of Africa: two thousand years of history (New York: Zone Books, 2003), 68-
77. 
7 David S. Newbury, The land beyond the mists essays on identity and authority in precolonial Congo and Rwanda 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009), 295.  
8 David Lee Schoenbrun, A green place, a good place: agrarian change, gender, and social identity in the Great 
Lakes region to the 15th century (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1998), 74. 
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Cattle played a critical role in the emergence of central African kingdoms in the 
seventeenth century, most notably Rwanda. While the region’s impressive population growth 
from the fifteenth century onwards must be attributed to the development of banana cultivation, 
cattle took on social and political significance in ways that agricultural produce did not. The first 
Rwandan monarch, Ruganzu Ndori, was likely a Muhima cattle-keeper from Nkore (present-day 
Ankole, Uganda) who migrated south with his herds to what is now central Rwanda, sometime 
around the middle of the seventeenth century. There, he managed to gain authority over other 
powerful herders by using his superior wealth in cattle to turn his would-be competitors into 
clients.9 Following Ndori’s death, his descendants pursued a course of consolidation and 
expansion, using cattle as a means of incorporating potential rivals into the fold.  
As the kingdom expanded, the court sought to exercise control over distant provinces 
through the development of permanent armies and the manipulation of its intricate patronage 
networks. Armies were particularly useful for managing the noble ranks, not only because they 
held the monopoly over violence, but also because their work as professional cattle raiders 
ensured a regular supply of new herds that the mwami could then use to reward his favorites. 
Nobles wanted cattle, in turn, because with cattle they could acquire their own clients; the more 
cattle they controlled, the greater their power base. The creation of permanent armies and the 
multiplication of dependent nobility allowed the royal court to begin seizing the herds of 
individual lords during the early-mid eighteenth century, making them ever more dependent on 
                                                 
9 Jan Vansina, Antecedents to modern Rwanda the Nyiginya Kingdom (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
2004), 47. 
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the king for their wealth.10 By the end of the eighteenth century, the court commanded all of the 
major herds in the kingdom.  
By the opening of the nineteenth century, the steady growth in human and cattle 
populations was beginning to limit the availability of arable land. Without land, nobles could not 
sustain their herds; without land, the majority of the kingdom’s subjects could not feed 
themselves. The court, however, took this burgeoning crisis as an opportunity to centralize 
control. In a move designed to protect his chief political resource—cattle—the mwami Rwogera 
(c. 1845-67) ordered the creation of royal pasture reserves, which he then placed under the 
control of a favorite client. The hiving-off of precious land for royal use accelerated under the 
reign of Rwogera’s son, Rwabugiri (c. 1867-95), who intensified the practice in the central 
region and extended it outwards into the kingdom’s periphery. The development of royal 
pastures exacerbated the land shortage at the same time that it displaced former provincial 
authorities, replacing them with clients who were responsible to no one but the mwami. The 
centralization of command further heightened competition among the noble families, who 
jockeyed to secure coveted positions for their sons. In the process, many found themselves on the 
losing end of the struggle.   
Intense political competition quickened painful processes of social stratification in the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century.11 It was at this time that the terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi”—
ethnonyms that had been in circulation for centuries—took on new socio-political meaning. Now 
that a personal connection to the court was of paramount importance in determining access to 
cattle and land, “Tutsi”—a term long associated with pastoralism—became the label for wealthy, 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 68. 
11 Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda, 134-36. 
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cattle-owning lineages, while “Hutu” came to mean, among other things, a lack of influential 
connections.12  
Yet in recognizing the social and political significance of the structural changes 
introduced under Rwabugiri, one must be careful to view these developments as on-going, 
historical trends, not fait accompli. This was the mistake of colonial administrators and certain 
academics who, in an effort to explain (or justify) how a Tutsi minority maintained such 
extensive command over people, land, and cattle, adopted a functionalist view of Rwandan 
society. This position originated in the works of Jacques Maquet, who hypothesized that the 
kingdom’s “coherence” stemmed from the symbiotic relationship between cattle-owning patrons 
and cattle-leasing clients, and that this give-and-take allowed for an integrated if grossly unequal 
society.13 Maquet’s “Premise of Inequality,” while popular among colonial officials, Tutsi 
monarchists and certain western academics, soon came under criticism from other scholars who 
pointed to the pervasiveness of violence that made such coercive relationships possible.14 
Historians have further endeavored to situate these relationships in time, demonstrating, in 
contrast to Maquet’s timeless functionalism, the significant variations in Rwandan political space 
and time. The Mwami’s command over territory and people was dependent on his ability and the 
ability of his chiefs to assert the court’s authority over disparate provinces of unwilling clients, 
often through violent means.  
                                                 
12 Catharine Newbury, The cohesion of oppression: clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1988), 11. 
13 Jacques Maquet, The premise of inequality in Ruanda: a study of political relations in a central African kingdom 
(London: Published for the International African Institute by the Oxford University Press, 1961). 
14 See for example Marcel d' Hertefelt, Les clans du Rwanda ancien. Éléments d'ethnosociologie et d'ethnohistoire 
(Tervuren: Musée royal de l'Afrique central, 1971). 
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It is also important to clarify that in highlighting the political significance of cattle and 
their relationship to political space, I am not suggesting that cattle clientage was universally 
important to all Rwandan subjects. As other scholars have shown, only a minority of Rwandans 
participated in cattle clientship (ubuhake) during the late 1800s through to 1954, the year the 
institution was formally abolished.15 Instead, my purpose in sketching the political history of 
cattle in Rwanda is to lay the groundwork for an investigation of changing border regimes in the 
twentieth century. When colonial veterinarians began to impose barriers against the movement of 
animals across the Uganda-Rwanda frontier, they did so in the interest of preventing the spread 
of disease and protecting what they considered to be a valuable economic asset. But their work 
was inherently political, whether they realized it or not, because the ability to control the 
distribution of cattle across space was central to how politics was done in Rwanda.  
The movement of cattle was also important for a host of other reasons that had little to do 
with ubuhake clientage. In this chapter, I follow Danielle de Lame in conceptualizing cattle as 
“ambiguous capital,” the value of which varies across time, space, and circumstance. Indeed, it is 
the slipperiness of the sign that make cattle such excellent things (beasts) to think with. Cattle 
may be bought, leased, given, received, swapped or stolen. A cow might embody the alliance of 
two families through marriage, or it might be sold at market price. A bull could be slaughtered in 
service of the sacred, or it could be castrated and raised for meat as part of a government-run 
development scheme. A herd still communicates one’s attainment of the ‘good life,’ while the 
careful distribution of animals among friends and relatives is thought a prudent way to hide 
                                                 
15 Claudine Vidal, “Le Rwanda des anthropologues ou le fétichisme de la vache,” Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines 9:3 
(1969): 384-401; Francois Saucier, “The Patron-Client Relationship in Traditional and Contemporary Southern 
Rwanda” (PhD Diss., Columbia University, 1974). 
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accumulation.16 Adding to these examples, this chapter also shows that cattle could signify 
biological danger, which might in turn be attributed to the animal’s “foreignness” or history of 
“illicit” mobility. Cattle, in other words, came to embody the ambiguity of the bordering process. 
Cattle and twentieth century borders 
The colonial imposition of the Uganda-Rwanda border in 1911 did not initially do much to 
disrupt the ebb and flow of Rwandan political territory, but that is not the same as saying that the 
border was inconsequential. The arrival of new political actors (e.g., the British and Germans, 
and after 1916, the Belgians) introduced new possibilities for strategic alliance-building.  
Take, for example, the story of Nyindo, a Tutsi noble who oversaw the northern province 
of Bufumbira. Bufumbira, the land beyond the Mfumbiro volcanic chain, had long been an 
independent territory just beyond the northern marches of the Rwandan kingdom. Rwabugiri 
finally conquered it sometime during the 1880s, after which he built a royal compound there and 
left it in charge of one his wives, Kumukera, and a favorite client. Nyindo was Kumukera’s and 
Rwabugiri’s son, and when he had grown his father installed him as the provincial chief of 
Bufumbira. From 1890 to 1911, Nyindo ruled the province at the pleasure of the Mwami, sending 
regular tribute to the court in exchange for his continued access to royal herds.  
When the British annexed Bufumbira as their own, they kept the preexisting political 
structures in place. Nyindo retained his position—now retitled Saza [County] Chief—but with 
the provision that he would accept the oversight of an agent selected by the British to tutor 
Nyindo in the ways of government.17 Nyindo agreed to this arrangement, likely because he saw 
                                                 
16 Danielle de Lame and Helen Arnold, A Hill Among a Thousand: Transformations and Ruptures in Rural Rwanda 
(Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 370. 
17 For the first twenty (and in some places, like Bufumbira, thirty) years of Protectorate rule, the British employed 
Ganda agents—trusted African conscripts from the Buganda kingdom in central Uganda—to help them establish a 
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it as the best possible option in a time of political uncertainty. Yet he continued to collect and 
send tribute to the Rwandan court, despite his new status as a British subject. The British, 
furthermore, were fully aware of his continued relationship with the Mwami, but their presence 
on the ground was weak, and they knew that the success or failure of their political project 
depended on the cooperation of local authorities. They were therefore willing to turn a blind eye 
to the steady movement of cattle, agricultural prestations, and laborers across their border with 
what was now German Ruanda, requesting only that Nyindo agree to share administrative power 
with one of their agents, and that he swear his ultimate allegiance to the British Crown, never 
allowing his loyalties to the Mwami trump his commitments to the Protectorate.18  
Nyindo’s reluctant cooperation with the new European interlopers, of course, was 
instrumental only, something to be discarded when a better opportunity arose. This opportunity 
came in the form of World War I. Mwami Musinga—Rwabugiri’s heir and Nyindo’s half-
brother—sent word to Nyindo instructing him to ally with the Germans, who promised to return 
Bufumbira to the kingdom if they won.19 The Germans, however, were quickly routed in 
Rwanda following a joint invasion of British and Belgian forces in 1916. Bufumbira was 
permanently lost to Rwanda, and Nyindo’s rebellion ended in failure. He surrendered himself to 
the British in 1916, who deported him and his family to the neighboring District of Ankole, just 
east of Kigezi.   
                                                 
colonial administration. See A.D. Roberts, “The Sub-Imperialism of the Baganda,” Journal of African History 3:3 
(1962): 435-50. 
18 Elizabeth Hopkins, “The Nyabingi Cult of Southwestern Uganda,” in Protest and Power in Black Africa, edited 
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Nyindo’s dismissal and exile were consequences of the new border, but the fact that he 
was allowed to maintain connections with the Mwami for as long as he did highlights the border-
as-process, over and above the border as political artifact or physical line. Moreover, his 
continued commitment to the Rwandan court, expressed through the ongoing traffic in cattle, 
people, and goods, demonstrated the extra-territorial reach of the Mwami, whose domain did not 
map neatly onto contiguous political space. Nyindo’s Bufumbiro chieftaincy had, like many 
other northern provinces, been created during the expansionist wars of his father, Rwabugiri. 
When the king died unexpectedly in 1895, the royal court descended into a violent succession 
struggle, and in the chaos that followed many of the northern clans had opportunity to reassert 
their independence. Rwabugiri’s son and successor, Musinga, was only an infant when the king 
died, and when he came of age in the 1910s, he found that he had lost most of the territories that 
his father had seized.20 Yet the contraction of the kingdom was not linear: Pockets of loyal 
clients remained behind the receding frontier, satellites that continued to send tribute despite 
being territorially remote. Bufumbiro was one such satellite, and would continue to be long after 
the establishment of colonial borders. Nyindo’s deposition was neither a consequence of his 
repeated border transgressions nor his continued relationship with the Rwandan court. Rather, 
the British removed him from power when his political commitments to the Mwami drove him to 
take the extraordinary act of siding with the Germans. The “border,” then, was about political 
alliances, not territorial sovereignty per se, and Nyindo’s case showed that even this boundary 
could accommodate considerable ambiguity.  
                                                 
20 The fact that Nyindo was Musinga’s half-brother meant relatively little when it came to the question of loyalty. 
Given the scarcity of land and political resources, family life in the growing noble class could be acrimonious, even 
violent. Relationships between brothers, half-brothers, and male cousins (i.e., between young men who were 
competing for a share of their father’s inheritance) could be especially fraught, and instances of fratricide were not 
uncommon. 
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While Nyindo was collecting cattle tributes in Uganda to send to the Rwandan court, his 
teenage nephew, Nyirimbirima, was preparing for life as a Tutsi noble. The son of a wealthy land 
chief, Nshozamihigo, with direct family ties to Mwami Musinga,21 Nyirimbirima was positioned 
to inherit extensive territory in the northern province of Mulera. But something happened 
between 1914 and 1917 that soured his relationship with the court. It began with the whisperings 
of the king’s most trusted advisor, Bandora, who warned the embattled monarch that 
Nyirimbirima was going to make a bid for the throne. Bandora’s motivations were obvious—he 
was also from Mulera, and he was envious of Nyirimbirima’s inheritance—but Musinga was 
clearly prepared to listen. Perhaps it was the fact that Nyirimbirima’s father had grown too 
powerful for comfort. Or maybe the king was suspicious of the young man’s dealings with the 
meddlesome Catholic missionaries, who had a station in Mulera and who were drawing so many 
young nobles away from the court. Then again, the Mwami might just have been paranoid, for 
these were anxious times: His bid to help the Germans had failed, he was under the surveillance 
of a new European power, many of the northern provinces were in open rebellion, and the 
Christian missions were becoming powerful patrons in their own right.22 
Whatever the reason, Musinga turned on Nyirimbirima shortly after Nshozamihigo’s 
death. In August 1917, the Mwami ordered the young noble to appear before the court, where he 
was placed in confinement for four months and subjected to repeated floggings and abuse.23 
                                                 
21 Nshozamihigo, Nyindo, and Musinga were all half-brothers, sons of the late Rwabugiri. Nyirimbirima was 
Rwabugiri’s grandson. 
22 The 1910s had been a tumultuous decade for Musinga, marked by a series of rebellions across his kingdom’s 
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heirs to the Rwandan throne. Nyirimbirima, then, as a grandson of the infamous Rwabugiri (Musinga’s father) and 
the son of the powerful notable, Nshozamihigo, (Musinga’s half-brother), might feasibly position himself as a 
contender to the throne. 
23 Des Forges 1972 [2011], Defeat is the Only Bad News, 148-50. 
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Nyirimbirima was finally released in November, but this was only the beginning of his 
punishment: He was to be sent back to Mulera, where news of his humiliating ordeal was already 
well known. Musinga had feared that Nyirimbirima might instigate a rebellion in Mulera, but the 
truth was that the people of Mulera hated the son as much as they had hated the father. Mulera 
was only incorporated into Rwanda during Rwabugiri’s reign, and the local residents resented 
the Tutsi nobles who collected tribute on behalf of the court. Nyirimbirima consequently would 
have had no chance of leading a popular revolt, even before his imprisonment. Now that 
everyone knew he had fallen out of favor with the court, he was an open target. He therefore 
made a logical decision upon reaching Mulera: he organized his household and closest followers, 
selected several hundred of his favorite cattle, and set out from his natal home in the direction of 
Bufumbira. 
Nyirimbirima’s decision to bring his cattle might be interpreted as an attempt to 
safeguard his inheritance and personal wealth, but it was much more than this. His cattle tied him 
into a complex web of patron-client relationships, making any major movement inherently 
political. He had likely acquired many cattle from his father as well as the Mwami, making him a 
client of the court. In Mulera, he had used these cattle and their offspring to gain his own 
following. In selecting his favorite cattle to bring with him to Bufumbira, he was simultaneously 
choosing which clients should follow him into exile. He was not simply protecting his material 
wealth: he was fashioning a political constituency.  
The British administration in Bufumbira, however, failed to recognize the political import 
of Nyirimbirima’s herds or the complex obligations they represented. Instead, the colonial 
government welcomed the young lord with open arms, believing they could use him, a 
Kinyarwanda-speaking Tutsi noble from Mulera, to govern the difficult borderland residents of 
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Bufumbira, whom the British regarded as “Banyaruanda,” or Hutu. Indeed, Nyirimbirima’s Tutsi 
identity was, in the eyes of the British, central to his legitimacy. Heavily informed by scientific 
racism, colonial administrators, most notably the DC Kigezi, believed Tutsi constituted a 
superior race that had conquered the Hutu cultivators of Rwanda centuries before. Therefore, the 
logic went, if a predominantly Hutu constituency was to be part of the British Protectorate, then 
it must be governed by a Tutsi chief, their presumed natural leader. Nyindo’s act of treason had 
turned the British against the local Tutsi population, but Nyirimbirima came from outside and 
could thus be seen as separate from local intrigues and cliques. In his annual report for 1921, the 
DC Kigezi even described him as an “indigenous chief,” despite the fact that he was neither born 
in Uganda nor “from” Bufumbiro in any sense of the word.24 His indigeneity was defined by his 
presumed racial identity—an identity symbolized in his wealth in cattle—at the same time that 
his trustworthiness depended on his separateness from Bufumbiro Tutsi politics. While it was 
true that Nyindo had betrayed them, the British believed the nephew would prove faithful: He 
was, after all, a refugee of the court. 
The stories of Nyindo and Nyirimbirima illustrate the kinds of social and political 
networks that animated the Uganda-Rwanda frontier during the first two decades of the twentieth 
century. This section has further emphasized the significance of mobile cattle to changing 
constellations of patrons and clients at the border. Appreciating the political possibilities of this 
earlier moment is crucial for understanding how Rinderpest (and, more importantly, anti-
Rinderpest campaigns) impacted the transborder mobility of both people and cattle. Here, it is 
important to state that my argument is not that the border went from being more permeable to 
less permeable, or less real to more real, but rather that changes to veterinary laws and 
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infrastructure, combined with colonial conceptions of a particular animal disease, had lasting 
consequences for how and where the border materialized.  
Part II: Creating a Colonial Veterinary Service 
For the first decade of the twentieth century, the Protectorate government operated without a 
resident veterinarian. Sick and injured animals used for government transport would be sent to 
the veterinary service in Kenya,25 where a white settler population ensured the presence of 
adequate care for their imported herds.26 Costly and inconvenient—the journey took three days 
by rail and lake steamer, meaning that most injured animals did not survive the crossing, while 
many contagious animals were simply not sent—this was the system for the first decade of 
British rule. 
The driving impetus behind the formation of a Protectorate veterinary department arose 
not from an internal demand for better services but from growing international investment in the 
treatment and prevention of epizootics, particularly Rinderpest. While European governments 
had largely managed to control the spread of Rinderpest within Europe by the turn of the 
century, they still did not have a safe vaccination. Moreover, the expansion of the global 
livestock trade and of European empires had opened up new potential circuits for the spread of 
disease, and few colonial governments had the veterinary infrastructure thought necessary to 
combat a serious epizootic episode. Finally, changing professional standards in the fields of 
human and veterinary medicine had given rise to a new class of certified physicians, who, in the 
                                                 
25 Unlike Kenya, which had been established as a settler colony, Uganda was a protectorate, and was not intended 
for white settlement. Kenya’s white settler community had ensured the availability of adequate veterinary services, 
at least in the highlands. See Waller 2004.  
26 J. Carmichael, “Uganda” in A History of the Overseas Veterinary Services, Part II, ed. DHL Rollinson and JFF 
Callear (London: British Veterinary Association, 1973), 341.  
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wake of the germ theory revolution, were committed to a brand of science that valued 
transparency, communication, and standardized methods.27 Gathering at conferences held across 
Europe and Africa, an international community of veterinary experts slowly coalesced around 
mutual concerns regarding disease, veterinary sanitation, animal husbandry, and policy. At the 
ninth meeting of the International Veterinary Congress, held in The Hague in 1909, government 
physicians and agricultural ministers representing nineteen countries across Europe and North 
America, as well as European colonial interests in Africa and the Pacific, passed a resolution 
urging “the various [colonial] Governments which have not yet organized a veterinary 
supervision…[to] do so as expediently as possible.” All “colonizing States” were furthermore 
encouraged to finance veterinary research in “the tropics,” on the grounds that “etiology forms 
the base of all veterinary sanitary administration.”28 Colonial veterinary surgeons operating in 
British East Africa (Kenya), German East Africa (Tanganyika, Ruanda, Urundi), and the South 
African colonies were all present at The Hague and endorsed these resolutions.29  
The British Colonial Office response to the Hague resolutions, and to the burgeoning 
international interest in veterinary science more generally, was to first augment the small 
veterinary department in Kenya with a bacteriologist, and to formalize plans for the construction 
of a laboratory dedicated to the study of animal diseases.30 That same year, the Colonial Office 
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sent E.E. Hutchins, a young Dublin graduate and Member of the Royal College of Veterinary 
Surgeons, to Uganda to serve as the Protectorate’s first resident veterinarian.31 He initially had 
only one staff member, an older clerk named H. Rahmtullah who had worked for the British in 
Uganda since 1898.32 The veterinary service gradually expanded over the next decade, adding 
veterinary officers, Indian veterinary assistants, stock inspectors, and clerks.33 
Hutchins and his staff, while initially brought in to oversee the health of the 
Protectorate’s transport animals,34 were soon overwhelmed with managing disease outbreaks, the 
most terrifying of which was Rinderpest. Rinderpest was, until its final eradication in 2010, one 
of the deadliest animal diseases on Earth. In immunologically naive populations, it was not 
uncommon to witness mortality rates exceeding ninety-five percent. An animal typically 
contracted the disease by inhaling the mucosa of an infected herdmate. Entering through the 
upper-respiratory tract, the virus quickly destroyed the linings of the alimentary tract as well as 
lymphoid tissue, suppressing the animal’s immune system and rendering the animal vulnerable 
to other infections. Acute infection was characterized by the rapid onset of symptoms, typically 
manifesting within three to five days (but sometimes taking as long as seven to nine days). 
Within six to twelve days of the appearance of symptoms, the host either recovered or 
succumbed. 35 
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The disease, which likely originated on the steppes of central Asia, had terrorized Eurasia 
for millennia, but was virtually unknown in sub-Saharan Africa prior to its introduction to 
Ethiopia by Italian soldiers in 1870. Within seven short years, Rinderpest had, with the help of 
its mobile hosts, traveled as far as the Atlantic Ocean to the west and Cape of Good Hope to the 
south. It reached northeastern Uganda by late 1890, moving rapidly with the herds of the Masaai, 
Karamojong, and Turkana communities into western Kenya and central and southwestern 
Uganda. Emin Pasha reported its arrival along the Kagera River in April 1891, less than four 
months after its first appearance in northern Uganda. Oral histories and traveler accounts of this 
period speak of unprecedented devastation; of mile after mile of dead and bloated cattle filling 
the air with choking stench; of subsequent famine and small pox epidemics; of buzzards too 
heavy to fly and lions that developed a taste for human prey; and of losses that drove some men 
to suicide, and others to barter their children for food.36  
The end of the African Rinderpest pandemic (1889-96) was brought about, not by human 
intervention, but by the contagion itself. Because the morbillivirus that caused Rinderpest could 
not survive outside of its host for more than a few hours, its survival in any given region 
depended on the uninterrupted availability of a susceptible population. In centers of endemic 
infection like western Europe, where experienced herds had acquired some level of resistance to 
through the disease, mortality rates were relatively low (0-30%), thus enabling the virus’ 
survival. Naïve hosts, on the other hand, had almost no immunological defenses and therefore 
succumbed in overwhelming numbers.37 This meant that the inexperienced herd, in order to 
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survive, had to be very large and capable of reproducing at a rate that outpaced the ravages of the 
disease. In most instances involving naïve hosts, the virus simply killed its host population and 
thus burned itself out.  
This was the case across much of eastern and central Africa in the 1890s: So complete 
was the devastation that in many places, the virus was left without a host and thus ceased to be a 
threat. Cattle and bison herds slowly recovered their numbers, and for the first decade of the 
twentieth century, Rinderpest outbreaks in Uganda were relatively rare. When Rinderpest did 
reappear, it was generally confined to the northeast and east where cross-border trade and cattle-
raids reintroduced the disease from Kenya and the Sudan.38 By the time Hutchins arrived in 
1909, most of major pastoral communities had rebuilt their herds.  
Hutchins and his staff had worked diligently to contain these minor foci, employing the 
weapons they knew from anti-Rinderpest campaigns in Europe—quarantines, movement 
permits, and veterinary sanitation ordinances—together with new inoculation technologies 
developed in South Africa. Hutchins’ staff devoted most of their time and energies to addressing 
outbreak, inoculating over 38,000 cattle in 1912 alone. The Protectorate placed a moratorium on 
the small cattle export business, with the Nile as an imagined boundary against the unfolding 
epidemic, but in August 1913 Hutchins’ staff confirmed Rinderpest cases in Buganda Kingdom 
(Map 1).39 
These methods worked with limited success for several years, but Hutchins knew that a 
serious episode would quickly overwhelm his limited staff and resources.40 Controlling 
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Rinderpest was demanding work, even when an outbreak was small and localized. Simply 
getting to the site of a suspected outbreak could require a one-two day journey on foot, by which 
point the disease might already have claimed a whole herd and moved on to new hosts. One 
veterinary officer recalled the dismal scene of an infected herd. Alerted to a possible outbreak by 
“the usual tattered note from some little sub-chief,” the officer would: 
“rush out on foot or by cycle to the area concerned and then, as we neared the boma, 
there, swinging lazily overhead, would be the inevitable vultures. As we approached still 
nearer we would be greeted by the unmistakable and overpowering smell of a Rinderpest 
kraal [paddock]—there was seldom any need for a closer diagnosis...”41 
 
In the absence of any laboratory test that might confirm the presence of Rinderpest (the 
virus could not be seen under light microscopes), the colonial veterinarian based his diagnosis on 
clinical observation alone. Armed with only a thermometer and stethoscope, the officer would 
check for the telltale symptoms: elevated temperature, excessive salivation, mucus discharge, 
oral lesions, and dehydration resulting from profuse diarrhea. Most often, however, it was the 
smell emanating from the animal’s stall that clenched the diagnosis.42  
In the event of an outbreak, sick animals were either quarantined or slaughtered, as there 
was no other treatment available at that time. For healthy animals, Hutchins’ team had the option 
of administering a primitive inoculation using what was known as the “serum-simultaneous” or 
“mixed” method, which two European bacteriologists had developed at a veterinary research 
station in South Africa. This method involved injecting a healthy animal with serum and an 
attenuated form of the virus at the same time. In the best-case scenario, eighty-eight to ninety 
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percent of treated cattle received life-long immunity, with only a 1.5% mortality rate.43 
However, the success of the inoculation depended on many factors, many of which were outside 
of the veterinarian’s control. The serum might be contaminated with another pathogen, for 
example, or the attenuated virus might be too potent for the animal to combat. Moreover, since 
both the serum and the attenuated virus were produced out of a lab in Nairobi until the 
Protectorate established its own research center, entire batches of inoculation expired while en 
route.44  
Consequently, early vaccination campaigns in Uganda witnessed very high mortality 
rates, and this contributed to widespread distrust and even open hostility towards colonial 
veterinarians. Protectorate officials predictably blamed “native superstition” for local aversion to 
veterinary practices, but herders had good reason to question the intentions of colonial surgeons. 
For starters, herders knew that inoculation was dangerous. By the CVO’s own admission, a 
“highly satisfactory” survival rate was 88 percent, meaning that in a district with a population of 
200,000 cattle, over 24,000 would be expected to die of complications.45 Cattle owners were 
furthermore expected to pay a fee for every inoculated animal that survived—a policy that 
ultimately backfired when people failed to pay their taxes, having spent all available cash on 
vaccinations. Even more troubling, Article V of the 1918 Animal Diseases Ordinance allowed 
any veterinary officer to order the immediate slaughter of any animal or animals infected or 
suspected of being infected with Rinderpest.46  
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The work took a serious toll on veterinary staff. Spending weeks at a time on safari, 
sleeping in tents near infected herds, and subsisting on a limited and largely vegetarian diet, staff 
were constantly falling ill. Two European stock inspectors died of Blackwater fever,47 two others 
were forced into early retirement by unremitting illnesses, and still another officer committed 
suicide.48  
Despite these hardships, Hutchins’ team appeared to be remarkably successful in 
containing the spread of Rinderpest for the first five years of operation. In his annual report for 
1915, the CVO even boasted that his staff had finally succeeded in bringing the disease to heel 
through a combination of effective quarantine practices and expert administration of the serum-
simultaneous inoculation method. It now only existed “in remote districts bordering the Sudan 
and British East Africa [Kenya],” he wrote, “and thus all danger of the epidemic extending 
through Uganda to Southern Africa has for the time being been removed.”49 Hutchins’ premature 
declaration of victory is perhaps understandable in view of the great personal costs entailed in 
early veterinary work, but much of his team’s apparent success had as much to do with luck as it 
did with scientific expertise. A bad batch of serum could kill an entire herd and poison local 
opinion; one infected goat could slip across a militarized quarantine zone, obviating the purpose 
of harsh sanitation measures. In the end, colonial veterinarians simply did not understand the 
ecology of the virus, and were consequently unable to prepare for all eventualities. Hutchins, for 
example, was unaware that pigs could swim. 
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In July 1917, the District Commissioner of Lango in Northern Province cabled Hutchins 
to inform him that the Rinderpest outbreak in his district had spilled over into neighboring 
Bunyoro, in Western Province. An Indian trader had allegedly been responsible for reintroducing 
the disease to Lango the month before by importing raw cattle hides from Gulu, where 
“Rinderpest was rampant.” The hapless suspect was convicted under the Animal Diseases 
Ordinance and sentenced with the maximum fine, but the damage was already done. By early 
July, chiefs were reporting multiple outbreaks along the Victoria Nile that formed the District’s 
western border with Bunyoro.  
The outbreak in Lango was lamentable, but district administrators and veterinary staff 
had been hopeful that the river would help contain the epizootic and prevent it from spreading 
further west. This approach of using so-called natural barriers to curb and channel epizootics was 
a common practice in Europe and especially Africa, where colonial administrations lacked the 
means and manpower to enforce sanitary corridors. But rivers are not simply barriers: they are 
part of complex ecosystems and geographical landscapes, and can just as easily act as conduits, 
filters, and sanctuaries. The river (and the crocodiles and hippopotami that swam beneath its 
surface) did indeed prevent many animals from crossing, but this did not make it a “natural” 
barrier against Rinderpest—this quality was ascribed to it in the imaginations of colonial 
scientists.  
In all likelihood, the Rinderpest virus forded the Nile’s treacherous waters in the 
bloodstreams of wild pigs. “Of its ability to swim the Nile I have ample proof,” the DC argued in 
his report to the CVO,  
“as its numbers have been increasing rapidly on the East bank of the Nile and they have 
been swimming across from Bunyoro. In the event of their becoming infected with 
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Rinderpest, nothing seems more likely than that they should try to avoid the scourge by 
returning to the West bank, thus carrying the disease to the buffalo.”50  
 
Pigs, goats, and antelope, while rarely exhibiting symptoms, could facilitate epidemics by 
acting as carriers of the virus. The invisibility of their infection, combined with their wide-
ranging mobility and (in the case of wild boar and antelope) relative independence of human 
caretakers, made them key actors in Rinderpest epizootics. Even if colonial governments had 
possessed the resources and human agents needed to control the movements of people and 
domestic cattle across borders, the ability of antelope to jump fences, of pigs to ford rivers, and 
of goats to trek mountains meant that all human efforts to contain the spread of Rinderpest could 
be undone by one intrepid swine. 
As predicted, Rinderpest, once introduced to Western Province in July 1917, spread 
rapidly southwards, crossing into Rwanda by March of the following year. As the next section 
will demonstrate, colonial responses to this phase of the epizootic signaled a marked shift in the 
history of border management between Uganda and Rwanda. Veterinary laws, practices, and 
infrastructure designed to respond to a deadly disease were slowly, over the period of fifteen 
years, incorporated into a more generalized mobility regime that structured how animals and 
people could move across international boundaries.  
Part III: The view from the border: Anti-Rinderpest Work in Kigezi, 1919-20 
British officials stationed in southwestern Uganda watched the unfolding epizootic with 
increasing trepidation. The Western Province was important cattle country, with an estimated 
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cattle population of 350,000 in 1917.51 Protectorate officials hoped to develop the pastures and 
herds into a lucrative livestock industry,52 but the region had suffered tremendous losses during 
the 1890s pandemic and was still in the process of recovery. Twenty years without Rinderpest 
had given the herds opportunity to rebuild their numbers,53 but it also meant that they had no 
immunological memory of the disease, and would therefore be highly susceptible in the event of 
a fresh outbreak. 
A second source of concern had to do with the lack of manpower, resources, and 
infrastructure needed to fight an epizootic in an area as rural and remote as Western Province. In 
1919, the Veterinary Division had a staff of thirteen people, four of whom were office clerks, 
fully occupied in fighting Rinderpest in Eastern Province and Buganda.54 A substantial grant 
from the Colonial Office enabled the Protectorate to elevate the veterinary service to department 
status in 1920 and to add thirty-five people to its pay roster,55 but they were still faced with 
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monitoring the health of over 1.5 million cattle, sheep, and goats across 91,100 square miles of 
Protectorate territory.56 And because the Protectorate had concentrated its veterinary efforts on 
Buganda and Eastern Province throughout the 1910s, it had no infrastructural capacity in the 
western districts at the beginning of 1919. Quarantine camps and veterinary offices57 had to be 
constructed on the fly, often in isolated reaches far from auto-accessible roads. Perishable serum 
and delicate glass syringes for inoculations had to be imported from Nairobi, which had the only 
veterinary research laboratory in East Africa at that time. Most importantly, the lack of a 
veterinary presence in Western Province before 1919 meant that staff had little knowledge of 
vernacular languages or even basic geography.58 Lacking the means to communicate directly 
with African livestock owners, veterinary officers opened the door to widespread 
misunderstandings about the aims of their department.  
The greatest cause for concern for Uganda administrators, however, was that in the 
absence of effective controls, the virus would cross into Belgian territory. The British viewed 
Rinderpest management primarily through the lens of territorial control. When the virus crossed 
borders, it multiplied the number of administrators involved. In Eastern Province, the British 
could at least count on the cooperation and shared colonial policies of their compatriots in 
(British) Kenya. Similarly, southwestern Buganda abutted northern Tanganyika, which was also 
British territory. Cooperating with Rwanda and Congo, on the other hand, would require 
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extensive cross-border communication59 and mutual trust in each other’s administrative capacity 
and scientific competency.  
When Rinderpest did finally appear in Rwanda in early 1920, British veterinary 
correspondence reflected deep levels of distrust in the reliability of their Belgian counterparts. 
For example, when the Director of Veterinary Services for Rwanda, M. Carlier, offered to assist 
in the emergency inoculation of Kigezi cattle, the Veterinary Officer newly assigned to the 
Western Province expressed strong reservations in a private memo to district administration, 
stating that he did not want “inoculations being carried out in British territory by anybody other 
than British, except in the most desperate condition.”60 The officer’s underlying fear, of course, 
was that inoculation campaigns would result in the same mortality rates as his department had 
witnessed in Buganda and Eastern Province, and that Belgian veterinarians, having little 
experience with inoculation techniques,61 would have even worse results.62 Should this happen 
in Kigezi, cattle owners could easily flee across the border, spreading the contagion to Belgian 
territory. The DC Kigezi, however, had little patience for these excuses, responding to the VO in 
a letter stripped of the usual decorum of colonial correspondence: “If Rinderpest, which now 
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closely threatens British Ruanda, gains an entry, which is most probable, in the near future, both 
political and Rinderpest conditions will be ‘desperate’.”63 
The shrillness of the DC’s response must also be understood in the context of recent 
history of violence in the borderland. Since the reign of Rwabugiri, the region had served as a 
place of asylum for persons seeking refuge from the imperial designs of the Rwandan kingdom. 
Kigezi’s secluded swamps, valleys, and caves offered shelter to those wishing to hide; they also 
provided ideal headquarters for refugees seeking to launch a rebellion, either against the 
Rwandan court, European colonials, or both. European boundary missions, meanwhile, engaged 
one another in minor skirmishes prior to the region’s incorporation into the British Protectorate 
in 1911, and these confrontations drew Africans into the struggle at the same time that they 
introduced new weaponry to the borderland.64 World War I commenced three years later, at 
which point Kigezi served as the Allied frontier against the Germans until 1916, when British 
and Belgian forces invaded German Rwanda via Lutobo.  
Throughout this period, rebellion against Rwanda and colonial powers continued to rage. 
Indeed, just a few months before the Rinderpest outbreak crossed the Victoria Nile, the District 
had broken up what they described as a “rebel base” of three hundred people on the slopes of 
Muhavura. Five months later, a man named Ntokibiiri, who was wanted by the colonial 
government for leading 1,400 combatants in a raid on a Kigezi administrator’s headquarters in 
1917, was finally apprehended by British forces in Kayonza forest, northern Kigezi.65 Ntokibiiri 
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was killed in the confrontation, and the District brought his body back to their headquarters in 
Kabale to be put on public display.66  
Into this dynamic frontier came the 1919 Rinderpest epizootic, a contagion that Kigezi 
officials seemed to fear almost as much as they feared rebellion. This was evidenced in the way 
that the line between viral pathogens and human rebels often blurred, both rhetorically and in 
practice. In a telegram to the CVO, for example, the DC reported on both the state of the 
Rinderpest epidemic and his cooperation with Belgian officials concerning rebel activities: 
“Regret inform you buffaloe reported dying CONGO…thus British Ruanda now also 
threatened…[Kigezi] District now island closely surrounded Rinderpest East, North and 
West; and Resident Rwanda asking co-operation against southern frontier rebels mount 
Muhavura whither I proceed tomorrow…can manage quite well but ask instant dispatch 
of the twenty extra police to Kigezi”67 
 
At first glance, it would appear that the district official was requesting police 
reinforcements to assist with the “frontier rebels,” but his message was addressed to the Chief 
Veterinary Officer, whose department was financing the special dispatch. The purpose of this 
newly assembled force, which increased the existing police force in Kigezi by nearly 50 percent, 
was to guard the Protectorate’s frontiers against the spread of Rinderpest. The DC had already 
received a commission of 6,000 rounds of .303 M.K. VI bullets from the Veterinary Department 
the month before, and these were to be distributed to the police constables when they arrived.68 
The introduction of new weaponry and the augmentation of security personnel, however, also 
served to curb rebellion. 
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Political borders, both internal and international, emerged as critical sites in the fight 
against Rinderpest. In early 1920, for example, Ankole and Kigezi administrators had ordered 
that a six-mile-wide, cattle-free zone be created between their two districts for the purposes of 
halting the internal circulation of Rinderpest. Armed askaris (guards) were positioned 
strategically along this line of quarantine,69 and were given authorization to slaughter all cattle 
found within the free zone.70 The free zone ran perpendicular to the Uganda-Rwanda border, and 
was delimited by what the government understood to be “natural” boundaries: the foothills of 
eastern Kigezi, and the forests that fringed western Ankole. The British hoped that by identifying 
and clearly marking the area of quarantine, they would be better able to manage the movement of 
animals across their territory.  
Two critical factors, however, undermined this early attempt at border control. First, anti-
Rinderpest measures brought to light the government’s spectacular lack of basic geographical 
knowledge. While district administrators were often familiar with the terrain of their 
jurisdictions, their familiarity was obtained on the job through regular safaris and interactions 
with local chiefs. Veterinary staff from Kampala and Kigali, on the other hand, were forced to 
rely on maps that were generally incorrect and incomplete. Correspondence between the DC 
Kigezi and the Veterinary Officer assigned to Western Province are replete with questions about 
place names, rivers, and roads, with frequent complaints about the poor quality of available 
maps.71 To assist his Kampala colleagues, the DC Kigezi included map citations in all of his 
                                                 
69 KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B: “Veterinary,” 1919-20; Veterinary Officer to Commissioner of Police re: 
Anti-Rinderpest Measures, January 7, 1920. 
70 KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B: “Veterinary,” 1919-20; DC Kigezi to the Chief of Belgian Veterinarian 
Services, March 5, 1920. 
71 See for example KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B: “Veterinary,” 1919-1920. Vet. Officer R.H.H. Hart to D.C. 
Kigezi, January 14, 1920. 
65 
 
communications concerning the location of outbreaks in his district.72 Following announcements 
of a positive Rinderpest diagnosis in Rwanda in March 1920, he issued an urgent appeal to 
Belgian and British officers, requesting that only “one map should be used by all concerned, and 
map names adhered to in correspondence. The only clear and reliable map is German East Africa 
Section A 2, Karagwe, 1:300,000, with additions July 1917. This I think you have.”73  
Anti-Rinderpest efforts obliged colonial agents to familiarize themselves with Ugandan 
territory in a way that previous boundary commissions and military engagements had not. 
European investments in seizing natural resources had largely informed the original cartographic 
expeditions of the early 1900s.74 While some attention was paid to linguistic and political 
divisions on the ground,75 such considerations were always made in the interest of creating a 
profitable colonial territory. Similarly, military strategists had concerned themselves with local 
topography inasmuch as it allowed for better defensive positioning and offensive maneuvering. 
Disrupting the spread of Rinderpest, on the other hand, required an understanding of how cattle 
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moved, which was a reflection of people’s workaday lives and their social and political 
relationships.76 
 
As colonial veterinarians struggled to get their bearings in new and often-uncharted 
territory, local cattle-keepers used their intimate knowledge of the countryside and their social 
networks to circumvent quarantines and border askaris.77 The free zone, despite being easily 
identified by geographic features like foothills and forests, was not indicative of any meaningful 
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social division. Instead, it cut across territory historically associated with Bahororo pastoralists, 
who had long occupied the gentle, rolling grasslands situated between the Kigezi hills to the 
west, Ankole plains to the east, and Rwanda to the south. Residents of this area were highly 
mobile, their social networks and transhumant routes spanning either side of the frontier.78 
Unsurprisingly, the DC Kigezi acknowledged defeat shortly after the creation of the quarantine 
zone, observing that local residents were “nightly taking cattle back into [the] mountains which 
constitute [the] free zone,” where they concealed their herds in the forests, “as anticipated.”79  
By late 1920, the worst of the Rinderpest epizootic in western Uganda and Rwanda had 
largely passed. The CVO credited this development to the department’s successful enforcement 
of strict quarantine measures and mass inoculation,80 and while this no doubt contributed to herd 
immunity and increasing rates of survival, veterinary science was not the only factor at play. As 
mentioned earlier, luck was often as important as skill, and an animal’s chances of surviving 
exposure to the attenuated virus administered during inoculation could depend on its health as 
well as the purity of the serum, the availability of clean drinking water and fodder, or even a 
break in the weather.81 The department’s use of coercive violence (armed border patrols, 
mandatory slaughter), moreover, had done much to encourage widespread resistance—resistance 
that often took the form of cross-border movement.  
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Part IV: After the Outbreak: Building borders, criminalizing cattle 
The passage of Rinderpest into Rwanda brought about a shift in the way that Protectorate 
officials framed the disease. While Uganda remained a center of endemic infection after 1920, 
veterinary authorities and district administrators increasingly framed Rinderpest outbreaks as 
consequences of “illicit cattle running” across the border with Belgian territory. “To provide 
against such movements is difficult,” wrote the CVO in his 1921 annual report, 
“the more especially as the territorial boundary is ill-defined, and whilst the patrolling of 
the boundary by armed guards did much to check the practice of ‘running’ cattle across 
the border, it was impossible to stop entirely.”82 
 
In the aftermath of the 1919-20 epizootic, Kigezi officials worked hand in hand with 
local chiefs and veterinary agents to erect border quarantine camps, identify Belgian cattle, and 
establish uniform protocols governing how people could move livestock across borders. In the 
process, they contributed to the Protectorate’s growing investment in territorial control.  
The work of categorizing livestock into stark dichotomies—healthy/sick, 
immune/susceptible, Ugandan/Rwandan, licit/illicit—placed an unprecedented imperative on 
adherence to territorial borders. Because the virus was highly mobile, traveling in the bodies of 
animals that could move up to thirty miles a day, colonial authorities believed that centralized 
oversight was necessary in the struggle against the disease. If an infected cow crossed from one 
jurisprudence to another, officials in the first jurisprudence would then have to rely on the 
cooperation and competency of their neighbors if they hoped to stamp out the infection. 
Colonial authorities experimented with a variety of methods to help identify animals that 
had been brought legally across the border. The Belgian authorities first tried to use metal rings 
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to identify animals that had been successfully immunized.83 In 1922, Kigezi officials declared 
that all persons entering the District with cattle from the Congo, Rwanda or Tanganyika must 
report immediately to the Gombolola (sub-county) Chief in charge of the territory into which 
they had crossed.  
In this way, cows became mobile embodiments of the international border, their branding 
scars and ear tags serving as visible markers of their new imperial “identities.” Yet such markers 
could be readily forged, as Kigezi officials quickly learned. Within months of introducing a 
policy of branding inoculated cattle, the District Commissioner was already predicting that his 
government would have to place a moratorium on livestock imports due to the widespread use of 
counterfeit brands.84 Residents of the important cattle-keeping county of Rujumbura had, by 
early 1923, illegally branded so many of their animals that the DC gave up trying to prosecute 
every case, hoping instead to make examples out of a few hapless convicts.85 
Frontier Tribunals 
The challenge of enforcing adherence to veterinary measures was compounded by what 
ostensibly amounted to local conflicts over cattle, but ones that had been internationalized with 
the creation of new borders. In response to a particularly severe altercation between residents 
living on either side of the Uganda-Congo border in 1923, Belgian and British administrators 
instituted frontier “barazas” in hopes of managing these cross-border conflicts. While frequently 
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acknowledging the questionable legal status of these tribunals, colonial officials maintained that 
they helped to ameliorate border conflicts while also ensuring that the subjects of one territory 
could not escape justice by fleeing to the neighboring state.86 Yet almost all cases litigated by the 
frontier courts revolved around questions of cattle.87  
Over the next ten years, European and African agents maintained four separate frontier 
tribunals, three along the Uganda-Rwanda border and one between Uganda and Congo. Each 
tribunal was expected to meet twice yearly, but actual court schedules tended to vary depending 
on the commitment of district administrators and the interest of local residents. Plaintiffs 
interested in having their case tried were required to submit their complaints to their most 
immediate chief—the muruka or parish chief in Uganda, and the sous-chef in Rwanda—who 
kept a running list over the course of each six-month cycle. Approximately six weeks before the 
scheduled tribunal, the miruka and sub-chiefs would pass these lists on to their superiors—the 
gombolola and saza chiefs in Uganda, the chiefs in Rwanda—who would then create a final list 
for submission to the European administrator. The administrator would then send a formal 
communication to his counterpart on the other side of the frontier, requesting assistance in 
distributing the list to the appropriate African authorities, who would then be responsible for 
locating and informing the accused persons. If the accused refused to comply with this 
“subpoena,” or if he or she could not be found, the case would still proceed to trial. If the judges 
decided in favor of the plaintiff, the accused person would be expected to comply with the 
sentencing, regardless of whether he or she had been present at the trial.  
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 Each tribunal sat for several days, sometimes as long as a week, during which the 
African justices would hear scores of cases, sometimes hundreds. European administrators were 
notably absent during the hearings, but would arrive on the last day to offer litigants a chance of 
appeal; it appears that the initial rulings were rarely overturned, however.88 
European administrators generally praised the tribunal system, describing it as “a distinct 
step forward in Administration of the two territories.”89 Indeed, the frontier courts offered 
colonial officers a relatively convenient (for them) means of governing their hard-to-reach 
subjects living in the outer peripheries of their already-rural domains. They were a kind of safety 
valve for local conflicts, an alternative to vigilante justice for those who would put their trust in 
the system. Cross-border raids, often carried out as acts of retribution or to recover stolen 
property, were not only destabilizing, but they could also act as conduits for disease.  
But most importantly, tribunals provided mutually-agreed upon means for colonial 
governments to quietly manage their extra-territorial subjects. As the Resident for Rwanda noted 
in his 1925 annual report, the new court system promised to stop Rwandan subjects from 
escaping justice by fleeing the country.90 Framing their operations as “extradition,” British and 
Belgian authorities sought to deny their subjects the option of voting with their feet by 
criminalizing certain forms of movement. Colonial governments worked to control cattle 
movement, initially in the interest of curtailing disease and protecting valuable livestock, but 
increasingly as a means of controlling political territory. Whereas Rwandan elites had previously 
been able to relocate their power base to British territory as recently as 1918 (as Nyirimbirima 
                                                 
88 Gouvernment Belge, Ministère des Colonies, Rapport sur l’administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi, 1927, 10. 
89 Uganda Protectorate. Annual Report for Kigezi District, 1923 (Entebbe: Government Printer), 13.  
90 Gouvernment Belge, Ministère des Colonies, Rapport sur l’administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi, 1925, 8. 
72 
 
had), by the mid-1920s this was no longer an option—at least not a legal one. Anti-Rinderpest 
measures had led to the further militarization of the physical border, while frontier tribunals and 
colonial commitments to extradition extended the reach of the border inland, into the parishes, 
villages, and compounds that sheltered Rwanda’s runaways.  
The control of cattle could also be used to keep undesirable persons out of Rwanda. Here, 
we return to Nyirimbirima, the Tutsi noble who fled Rwanda in 1917. The British had welcomed 
him, installing him as the Saza chief of Bufumbira (“British Ruanda”) in 1921, apparently 
believing that his tense relationship with the Mwami would ensure his loyalty to the Protectorate. 
But it seems Nyirimbirima maintained his connections with his natal home, and throughout the 
latter half of the 1920s, his compound in Bufumbira became a refuge for other exiled Mulera 
patrons.91  
In 1930, he submitted a formal request to British authorities, asking that he be allowed to 
return to Mulera. The message was subsequently passed to the Resident of Rwanda and the 
Territorial Administrator for Gatsibu, both of whom rejected the request, believing that 
Nyirimbirima was hoping to exploit the current instability in northern Rwanda and reinstall 
himself as chief, or worse, launch a rebellion of his own.92 Adding to these concerns, the 
Resident of Rwanda also noted that,  
“In addition to political considerations, there is also the reason that the British authorities 
in recent months returned several hundred head of cattle to Gatsibu territory that 
Rwandan herders had taken to Uganda. Will they not ask us to do the same if 
Nyirimbirima carries out his plan?”93 
                                                 
91 KigDA Administration Box 4, File ADM 006, “Rwanda,” 1929-32. Resident of Rwanda to Delegate at Gatsibu, 
re: Nyirimbilima, 26th January 1931. 
92 KigDA Administration Box 4, File ADM 006, “Rwanda,” 1929-32. Pr. le Resident du Rwanda en route, Le 
Resident - Adjoint R. Bonjean, to the Delegate du Resident pres Musinga-Nyanza, 24 December 1930. 
93 KigDA Administration Box 4, File ADM 006, “Rwanda,” 1929-32. Resident of Rwanda to Delegate at Gatsibu, 
re: Nyirimbilima, 26th January 1931. My translation. 
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Recall that Nyirimbirima fled to Uganda with several hundred head of cattle. Presumably 
he used this wealth to rebuild his political base in Bufumbira, accruing clients and increasing his 
herds. While the archives available to me do not indicate what his actual intentions were, it is 
significant that less than a year after submitting his request for repatriation, he was dismissed 
from his Ugandan post on charges of “nepotism.” The DC angrily reported that Nyirimbirima’s 
administration saw “the undeserved ousting of many Batongole and Muruka Chiefs, and their 
substitution by others with little or no claim to advancement beyond the payment of a fee to the 
Mtwale [Nyirimbirima].”94 The subtext of the DC’s report gives the idea of political laziness 
mixed with corruption, but a more likely scenario was that Nyirimbirima had been busily 
building a political base. The Belgians were obviously concerned that if he returned to Mulera, 
he would try to bring his cattle—which represented his political capital and human followers— 
with him. Should the British request the return of Nyirimbirima’s cattle and dependents, the 
Belgian authorities would have to expend tremendous resources in finding, identifying and 
extraditing the persons and beasts concerned. And, if they failed to do this, they would not be 
able to count on British assistance with similar cases in the future. 
Cattle played a determining factor in the Belgians’ decision about how and where 
Nyirimbirima would be allowed legal passage across the border. In the end, the Belgians 
permitted him to return to Rwanda, but not to Mulera. Perhaps if he had been willing to go alone, 
without his cattle and followers, they might have let him resettle in Mulera, where anti-Tutsi 
sentiment was high and likely to keep his political aspirations in check. But, in the company of 
                                                 
94 Kigezi District. Report for the quarter ending 30th June, 1931. 5th July 1931, 5. 
74 
 
his entourage, he was too powerful to risk sending him back to home territory, where he might 
prove strong enough to launch a successful revolt—or at least a disruptive and costly one.  
Part V: Permits against Patrons: The 1931 Lutobo Agreement 
Controlling the movement of cattle across borders had, at the beginning of the 1920s, been seen 
as important for the prevention of disease. By the end of the decade, Belgian officials were 
attempting control cattle mobility as a way of 1) preventing emigration from Rwanda and 2) 
cudgeling non-compliant chiefs into obedience. The reasons for this were multiple, and some 
context is here necessary.  
In brief, all was not well in Rwanda. Failed rains, faulty agricultural policies, exploitative 
labor practices, and a deepening land crisis had culminated in a severe famine in the northeast. 
Between 1928 and 1930, an estimated 35,000-40,000 people perished in the political and 
ecological disaster known as Rwakayihura, while another 100,000 sought refuge elsewhere in 
Rwanda or left the country entirely. The Belgians fumbled their response, first by waiting too 
long to initiate emergency food provisions, and then by using punitive action against those who 
failed or refused to comply with desperate eleventh-hour policies. As the crisis mounted, they 
ordered the northeastern marshes to be drained and prepared for cultivation in 1928. The chiefs 
and Tutsi elite were bitterly opposed to this plan, for the marshes provided the only source of 
water and grass in the dry season; without the wetlands, the herds would not be able to survive if 
the drought continued. The Belgians responded with threats, stating that chiefs who failed to 
enforce emergency famine cultivation would be stripped of their position and herds, and the 
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animals would be slaughtered to feed their people. Some chiefs capitulated, but others gathered 
up their cattle and followers and left.95  
The issue of immigration between Uganda and Rwanda was therefore a sensitive one for 
colonial officials. The Belgians were anxious to salvage their reputation before the League of 
Nations, which had entrusted them with the Mandated Territory of Ruanda-Urundi following the 
defeat of the Germans in World War I. Their British neighbors, meanwhile, were put in the 
awkward position of receiving tens of thousands of Rwandan famine victims who constituted the 
human cost of colonial failure (see Chapter Three). Emigration from Rwanda was so 
pronounced, in fact, that the Chief Secretariat’s Office in Entebbe was actually concerned that 
Belgium might accuse the Protectorate of using emergency food aid “as bait to tempt natives 
from them to us, to settle, for our labor purposes.” In case this happened, the CSO requested the 
DC Kigezi to report on the number of Banyarwanda refugees who remained in the District in 
early 1931.96   
While famine victims made up the largest proportion of emigrants from Rwanda at the 
end of the 1920s, the Belgians were also concerned about the departure of chiefs who left either 
in protest of colonial policies or because of a local political conflict. In late 1930, for example, a 
man named Kabengo, a sub-chief in the northern Rwandan district of Rukiga, absconded across 
the border with 500 head of cattle and seventy followers. Kabengo’s dramatic departure 
undermined the legitimacy of the principal Chief, Rukeratabaro, and the Belgian Territorial 
                                                 
95 Des Forges and Newbury, Defeat is the Only Bad News, 233-34. 
96 KigDA Immigration Box 8, File 112: “Native Affairs: Repatriation of Banyarwanda, etc., etc.,” 1930-1949. 
Memo from the Secretariat to “Adams”, 13 Feb. 1931. 
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Administrator. Accordingly, the latter wrote to the DC Kigezi with an urgent request for 
assistance in returning the fugitive:  
“You will realize that it would be impossible for me to go on governing the district if 
these cattle do not return. Every time I make the slightest remark to a chief, he will go off 
to your side, whereas if you take him back, the whole country will know about it, and 
people will think twice before they go across. As I have shown on several occasions, I am 
ready to restore any of your people you wish, complete with cattle. I hope, and in fact I 
am sure, that you will reciprocate.”97 
 
Considering the political significance of mass departures like Kabengo’s, British and 
Belgian authorities worked hard to honor what one official referred to as “an exchange of good 
neighborly courtesy,” which was a euphemism for the work of extraditing cattle and people with 
few questions asked. The British apprehended Kabengo and returned him to Gabiro under escort 
in January 1931.98 
Despite these efforts, however, emigration from Rwanda continued unabated, and in 
March 1931, Belgian and British officials gathered at Lutobo in eastern Kigezi to discuss ways 
of reducing the flow of people across their border.99 The primary focus of the meeting, however, 
was not on immigration in general, but on the movement of livestock. The conference resolved, 
specifically, to institute a permit system that would henceforth require persons interested in 
conducting cattle across borders to apply for a permit with their respective government. This 
permit, however, would only be granted for “good reason being shown, e.g., dowries, debts, 
joining relations, etc.” This was a vague guideline that gave considerable discretion to local 
                                                 
97 KigDA Administration Box 4, File ADM 006, “Rwanda,” 1929-32. Delegue Verhulst to DC Kigezi Rogers, 7 
January 1931.  
98 KigDA Administration Box 4, File ADM 006, “Rwanda,” 1929-32: DC Kigezi (ROGERS) to Resident at Gatsibu, 
11 Jan. 1931. 
99 Kigezi District. Report for the quarter ending 31st March, 1931. 11 April 1931. 
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administrators at the same time that it restricted the scope for what would be considered 
“reasonable” movements.100  
Rinderpest, unsurprisingly, provided a key justification for instituting a permit system,101 
but this stated reason requires careful scrutiny. Rinderpest was still a concern for both colonial 
governments, and western Uganda did experienced a resurgence in Rinderpest cases in 1929 and 
1930, after five years of being essentially free of the disease.102 The outbreak had been relatively 
severe, but mortality rates never approached those witnessed in 1919-20, because of the 
improvement in inoculation technology and the growing resistance of Ugandan herds. The 
reemergence of the virus in Western Province, moreover, was the result of infected game from 
northern Uganda crossing the Victoria Nile into Bunyoro—i.e., the 1929-30 outbreak was not 
introduced from Belgian territory, but had followed the same internal path as the 1919-20 
epizootic. So, while the disease still posed a danger to Ugandan and Rwandan herds, officials 
were far more moderate in their risk assessments. 
Anti-Rinderpest rhetoric arguably allowed government officials to downplay more 
pressing reasons for instituting a permit system. By limiting the distribution of permits to 
applicants who wanted to move livestock for reasons of kinship and debt repayment, for 
example, colonial agents would have an easier way of justifying extradition requests in cases like 
that of Kabengo. A restrictive permit system could also be used against Rwandan cattle owners 
                                                 
100 KigDA Justice, Law, and Order (JLOS) Box 6, File 52: International Tribunals: Belgian Rwanda Native 
Frontiers, 1930-37. DC Kigezi to Delegate for the Resident, Gatsibu, 10 March 1931. 
101 See for example KigDA Justice, Law, and Order (JLOS) Box 6, File 52: International Tribunals: Belgian Rwanda 
Native Frontiers, 1930-37. Resident du Rwanda to PC Western Province, 2 May 1931. 
102 Uganda Protectorate. Annual Report of the Veterinary Department, 1929 (Entebbe: Government Printer), 4. 
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who, in the face of rising taxes on livestock and polygyny,103 tried to dodge the system by 
moving their animals across the border temporarily—an action which then obliged the Uganda 
authorities to intervene.104  
A test case for the Lutobo agreement presented itself in September of that year. The 
Territorial Administrator for Gabiro Province wrote to the DC Kigezi requesting assistance in the 
return of 131 Rwandan families who had fled to Uganda with 347 head of cattle. To assist the 
Uganda authorities in locating the families concerned, Verhulst attached a list providing the 
name of the (assumed) family head, their racial identity (Tutsi/Hutu), their identity card number, 
and the number of cattle they were believed to have taken with them. The list also gave details 
regarding their possible whereabouts: the hill on which they are staying, the gombolola chief 
who was believed to be providing them sanctuary, and the district. 
While Belgian authorities did not provide details as to the origins of the runaways, we do 
know that they were from the eastern province of Mutara, a region that had suffered substantially 
during the famine. Many people who had strength to flee had already done so, leaving Verhulst 
to complain that he did not have the labor he needed to complete the public works projects 
assigned to him.105 Several of the chieftaincies under his watch were so turbulent that he failed to 
requisition any laborers from them at all. Writing to the DC Kigezi in September, he worried that 
                                                 
103 C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 172-73. 
104 Uganda Protectorate. Annual Report for Kigezi District, 1931 (Entebbe: Government Printer), 6. 
105 KigDA Administration Box 4, File ADM 006, “Rwanda,” 1929-32. Delegue de Resident Rwanda to DC Kigezi, 
11th December 1930.  
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if Uganda failed to uphold its end of the Lutobo agreement and “return those natives who 
escaped with their cattle,” he was convinced that many more would soon follow.106 
Verhulst justified his extradition request on the grounds that “ces fuites”—these run-
aways, or literally, “these leaks”—had brought their cattle to Uganda in violation of the permit 
regulations formalized under the Lutobo agreement, and in so doing had placed all Ugandan 
livestock at risk of infection. Yet even a cursory review of the document reveals that of the 
persons listed, fifty-five families (41%) crossed the border without cattle. Verhulst himself 
admitted that many of the so-called “fugitives” were simply “Banyarwanda” who did not wish to 
submit themselves to new cultivation ordinances, which the government maintained were 
intended for their own benefit. Obviously, then, the Belgian administrator was not just worried 
about Rinderpest, or even cattle—he was desperate to prevent the complete implosion of his 
territory.  
The Rwanda Resident, in his annual report, noted that the British had graciously returned 
300 cattle to Rwanda that had been brought across the border “in violation of statutory 
measures.”107 Such “valuable aid,” he added, was critical to the struggle against Rinderpest. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has traced colonial efforts to control the movements of cattle, initially in the interest 
of curtailing disease and protecting valuable livestock, but increasingly as a means of controlling 
political territory. Whereas Rwandan elites had previously been able to relocate their power base 
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to British territory as recently as 1918 (e.g., Nyirimbirima), by the late-1920s this was no longer 
an option—at least not a legal one. Anti-Rinderpest measures had led to the further militarization 
of the physical border, while frontier tribunals and colonial commitments to extraditing each 
other’s “fugitives” extended the reach of the border inland, into the parishes, villages, and 
compounds that sheltered Rwanda’s runaways.  
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Chapter 2: Migrant Nation: Rwandans making themselves at home in Buganda 
 
 
The previous chapter explored the British Protectorate’s effort to use its southern border as a 
barrier against epizootic disease and political unrest, and the consequences that this had for 
human migration and the ways in which people could relate to one another across political 
territory. Specifically, it demonstrated how colonial interventions into the movement of cattle 
ultimately had ramifications for the play of Rwandan politics, which were largely organized 
around the distribution of cattle across space. Although the British and Belgians had originally 
been concerned about disease, their investment in controlling animal mobility became, by the 
late 1920s, a convenient reason to go after the movement of people. Under the pretext of 
Rinderpest prevention, British authorities could extradite fugitive Tutsi cattle-owners back to 
Rwanda and deny movement permits to suspicious figures like Nyirimbirima. What began as a 
concern about veterinary policy had morphed into a set of border-control practices that helped 
both colonial governments consolidate their control over territory.  
Yet, at the same time that the British sought to close their border to destabilizing politics, 
they were growing increasingly aware of their need for Rwandan labor. The young Protectorate 
needed a reliable workforce to build roads, plant cash-crops, and transport goods to market. 
Early efforts to create a domestic labor pool, however, had largely failed by the end of World 
War I. Uganda residents, particularly those living in Buganda, the Protectorate’s economic 
heartland, were highly reticent to sell their labor to public works projects and European 
plantations. They preferred instead to support themselves on subsistence agriculture 
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supplemented by small-scale cotton production. Government officials, unable to conjure the 
necessary manpower by coercive means, felt compelled to look for labor elsewhere, first in the 
Protectorate’s supposedly less-productive peripheries, and then across borders into Ruanda-
Urundi, Congo, Tanganyika, Kenya, and the Sudan. Of these extraterritorial sources, Ruanda-
Urundi would prove the most vital. Where colonial officials had once been preoccupied with 
keeping certain people out, they were now anxious to bring people in. 
The border, in other words, had always been porous, but the colonial justifications for 
population control were changing. This chapter investigates the Protectorate’s evolving 
gatekeeping strategies and the political and social consequences of its nascent dependency on 
foreign labor. Between the early 1920s and late 1950s, Protectorate labor demands and border 
practices helped set in motion a new and unprecedented circuit of regional mobility. Hundreds of 
thousands of Rwandans and Burundians would make their way to Uganda over the course of 
three decades, with many choosing to settle permanently in Buganda, Ankole, and Kigezi. By the 
mid-1930s, the government estimated that migrant laborers were responsible for growing half of 
Buganda’s cotton, the country’s most lucrative cash crop.1 By the end of World War II, 
approximately one in five Buganda residents were of foreign origin, with Rwandan and 
Burundian settlers accounting for nearly 5.9 percent of the Kingdom’s population.2  
British observers interpreted this stunning demographic shift as a function of the 
Protectorate’s economic prosperity, but it arguably had as much, if not more, to do with 
deteriorating conditions in Ruanda-Urundi. Life in Belgian territory, as noted in the previous 
                                                 
1 Maryinez Lyons, “Foreign Bodies: The History of Labour Migration as a Threat to Public Health in Uganda,” in 
African Boundaries: barriers, conduits, and opportunities, eds. Paul Nugent and A.I. Asiwaju (London: Pinter, 
1996), 135. 
2 O. Dak, A Geographical Analysis of the Distribution of Migrants in Uganda (Kampala: Dept. of Geography, 
Makerere University College, 1968), 6. 
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chapter, was in a state of precipitous decline for the majority of the population. From 1929 
onwards, on the pretext of famine prevention, Belgian authorities built roads, drained 
marshlands, and established new regional headquarters. In 1931, they instituted new cotton and 
coffee quotas for chiefs and sub-chiefs. This work was accomplished on the backs of Hutu 
peasants, who were required to provide free labor to their chiefs under a clientship institution 
known as ubureetwa.3 In addition to cash-crop production and public works projects, peasants 
were also expected to grow food for government famine reserves and, from 1937 onwards, 
participate in anti-erosion terracing efforts. By the outbreak of World War II, Hutu residents 
were devoting as many as three days out of six to chiefs, Belgian officials, and even private 
European planters. Traveling to Uganda was thus a way for people to escape the drudgery of 
Rwandan peasant life while searching for new economic and social resources that might alleviate 
some of the more difficult aspects of life back home. For an increasing number of people in 
Rwanda, Uganda offered a political alternative to the twinned oppressions of Tutsi vassalage and 
Belgian governance.4 
                                                 
3 Ubureetwa was the most humiliating of labor prestations, initially introduced by King Rwabugiri in the late 19th 
century as a means of bringing the unruly provinces to heel. In representations to the League of Nations and the 
ILO, Belgian Mandate officials framed their interventions as good faith efforts to: 1) prevent future famines and to 
2) cooperate with African political authority. They acknowledged that ubureetwa was a form of forced labor, but 
they claimed to have softened and rationalized the more onerous aspects of the “traditional” practice. Prior to 
Belgian reforms, family lineages could collectively fulfill their ubureetwa obligations by sending a single 
representative to work for the state. Moreover, ubureetwa was only practiced in those regions under firm control of 
Nyanza; in the more distant marches of the north and northwest, ubureetwa was virtually unknown. In reality, these 
interventions played on the very worst political legacies laid down by Rwabugiri a half-century before, at the same 
time that their streamlining of chiefly governance meant that people were increasingly subject to the whims of a 
single sub-chief; where clients once had some ability to navigate power relations by playing one patron off of 
another, Belgian reforms removed even this possibility. See C. Newbury, Cohesion, 140-142; Lemarchand, Rwanda 
and Burundi, 122; and Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda, 13.  
4 Regarding Rwandans in Uganda, see Richards, Economic Development, 29. Regarding the famine, see Newbury, 
Cohesion of Oppression, 153 and Singa, La Famine Ruzagayura, 30; for an account of a Hutu man who left Rwanda 
in 1925, likely in response to the Gakwege famine, see Codere, Biography of an African People, 197-201. 
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Protectorate administrators adopted a laissez-faire approach to African immigration from 
the early 1930s onwards, initially because of the Depression but later out of concern for 
expediency. Uganda needed foreign labor, and officials feared that overt forms of surveillance 
would “frighten” migrants away and encourage non-compliance. For this reason, Protectorate 
administrators consistently refused to implement pass systems, labor registries, and medical 
screenings, even though other British colonies in Africa readily employed such measures.5 In 
1942, for example, after an alarming number of Rwandan migrants had been found dead along 
the highway, a special committee of labor experts urged the Protectorate government to establish 
screening posts at various points along the border to weed out the medically unfit. This would 
spare the administration from potential scandal and help prevent the spread of communicable 
diseases. Central authorities, however, rejected the proposal on the grounds that too many 
migrants would be turned away if subjected to medical inspection.6 “It is not really satisfactory 
that these large bodies of men should be roaming about the country without coming under the 
cognizance of any public authority,” another labor official conceded, “[but] [a]ny general 
registration or pass system may be dismissed at once as both impracticable and undesirable.”7 
This stance invited widespread criticism from business leaders, Baganda authorities, and even 
some British officials, who feared that uncontrolled migration would have deleterious 
consequences for business, public health, and security. Yet the Protectorate refused to reconsider, 
                                                 
5 Uganda Protectorate, Second Report of the Labour Advisory Committee: Organisation of the South-West Labour 
Migration Routes (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1943), 6. 
6 Lyons, “Foreign Bodies,” 139. 
7 Uganda Protectorate, Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Labour Situation in the Uganda Protectorate, 
1938 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1938), 50. The author of this report did go on to recommend that the 
Protectorate provide migrants with identification documents, but even this measure was ultimately rejected on the 
grounds that it was too expensive and impractical. 
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and labor migration to Uganda continued unabated with almost no central oversight. Instead, the 
work of identifying cross-border migrants—a task that was necessary for reliable tax assessments 
and social planning—fell to local chiefs at the village and parish levels. The government’s 
lowest-paid “man on the ground,” in other words, became responsible for managing what would 
become one of the largest population transfers in twentieth century central African history. This 
was a remarkable cession of colonial authority to local power brokers.   
The Protectorate claimed that it lacked the technological capacity to identify and track 
cross-border migrants, but this chapter suggests that at an even more fundamental level, the 
Protectorate refused to document migrants because such interventions undermined their 
economic imperatives. Unlike neighboring Kenya, where European planters formed the basis of 
the colonial economy—and where planter success depended on easy access to alienated land and 
labor—Uganda’s relative wealth derived almost entirely from peasant production. African 
farmers in Uganda growing small plots of cotton on their own land brought in tenfold what the 
European and Asian plantations did. As early as early as 1914, peasant farmers exported over 
£500,000 in agricultural goods, while European planters raised only £26,000.8 The meteoric rise 
of the small-scale farmer, however, meant that the Protectorate administration could not depend 
on the local populace for its labor supply, and had to attract adequate numbers of workers from 
abroad. European planters in Kenya, by contrast, were far more numerous and influential than 
their counterparts in Uganda, and they used their economic and political power to secure greater 
access to native land and labor. In 1915, the colonial administration in Kenya, at the urging of 
white settlers, introduced the notorious kipande system, which required all Kenyan men and boys 
                                                 
8 Cyril Ehrlich, “The Uganda Economy,” in History of East Africa, vol. 2, eds. Vincent Harlow and E.M. Chilver 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 414. 
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over the age of fifteen to submit their information to a centralized labor registry and carry 
identification papers on their person at all times.9 Such explicit checks on African mobility 
would have hindered the Ugandan economy if applied to Ugandan farmers or migrant laborers, 
and they were therefore never introduced.  
Few historians have looked at the mechanisms of documentation and recognition for 
migrants in colonial Buganda. The laxity of state supervision over movement and documentation 
can be read as giving migrants a much greater ability to move and assimilate. Shane Doyle, for 
instance, has argued that the Protectorate’s lax policies contributed to and even facilitated 
flexible identification practices, granting migrants wide berth to reinvent themselves abroad. 
Buganda Kingdom was able, he claims, to absorb and integrate large numbers of foreigners 
between 1920 and 1960 because the state gave low priority to registration. In this way, the lack 
of official recognition benefitted vulnerable migrants because it allowed them to carve out new 
places for themselves in Uganda.  
This chapter argues that, while this was certainly true for the Rwandans who made their 
homes in Buganda at mid-century, the lack of official recognition was also always a double-
edged sword. In the interest of short-term economic growth, the Protectorate government 
facilitated a demographic trend that their bureaucratic infrastructure ultimately could not handle. 
Migrants helped build the Ugandan state, but the state’s failure to recognize and secure political 
rights for them set up a political problem that the country has yet to resolve. And, when the 
                                                 
9 The colonial government issued specially-designed metal cases to all men and boys over the age of sixteen, and 
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Uganda authorities imposed a new documentary regime requiring certain groups of migrants 
(“refugees”) to submit to individual identification in 1959, the central government had no 
reliable means of distinguishing one migrant from another, resulting in heightened insecurity for 
all persons of Rwandan origin, both real and suspected. The lack of individual recognition, while 
a momentary convenience for the state and a possible boon for migrants, became a source of 
significant long-term anxiety. 
This chapter proceeds in two parts. Part I, “Illegible Migrants,” analyzes the efforts of 
state and private interests to control and organize foreign labor power for their respective ends. It 
demonstrates how Protectorate fears about labor shortages and their dependency on Rwandan 
labor led officials to adopt a relaxed policy towards immigration control, one that ultimately 
undermined their capacity and political will to know their subjects. Migrant illegibility served the 
interests of the state and facilitated African mobility, but it also burdened local administrative 
structures and opened up space for abuse. Part II, “Studying Migrants,” turns from this larger 
structural analysis to the everyday work of Rwandan settlement. It emphasizes how migrants, 
however successful they were at “fitting in,” still tested the boundaries of Ganda society—often 
at great personal risk. For this reason, scholars should be wary of celebrating the apparent 
flexibility of migrant identities. Migrants remained vulnerable to the whims of chiefs, landlords, 
and neighbors who, unchecked by central oversight, could make their lives in Uganda miserable, 
even unsustainable. Dispensing with apolitical narratives of assimilation, this chapter therefore 
calls attention to the rough edges of resettlement, the inflexibility of identities, and the limits of 
personal reinvention.  
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Part I: Illegible Migrants 
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Protectorate sought to develop the 
Ugandan economy along two broad lines. First, they encouraged commercial planters and Ganda 
chiefs to experiment with cash crop production. Uganda, as far as the administration knew, was 
poor in mineral resources but rich in agricultural potential. Fertile soils along the shores of Lake 
Victoria had sustained impressive populations for centuries, leading colonial authorities to 
believe that they might also support more lucrative crops like rubber, sugar, coffee, and cotton. 
They were not entirely wrong in this. Early attempts in cash-crop production were largely 
successful in terms of actual yield. The problem, however, was that each crop, in order to be 
produced in large scale, required tremendous labor inputs that outstripped planter budgets. The 
Belgian Congo had grown rich off of rubber only by enslaving the Congolese population.10 The 
same had been true for sugar in the Caribbean, cotton in the United States, and coffee in Kenya. 
Without access to a continuous supply of free or nearly-free labor, planters in Uganda could not 
produce yields that encouraged their long-term commitment to the Protectorate. Moreover, 
without a steady supply of workers, the government could not build the roads, bridges, and ports 
that it needed to transport these potential goods to market.  
The Protectorate’s second aim was therefore to develop a domestic labor market. This 
was not an easy task, however, and it ran into conflict, ironically, with the government’s first 
development goal. Few Ugandans were willing to sell their labor in the years leading up to 
World War I because they found they could raise whatever cash they needed for taxes by 
growing small plots of cotton alongside their matooke trees and vegetable gardens. Cotton, while 
                                                 
10 C.C. Wrigley, Crops and Wealth in Uganda: A Short Agrarian History (Kampala: East African Institute of Social 
Research, 1959), 13. 
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attracting little interest from European planters, had quickly become a popular crop among 
peasant farmers after missionaries introduced it to the Protectorate in 1904. Unlike coffee, which 
required considerable up-front expenditures in time and money, cotton generated a harvest 
within a single season. Cheap to plant and quick to grow, peasant farmers could easily add a 
small batch to their regular rotations without incurring much risk to themselves (for a gender 
analysis of cotton production, see Chapter Three).  
The unexpected success of peasant production came at the expense of the Protectorate’s 
labor needs, and in response, the British turned to coercive measures to draw people into the 
market. They first imposed new taxes in 1904 and 1905, and when these failed to produce the 
desired results, they introduced a compulsory labor requisition known as kasanvu. Kasanvu 
played on an older practice of unpaid labor in Buganda known as luwalo, in which subjects of 
the Kabaka contributed one month to the construction and maintenance of local public works. 
Unlike luwalo, the kasanvu system was paid (three rupees per month) but still compulsory, and 
laborers were often forced to work on dangerous government projects located far from their 
homes. People could claim exemption from kasanvu if they could demonstrate employment with 
a private employer, but others chose to emigrate rather than cooperate. Premised on the faulty 
assumption that colonial subjects in Uganda shared a common patriotic loyalty to the imperial 
state (and would therefore see the value of contributing towards public works projects in distant 
counties), the kasanvu system quickly became an object of widespread resentment.11 Chiefs, who 
had the unpopular job of enlisting their own people, watched their parishes shrink as people 
chose to seek alternative employment or even emigrate rather than submit to government labor 
                                                 
11 P.G. Powesland, Economic Policy and Labour: A Study in Uganda’s Economic History, ed. W. Elkan (Kampala: 
East African Institute of Social Research, 1957), 18-34. 
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demands.12 Kasanvu also depressed wages and discouraged private European estates from 
improving labor conditions, since they knew that many people would prefer to work for an 
abusive planter locally than for a public works project that was far from home.13  
Uganda residents became so successful in avoiding compulsory service that by 1918, the 
government was once again facing acute labor shortages. Certain voices, namely European 
planters, insisted that the state needed to adopt more punitive measures if they were ever going to 
overcome the African’s inherent laziness.14 But by then the tide was beginning to turn against 
kasanvu, and fewer government officials were willing to come out in support of compulsory 
labor.15 Coercion had failed to drum up adequate numbers, and the unpopularity of the program 
had led the Buganda kingdom to denounce it in 1921. Protectorate authorities were also under 
mounting pressure from the Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill, who announced that forced 
labor would no longer be tolerated anywhere in the empire following scandalous revelations 
about African labor conditions in Kenya.16 Thus, despite vociferous objections from the white 
planting community, the Protectorate phased out kasanvu between 1922 and 1923. Forcing 
Ugandans to sell their labor had disrupted and displaced productive peasant farmers, and in so 
                                                 
12 Holly Hanson, Landed obligation: the practice of power in Buganda (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003), 176-
77. 
13 Powesland, Economic Policy, 21-22. 
14 Uganda Development Commission, Report of the Uganda Development Commission, 1920 (Entebbe: Government 
Printer, 1920), 13. 
15 Powesland, Economic Policy, 24. 
16 Winston Churchill, Despatch to the Officer Administering the Government of the Kenya Colony and Protectorate 
relating to Native Labour (London: HMS Office, 1921). See also Berman and Lonsdale, “Crisis of Accumulation,” 
111-112. 
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doing undermined the country’s profit aims.17 Yet Uganda’s labor question remained, and the 
abolition of kasanvu did little to address it.  
Rwandans in Uganda 
The Protectorate’s response to the first noticeable movements of Rwandans to Uganda in the 
early 1920s was therefore one of cautious optimism. Here was a potential short-term solution to 
their post-kasanvu labor shortage.18 Viewing Rwandan migration as a temporary phenomenon, 
they gave little thought to possible long-term political consequences. Instead, officials were 
primarily concerned with improving migrant health and facilitating their passage along the main 
highways that connected Ruanda-Urundi with Buganda.19  
Even with these modest aims, however, the Protectorate soon ran into trouble. The late 
1920s revealed how little control the British had over migrant labor. From year to year, their 
numbers could fluctuate wildly, for reasons that the government scarcely understood. Migrant 
trends appeared to have little to do with demand on the Uganda side, resulting in alternating 
seasons of widespread unemployment and labor shortages. Public health authorities and security 
officials complained that these unpredictable changes could leave people stranded in urban 
centers with neither work nor food nor the means to return home. Still others made their way to 
                                                 
17 European planters in Uganda, while relatively few in number compared to Kenya, formed a relatively powerful 
political bloc during the 1910s, when the direction of the country’s economic development was still unclear. Yet by 
the early 1920s Protectorate authorities believed that peasants, rather than planters, were the key to Uganda’s 
economic prosperity. The planters subsequently lost the political platform they had enjoyed momentarily during the 
war years. See Ehrlich, Wrigley, and Powesland for detailed histories of the planter class in Uganda; see also the 
Uganda Development Commission’s 1920 report. 
18 G. Powesland, “The History of the Migration in Uganda,” in Economic Development and Tribal Change: A Study 
of Immigrant Labour in Buganda, ed. Audrey Richards (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd, 1954), 30. 
19 Uganda Protectorate, Medical and Sanitary Department: Annual Report for the Year ended 31st December 1928 
(Entebbe: Government Printer, 1929), 28. See also Uganda Labour Department, The Housing and Hygiene of 
African Natives on Plantations, Estates and at Ginneries (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1928), 8. 
92 
 
Buganda under extreme duress, setting out from Rwanda when they were already half-starved. It 
was not uncommon during the interwar years to find Rwandan migrants either dead along the 
road or bed-ridden in Ugandan hospitals. Medical officers began to identify Rwandan 
communities as centers of epidemic disease, a perception that Maryinez Lyons has shown spread 
quickly to the Ganda populace.20  
Government intervention during the late 1920s was limited to sporadic health screenings 
and the occasional provision of food aid, but by the mid-1930s, officials were beginning to 
consider more ambitious programs. The economy was slowly recovering from the 1929 crash, 
and the Colonial Office in London was under increasing pressure from trade unions and the 
International Labor Organization to implement much-needed labor reforms across the empire.21 
Many of these reforms would have little impact on Rwandan migrants, however, because they 
targeted formal industry, not private Ganda farmers (who employed the majority of foreign 
laborers in Uganda). Even so, Protectorate attempts to “stabilize” labor relations by raising 
wages, improving living quarters, and replacing Master and Servants ordinances with 
employment law had indirect consequences for migrant workers.22 For starters, they put the 
Protectorate’s industrial leaders on the defensive, encouraging some to take drastic action to 
secure access to low-cost workers. Migrants entering Buganda from the southwest routes often 
spoke of illicit labor recruiters who lay in wait along the road, kidnapping unsuspecting travelers 
and spiriting them away to Ganda farms and commercial plantations (see Paulo’s story, below). 
                                                 
20 Lyons, “Foreign Bodies,” 131-44. 
21 M.K. Banton, “The Colonial Office, 1820-1955: constantly the subject of small struggles,” in Masters, servants, 
and magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562-1955, ed. P. Craven and D. Hay (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2004), 295. 
22 On the history of stabilization and British colonial labor policy, see Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African 
Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
93 
 
British officials regarded recruiter scares as evidence of migrant irrationality, rather than 
systemic exploitation. The Protectorate Labor Inspector, writing at the end of World War II, 
downplayed the rumors, suggesting that most stories were the result of migrants who either 
misunderstood the terms of their contract or who were trying to cheat their employers out of a 
free ride. This argument continued to circulate among British observers for the next decade. 
Even Audrey Richards was quick to dismiss migrant recruiter stories as either ghost stories or 
convenient half-truths. “Recruiting stories are common on the road and many of them are 
probably a survival of the terror of old days, and not of actual conditions at the moment,” she 
wrote, adding that,  
“it must also be said that those who are most vehement in their indignation against the 
recruiting companies do not consider that they have done any injury to the company by 
accepting free motor transport from the borders to the sugar estates in East Uganda and 
then deserting on arrival, and it is estimated that 40 to 60 per cent of those transported by 
the Lugazi factory do so desert.”23  
 
Despite such skepticism, however, the Labor Inspector still admitted that “sufficient 
evidence” indicated that some recruiters did use “undesirable methods” “at times.”24 In a 
different section of the same report, he even noted that one Asian and four African recruiters had 
been convicted of “conspiracy to recruit labour by unlawful means and of wrongful 
confinement” and had been sentenced to three to nine months’ imprisonment with hard labor.25 
Two years later, when licensed recruiting firms reported that migrants were openly hostile to 
                                                 
23 Richards, Economic Development, 60. 
24 Uganda Protectorate, Labour Department Annual Report for the Year Ended 31st December 1946 (Entebbe: 
Government Printer, 1947), 6. 
25 Ibid., 10. 
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their agents at Masaka, the Labor Department urged “patience,” admitting that migrant attitudes 
were understandable in light of “incorrect methods used in the past.”26 
It is impossible to know the extent to which migrants were subjected to forcible 
recruitment and kidnapping en route, but the stories speak to the predations of an unregulated 
labor market. Fresh reports of forcible recruitment drove migrants to abandon highways, avoid 
government labor camps, and refuse free rations. They profoundly impacted people’s sense of 
security, convincing travelers to take the “jungle route” at the expense of their physical health.27 
Migrants at Lugazi told Richards that they had been kidnapped at a camp called Mutukula on the 
border with Tanzania.28 Still others spoke of an “Indian lady who built a camp for migrants, and 
when they sleep in it [she] catches them and takes them to the plantations.”29 The “Indian lady” 
in question was actually an Italian woman named Toni Nuti, who kept a whites-only guesthouse 
on an island in the middle of Kagera River. Her role in labor recruiting is unclear from available 
evidence, but her name came up often in Richards’ research. The DC Masaka knew her but 
refused to comment when pressed for information, saying only, “Well she is a foreigner after all, 
and they are always highly emotional. That is all you can say.”30 Indeed, the mystery that 
surrounded recruitment only exacerbated migrant fears.  
                                                 
26 Uganda Protectorate, Labour Department Annual Report for 1948 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1949), 5. 
27 On the “jungle route” expression, see Richards, Economic Development, 60. On the relationship between 
perceived insecurity and migrant health, see the Labour Department’s Annual Reports for 1946-1948. 
28 LSE Richards, 7/11, Estates and Co-operatives; “Field-notes, visit to Lugazi Sugar Factory, Kyagwe,” 6 April 
1951. 
29 LSE Richards, 7/19, Kyagwe Survey, 1951; “Lukiko meeting, Ssabagabo muruka [Kyagwe],” 28 February 1951. 
30 LSE Richards 7/3, Modern Political Organization; “Interview with Graham Moss, DC Masaka,” 5 May 1951. 
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Yet sometimes the evidence of forcible recruitment was incontrovertible, at which point 
the British were quick to place the blame at the feet of Asian businessmen, African headmen, and 
the occasional non-British European. Sir Granville Orde-Browne, then the Labor Advisor to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, reported that the demands of wartime production had had a 
“retrograde influence” on certain businesses in Uganda, namely the two Asian firms: “[T]wo 
managers of important Indian concerns,” he wrote in 1946, “approached me for support for 
measures on compulsion, penal sanctions, and corporal punishment of a preposterous nature.”31 
This was implicit in the larger mantra about the importance of employers taking over primary 
responsibility for labor health. Either way, the problem was racialized, stereotyping irrational 
natives who told wild tales of kidnappers along the road, and unscrupulous Asians who abused 
their workers.  
The story of Paulo Kabano offers insight into the possibilities and perils that Uganda’s 
immigration practices created during the interwar years.32 Originally from Mukonya in 
Ruhengeri Province, northwestern Rwanda, Paulo first came to Uganda in January 1944, when 
he was only fifteen years old. On the cusp of adulthood, he knew what awaited him if he 
remained in Ruhengeri for much longer: The average Rwandan farmer no longer worked for 
himself, but for the state, and the demands of the state were always growing. Born in the wake of 
the Rwakayihura famine (1928-30), Paulo had grown up during a period of unprecedented state 
expansion, and had watched his parents struggle to keep their household afloat amid ever-
increasing demands on their time, energy, and labor. Forced labor was accompanied by the 
constant threat of corporal punishment. “Sometimes,” Paulo said, “without luck on his side, [my 
                                                 
31 TNA CO 536/213/4, East Africa: Uganda: Labour Conditions, 1943; Orde-Browne, Notes, 21 May 1946. 
32 Interview: P.K., Mukono District, 11 September and 8 November 2013. 
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father] would come back [at the end of the day] when he had gotten eight strokes of the cane.” 
Paulo himself worked as an unpaid domestic servant in the home of the local sub-chief. It is little 
wonder, then, that he started looking for an escape.  
The opportunity came in December 1943, when six of his neighbors—all members of his 
clan—returned to Mukonya on holiday. They had been in Uganda, working on private farms in 
Buganda, and had only come back to bring money to their families and to check on their 
homesteads. It was during their visit that Paulo hatched a plan: he would ask his master for a 
chance to visit his parents, but instead of going home, he would run away with his clan mates. “I 
told [my master], ‘Let me go see my parents at home for only two Sundays, two Sundays,’” he 
recalls. “The days I would have spent [at home] were used to walk to Uganda...He was [later] 
just told that I left.”  
The timing of his departure was significant, because in theory, he should not have been 
able to leave Rwanda when he did. That was the year when the British and Belgians decided to 
close their mutual border in order to prevent Rwandan victims of the Ruzagayura famine (1942-
44) from seeking asylum in Uganda. The closure lasted for several months, during which time 
many unfortunate travelers were apprehended at the major border stations at Kisoro and Kabale 
(see Nyirambonwa’s story, Chapter Three). Paulo’s ability to escape depended in large part on 
the travel expertise of his companions. They knew the main route, but more importantly, they 
knew the back roads. Warned ahead of time by fellow travelers about the border closure, the 
party diverted from the main road as they approached Kisoro, crossing the border at night by 
way of a hidden footpath. Having made the journey many times before, they were able to evade 
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new obstructions such as border closures, while less-experienced migrants were apprehended and 
deported.33 
The party’s successful passage at Kisoro, however, was only the first challenge they 
would face during their long walk to Buganda, and Paulo’s travel companions, no matter how 
experienced or knowledgeable, could not be prepared for all situations. They did not know, for 
example, that the border closure had caused an uproar among the Protectorate’s plantation 
owners, who viewed the government’s actions as a direct assault on their labor supply and thus 
their bottom line.34 Stories of forced labor recruitment multiplied during the border closure, and 
Paulo was an unhappy recipient of the industry’s wrath. As the group approached Masaka, Paulo 
remembered, they came across a set of three waiting lorries. “We were walking and when we got 
to the road with the six people I came with, we joined others—Banyankole, Barundi... we were 
many,” he said. “We were found and kidnapped in the area in Masaka called Mbirizi, somewhere 
before you reach Masaka, we were kidnapped and put on the side, they brought three lorries and 
we were put in and locked in.” When asked how the Kakira employees managed to capture such 
a large group, Paulo laughed. “We could not fight them. They were more than us.” The men who 
captured them were neither Asian nor Baganda, he said, but “blacks” from northern Uganda and 
Congo. “The Lugbara were very tough!” he exclaimed, adding that some of his kidnappers had 
also been Congolese. “Do you think you can call a Congolese a person?” he asked rhetorically, 
using racial stereotypes about the militancy of northerners to explain his inability to escape. 
                                                 
33 The border closure was short-lived and attracted considerable grief from the business community. See Chapter 
Three for a more detailed analysis of the closure. For more on the Protectorate’s efforts to deport sick and injured 
migrants, including those deemed “mentally unfit,” see KigDA Immigration Box 1, File MIG.2/1, Repatriation of 
Africans (Destitutes), 1935-43; KigDA Immigration Box 6, File MIG 004, All Districts: Inquiries Concerning 
Surrounding Refugees, 1945-73.  
34 D.P.S. Ahluwalia, Plantation and the Politics of Sugar in Uganda (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1995) 121. 
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The lorries transported Paulo to Kakira Sugar Works in eastern Buganda, where he 
worked for six months, supposedly as a contract laborer (though he does not recall ever signing 
an agreement). Uncertain of where they were and unfamiliar with eastern Buganda, he and his 
relatives decided to remain at Kakira, having been promised room and board and a decent wage. 
Paulo’s own memories of life at the plantation are mixed. On the one hand, he consistently 
referred to his time there as “kasanvu,” suggesting that, although the Protectorate had abolished 
forced labor in the 1920s, the word lived on as a reference to other forms of coerced labor. Work 
in the cane fields was difficult, and Paulo was only paid half of what his older relatives received, 
on the grounds that he was a “child” and therefore incapable of doing a full day’s work. Meals 
consisted of stale posho served with beans or groundnuts, the latter of which was an unfamiliar 
and acquired taste for most Rwandan migrants. Workers were not allowed to leave the 
plantation, nor did they receive their wages until six months had passed. On the other hand, 
Paulo also had favorable memories of Kakira. “We were treated well,” he said. “There was no 
one to beat you and we changed shifts on time.” While it seems unlikely that Paulo was treated 
“well”—even ignoring his forcible conscription, cane cutters at Kakira suffered an appallingly 
high death rate, which had contributed to riots in 1942—his emphasis on the regularity of hours 
and meals and the absence of corporal punishment suggests his life of kasanvu was better than 
what he experienced at home.  
At the end of six months, a Kakira lorry returned Paulo to Masaka, from where he walked 
the rest of the way to Ruhengeri. He returned home with only thirty-six shillings in his pocket, 
the sum total of his wages; what a grown man working for a private farmer might earn in a 
month, Paulo had earned in half a year. He remained in his parents’ home for another two years, 
turning down invitations from his relatives to go back to Buganda. But he did eventually go 
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back, only this time he paid fifteen shillings to ride the bus from Kisoro to Kampala in order to 
avoid the labor recruiters in Masaka. That he would purchase a ticket that cost two-and-a-half 
times his previous monthly salary at Kakira was evidence of his fear of the recruiter lorries, but it 
also reflected his determination to return to Uganda.  
His second journey was far more rewarding. He traveled alone this time, if traveling in an 
over-crowded bus with other Banyarwanda, Congolese, and western Ugandans could be called 
traveling alone. He knew that some of his more distant relations had found work in eastern 
Buganda, and he hoped to find them by talking to other migrants he met en route. In this hope he 
was not disappointed, as there were people on the bus who knew his relatives and were able to 
direct him to where they stayed in Mukono. Arriving in Mukono, he stayed with his relatives for 
two weeks, during which time he looked for work.  
Paulo eventually found secure employment as a domestic in the household of a wealthy 
chief.35 How he landed this position is a bit unclear, but he was likely put in contact with the 
chief through other Banyarwanda laborers who worked in his fields. Paulo described the chance 
opportunity as a gift from God, but one also gathers that he knew how to play the part of the 
“house boy,” a title heavy with gendered connotations. He had already learned, from his prior 
experience in Rwanda, that he could win the favor of a patron by being “humble and obedient,” 
carrying out household chores normally reserved for women. When asked why he thought he 
was chosen over other applicants, he even likened his good fortune to a marriage proposal in 
which he was the lucky bride: “Amongst many people, many women, wouldn’t you pick just one 
[to marry]?” Perceiving an opportunity to get ahead by taking on the role of the deferential 
household help, he performed his daily tasks with diligence and attention to detail.  
                                                 
35 For the sake of Paulo’s anonymity, I have decided to omit the name of the chief. 
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Paulo remained with his employer for the next twenty years, living in a grass hut behind 
the main house. In contrast to his time at Kakira, where he spent most of his work and leisure 
time with other Kinyarwanda-speaking migrants, his position as a houseboy brought him into the 
more intimate spaces of Ganda life, where he had to communicate in Luganda and organize his 
days around the itineraries of his master’s children.36 In our interviews, Paulo was reticent to 
share details about his previous employer, even though he boasted that he knew “a lot [of] very 
private and important” information. Whatever he knew about the inner world of Ganda politics, 
he was evidently keen to demonstrate his mastery of Ganda history and culture, even lecturing 
my research partner, Rebecca—a young Muganda woman belonging to the royal clan, 
Bambejja—on the importance of being able to count back the generations of Ganda kings. He 
later became exasperated when Rebecca didn’t seem to know the biography of his former 
employer or how he came to reside in Mukono. “What got him from Kampala to Mukono?” he 
asked incredulously, repeating Rebecca’s question: 
PK: I think that you are not getting these things properly. 
R: We will get them. 
PK: You ought to understand. 
R: I have gotten them. 
PK: You ought to understand, you know, Kabaka Mutesa, the Kabaka who gave [my 
boss] the chief’s title. 
R: (conceding defeat) Yes, sir. 
 
Later, while discussing the affairs of Mutesa, Rebecca made the mistake of asking which 
Mutesa Paulo was referring to. “The one who produced Mutebi, the current king.” Glancing at 
                                                 
36 Richards, Economic Development, 134. 
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his wife, he shook his head. “Mutesa the First, can you know? Can you count [the kings]? You 
can’t.”37  
Paulo took great pride in his social connections and cultural literacy, but neither of these 
provided sufficient security in late colonial Buganda. Paulo knew he was like a member of his 
employer’s household, but he was still only a domestic servant and his status was subject to 
change. And so, after spending several years in Mukono, he set about securing a more reliable 
attachment to Buganda: He acquired land.  
From Migrants to Settlers 
Buganda’s unique land practices enabled migrants like Paulo to relocate permanently to Uganda. 
Xenophobic politics would rear their ugly head in the 1950s, but ethnic identity was never a 
prerequisite for access to land. Buganda political authority during the mid-late nineteenth century 
was based on land tenure and, more specifically, the power of the chief to distribute that land—
which he received from the Ganda king, the kabaka—to his followers in exchange for their 
loyalty and labor. In turn, his followers had the power to leave and find new patrons if he proved 
to be a harsh, incompetent, or lazy administrator. This relationship of reciprocal obligation kept 
Buganda’s political order in balance.38 Social membership, then, was primarily tied to 
relationships and land, and only secondarily to territorial origins.  
Colonialism profoundly altered the politics and practices of land tenure, which in turn 
altered the terms of client-patron relationships and political membership in Buganda. Under the 
1900 Buganda Agreement, which provided the legal platform for colonial rule in Uganda, British 
                                                 
37 In fairness to Rebecca, herself a schoolteacher, Paulo was discussing Muteesa II, who reigned from 1939-69. 
Muteesa I reigned from c. 1856-1884. She was not about to challenge him during our conversation, however. 
38 Hanson, Landed obligation, 240. 
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agents and powerful Ganda chiefs negotiated a new system of land tenure that came to replace 
earlier landholding practices with a rationalized grid of individual freehold plots. This new 
system, known as mailo, turned chiefs into landowners where previously they had functioned 
more like stewards of the kabaka, who had in principle owned all of the land. Individual freehold 
broke the cycle of reciprocal obligation, for it ensured that landowning chiefs were no longer 
dependent on the kabaka for their source of power and authority. Instead of pandering to a 
centralized monarch, chiefs could use their property to accrue wealth-in-rent through private 
leasing.39 Baganda clients-cum-tenants lost much of their sole bargaining power (i.e., their ability 
to leave patrons) when they became tied to the land through leases, and were furthermore subject 
to the whims of their new landlord-chiefs, who could evict tenants at will and without reason. 
Changes to the Buganda land market added to the labor vacuum created by the abolition 
of kasanvu. The 1900 Buganda Agreement had enabled land-owning chiefs to lease small plots 
to whomever they chose, but this new tenure system offered few protections to tenants and was 
weighted heavily in favor of landlords. By the mid-1920s, public resentment of abusive Ganda 
landlords boiled over into a vigorous populist movement known as the Bataka Association,40 
which united a broad spectrum of peasants and clan heads against the landed chiefly class. The 
critical aspect of this collaboration was that it sought to unify bakopi (peasants) and bataka 
(traditional clan elders) regardless of nationality or birthplace against the landlords. 
Banyarwanda immigrants and settlers, then, were welcomed members of the class-based 
coalition. In the end, the Protectorate determined that it could not overturn the 1900 Agreement, 
                                                 
39 Richards, Economic Development and Tribal Change, 173. Elsewhere in colonial Africa, native councils 
controlled access to land, and it was much more difficult and politically sensitive for a governing body to 
collectively decide to grant tenancy to outsiders. 
40 Not to be confused with the Bataka Union of the 1940s. 
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but it did pass the Envujo and Busulu laws. These laws codified leasing rates (busulu) and the 
percentage that landlords could receive from a sharecropper’s profits (envujo), and made it 
nearly impossible to evict tenants from their rented plots.41 Perhaps most importantly, the laws 
made ebibanja a heritable asset: upon his death, a tenant’s land would pass to his heir—it would 
not revert back to his landlord. Busulu and Envujo laws revolutionized Buganda’s land market by 
providing previously unheard-of protections to tenants. Moreover, the guarantee of heritability 
allowed peasant families to accrue wealth across generations independent of patron-client 
networks.  
The new law also did not discriminate on the basis of tribe or origin. Migrants could 
claim the same legal protections as native tenants, thus challenging earlier notions of belonging 
and social order. This was to have a profound and lasting impact on immigration to the 
Protectorate, for it provided migrants with the option of settling in Buganda without fear of 
arbitrary eviction. Migrants who chose not to permanently relocate could still take advantage of 
the new tenancy laws by supplementing their incomes with money earned from planting fast-
growing cotton on rented land. This latter option proved extremely profitable for Banyarwanda 
accustomed to low wages, so much so that many were able to abandon manual labor on Ganda 
farms altogether and begin growing cash crops instead. In his 1949 report, the Labour Director 
lamented that the availability of land, and its accessibility to migrants, meant that industrial 
concerns could no longer attract sufficient numbers of laborers. Given the option of working for 
an employer or himself, a migrant usually chose the latter. “Until such time as the land available 
                                                 
41 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda 
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for cultivation throughout the country can no longer meet the needs of an increasing population,” 
he wrote, “the labour shortage is likely to continue.”42  
The EAISR Study 
Buganda was, by the early 1950s, grappling with the effects of an incredible population boom, 
one that owed as much to immigration as it did to natural reproduction. Protectorate efforts to 
manage immigration through halfway measures like transit camps and road construction had 
failed to check immigration rate. This was shockingly clear in the 1948 census data, which found 
that the kingdom’s African population had grown by 49.6 percent since 1931.43 The census 
findings, combined with a conservative swing in Ganda politics, gave rise to nativist fears that 
Buganda was being invaded by foreigners.44 Ganda editorialists warned their compatriots that 
they were rapidly becoming a minority in their own land, while landlords and chiefs called for 
greater government surveillance of migrants.45  
Uganda’s administrative hierarchy, however, was not set up to “know” individual 
subjects. In theory, the muruka chief was supposed to serve as the eyes and ears of the 
government, providing invaluable information about the comings and goings of his people. In 
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practice, however, chiefly ability varied tremendously across time and space. In more urban 
areas like Kampala, or rural areas with high resident turnover like Kyagwe, miruka chiefs were 
hard-pressed to keep up with the constant flow of people in and out of their jurisdictions.46 This 
was reflected in the parish tax registries. A muruka chief’s primary responsibility was to collect 
taxes, a job that presumably required him to keep a registry of revenues collected and owed. Yet, 
as Southall and Gutkind found in their two-year study of local governance in Kampala, muruka 
tax registries bore little resemblance to demographic realities. Chiefs were required to collect a 
fixed amount for their parish as a whole; they did not need to ensure that each taxpayer 
contributed their share. This allowed for widespread tax evasion, particularly by migrants who 
could claim that they had paid taxes elsewhere.47  
Growing concerns about migrants prompted the Protectorate government, in 1950, to 
commission Audrey Richards, then Director of the Kampala-based East African Institute of 
Social Research (EAISR), to conduct a preliminary study of the situation in Buganda Kingdom. 
Over the next three years, Richards and her team of anthropologists fanned out across Buganda, 
conducting interviews, village surveys, and intensive archival research; checking government 
census data; visiting labor camps; and traveling up and down the main migration routes that led 
to Buganda. Focusing on three amassaza or counties—Buddu (West), Busiro (Central), and 
Kyagwe (East)—the EAISR team was able to chart the distribution of migrants across the 
Protectorate and note differences in settlement patterns. Despite government fears of 
detribalization, Richards found that many Banyarwanda migrants were able to successfully 
                                                 
46 Southall and Gutkind, Townsmen, 191-92; Richards, Economic Development, 235-40. 
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assimilate into Buganda society: they secured local patrons, adopted local names and dress, 
learned the Luganda language, and sent their children to local mission schools. While Baganda 
interviewees often spoke disparagingly of the abannamawanga (foreigners), denying that a 
Munyarwanda could ever pass as a Muganda native, the Province’s diverse African populace 
seemed to be getting along peaceably in practice.  
Nevertheless, even as Richards demonstrated the tremendous capacity of Ganda society 
to incorporate foreigners, she still concluded her study with an ominous warning: if the 
Protectorate did not find a way to incorporate Rwandan migrants into the political state, then the 
coming of independence “may quite possibly cause a recrudescence of ‘tribalism’.” Buganda’s 
population problem, she argued, was not about resource scarcity or ethnic tension per se, but 
rather the government’s reluctance to ensure the equitable incorporation of settlers. Summarizing 
her major findings, she stated that, “Buganda has assimilated an enormous influx of foreigners in 
the past twenty-five years and has done so in an unexpectedly peaceful manner.” But, she added, 
“in the future its government will have to decide whether it wants to encourage or discourage 
colonising [settler] migration; and whether it wants to facilitate the complete social absorption of 
migrants already settled on the land or to continue to treat them as people of inferior social 
status.”48 The Protectorate, in other words, had a difficult choice to make. It could either accept 
the permanency of Rwandan settlement and work toward greater social cohesion and political 
inclusion, or refuse to accept this demographic shift and instead pursue segregation and mobility 
control.  
In the end, however, it chose neither. Believing foreign migrants to be too critical to the 
country’s bottom line, the Protectorate continued to encourage Rwandan migration at the same 
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time that it refused to invest in the administrative infrastructure necessary for their incorporation. 
The consequence of this refusal was that chiefs—especially the lowest-paid miruka chiefs and 
their unpaid headmen—found themselves in charge of rapidly expanding jurisdictions which 
they possessed neither the resources nor personnel they needed to administer effectively. Private 
landlords, meanwhile, granted access to land and the coveted kibanja title, which gave migrants 
the closest thing approaching legal residency. Low-level bureaucrats and landed interests, in 
short, became the face of “the state” for Rwandan settlers, determining who belonged and who 
did not.  
Part II: Studying Migrants 
The lukiko (council) meeting at Sabawali parish had taken an uncomfortable turn. Ganda 
landlords, decked in impeccable white kanzu (tunics), shifted in their seats while tenant farmers 
and ragged field-hands, uninvited but curious, leaned into the crowded hall through open 
windows. Richards and her EASIR colleague, A.B. Mukwaya, sat at the front of the room, 
waiting. Their research assistant, Mr. Kabubi, poised with pencil to paper, was ready to record 
the room’s answer to Richards’ question: “Is it a good thing that the Ganda should live together 
with other people?” The Baganda had always lived together with other people, of course—pre-
colonial Buganda had been, like any empire, heterogeneous—but that was not the gist of the 
inquiry.49 Richards and Mukwaya were not asking about the potential assimilability of abstract 
‘others.’ Theirs was a specific question about contemporary Buganda’s rise as a major 
destination for migrant workers from Ruanda-Urundi, a phenomenon driven in large part by the 
landed aristocracy’s demands for cheap labor and paying tenants. Ganda landlords and the 
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108 
 
colonial state had made a killing off of Rwandan migration during the 1940s and ‘50s, yet their 
profits came at a price: The cost of land was rising, as was the number of non-Ganda tenants. 
People told Richards they feared foreigners would one day take over the kingdom from within. 
“Buganda will lose her empire just as Rome did when they kept slaves and forgot how to work,” 
one chief told her.50 For many Baganda, the question of Rwandan settlement was believed to be 
an existential one.51 
Several awkward moments passed as meeting participants waited for someone else to 
answer. Finally, after much “embarrassment and shrugging of shoulders,” one elderly landlord 
stood up and said that migrants were welcome as seasonal workers, but they should not be 
settling in Buganda. “They are eating our land,” another concurred. The uneasy silence gave way 
to a buzz of angry murmurs. “Where will our children live?!” someone demanded from the back 
row. At this point, another man, “wall-eyed” and “blunt,” attempted to intervene. Standing up 
before the council, he informed his neighbors what they no doubt already knew: he was “a 
Munyarwanda,” he “suppose[d],” but he was “born here.” His parents were dead, and he had 
nowhere else to go. “[I] never even went as far as Mbarara,” he said humbly, attempting to cut 
the tension of the room with gentle self-deprecation. The audience rewarded his performance of 
obliging dependency with “good-humored laughter,” but it was not enough to turn the collective 
mood. The EAISR team had struck a nerve.  
As the laughter fizzled, another man, described in Kabubi’s notes as “old,” “mild,” and 
dressed in a “dirty coat and dirty kansu [sic],” rose and stated that he, too, was a Munyarwanda. 
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51 Shane Doyle, “Immigrants and Indigenes: the Lost Counties Dispute and the evolution of ethnic identity in 
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But unlike his compatriot, he was not prepared to cater to Ganda egos. “I have planted trees here 
and have cows…I don’t want to go. Besides, the foreigners are married to Ganda and have 
children by them. Do you want to lose these?” Rumblings from the audience, but the man 
pressed on: “I have paid my busulu [rent] and have done everything I ought to do.” Pausing 
briefly, he then posed a question of his own: “Is there anything wrong that I have done? I have 
been here six years. Have I done anything wrong during that time?” Turning to sit back down, he 
again challenged his infuriated listeners to “tell me if I have done anything wrong.” 
Have I done anything wrong? In highlighting his investments in land, trees, cows, and 
family, the second Rwandan speaker was challenging the boundaries of Ganda society. He made 
no attempt to fool his neighbors about his identity—they knew where he came from—but he also 
refused their efforts to consign him to a second-class status.52 For starters, he had paid busulu, 
thus establishing his legal right to residency. Beyond this, he claimed to have “done everything” 
that he “ought to do” as a responsible member of the community. He communicated in Luganda 
and wore Ganda dress, however imperfectly. He grew cash crops and contributed to the local 
economy, and he had evidently figured out the delicate balance of gift-giving that underwrote 
landlord-tenant and local government relations. He knew, furthermore, that he was part of a 
demographic shift that neither the Baganda nor the British could stop: Rwandans were settling 
down permanently in the hundreds of thousands across the Buganda kingdom. Protectorate 
authorities, believing that the country’s economic success hinged on the ready availability of 
migrant workers, did little to hinder their movement, preferring instead to allow Rwandans to 
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integrate freely with the local population. Unimpeded by onerous pass systems, native reserve 
schemes or immigration controls like those found in neighboring Kenya, Rwandan migrants 
were living side-by-side with Ganda residents. They were adopting Ganda names, renting Ganda 
land, and finding Ganda partners. The man’s question about children (did the Ganda want to lose 
these?) was thus a pointed rebuke of Ganda chauvinism and their hypocritical treatment of 
Rwandan settlers. He knew, as did his neighbors, that the Ganda did not have the power to 
dictate Rwandan migration as a phenomenon. 
As an individual, however, the man in the dirty kansu was taking a serious risk in 
publicly challenging the lukiko and the parish’s land-owning class. He claimed that he deserved 
to live in Buganda because he paid busulu and observed local norms, but his presumptiveness 
was precisely the problem. Wealthy Ganda were not interested in civilizing Banyarwanda, but in 
domesticating them. They wanted docile, disease-free workers who would show up in season and 
depart after the harvest. Rwandan migrants who tried to adopt local dress, manners, and language 
were not appeasing Ganda chauvinists, but threatening the social hierarchy that supported Ganda 
prosperity. And so, while the landlords in Sabawali could do little to stop the general flow of 
migrants into Buganda, they could certainly make life difficult for one uppity tenant.  
The nerve of the man to challenge his own exclusion at the Sabawali lukiko was enough 
to excite the first Rwandan man—the deferential “wall-eyed” chap—into emergency action. 
Raising his voice above the angry din of the meeting hall, he tried desperately to calm the 
audience by cutting his compatriot down to size. “Those children aren’t his,” he said, “They are 
his brother’s. And the cows aren’t his, they are his brother’s.” “Brother” was an honorific that 
Rwandan migrants used to refer to Baganda, and the man’s statement was an attempt to assure 
the lukiko that no one was threatening to take away children or cows from the Kingdom; no one 
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was threatening the social order. “The Baganda are our friends and we depend on them. We must 
live together.” His anxious pleas, however, fell on deaf ears. The meeting ended abruptly, 
without the usual ceremony. Outside the hall, landowners refused to pose for Richards’ group 
photograph if foreigners were to be included. Kabubi recorded that even after the meeting 
disbanded, people remained in the hall to continue their “angry discussion” for another half-
hour.53 
*** 
The literature on Banyarwanda settlement in Uganda has emphasized the ability of 
migrants to assimilate into Ganda culture. Highlighting the generosity of the Protectorate’s 
tenancy laws, the relative accessibility of Buganda’s native court system, and the flexibility of 
east African identities, scholars have argued that Rwandan migrants enjoyed unique 
opportunities to both assert and reinvent themselves in late colonial Uganda. Images in Richards’ 
study present a gendered, teleological narrative of Rwandan assimilation, in which ragged 
bachelors living in grass-huts slowly morph into respectable Ganda peasants with wives and 
children.54 Yet it would be wrong to assume that all Banyarwanda could assimilate, or that they 
wanted to. Even as they took up land, adopted Ganda names and sent their children to Ugandan 
schools, Rwandan migrants still found themselves on the short end of local power inequalities. 
The British had opened the country’s gates to foreign workers, but landlords, chiefs, and 
employers still possessed considerable means to make life difficult for them, especially those 
who struggled to speak Luganda or who were naive of local laws. Even the Busulu and Envujo 
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laws, which were intended to protect the most vulnerable tenants against abuse, were not enough 
to mitigate the power differential between Ganda landlord and foreign settler. A landlord, for 
instance, could refuse to issue a busulu ticket to an immigrant kibanja holder, meaning that the 
tenant lacked proof of legal occupancy.55 The tenant could haul his or her landlord to court, but 
always at the risk of retaliation. A gombolola chief in Buddu informed Richards in 1950 that 
landlords were beginning to chase foreign tenants off their ebibanja plots. Tenants could contest 
their eviction in the courts—and when they did, they often won—but the landlord would find 
other ways to make life difficult for them. The gombolola chief gave as an example the story of a 
landlord in Kayonde who informed his unwanted tenants that he was reducing their monthly 
wages by nearly half, from 25/- per month to 15/-; four tenants abandoned their claims as a 
result.56 
Rwandan migrants therefore had compelling reasons to try and become Ganda, or at least 
to study them closely. “Assimilation” was neither automatic nor easy, and certainly not a process 
to romanticize. A migrant’s education in Ganda ways generally began on the road, in the 
company of more experienced travelers who knew the way and could already speak broken 
Luganda. Reaching Buganda, many found accommodation, not in migrant hostels, 
neighborhoods or camps, but with Ganda farmers who allowed them to sleep in their kitchens or 
build temporary huts on their land in exchange for menial labor. Here, in the domestic spaces of 
Ganda kitchens and compounds, migrants gained some of their first critical insights into their 
hosts’ everyday routines, personal hygiene practices, and family life. They came to know the 
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parish chief and received visits from his headmen. Migrants would have opportunity to witness 
and perhaps even attend the monthly parish lukiko (council) meetings where the chief and his 
men announced new government policies and arbitrated local disputes.  
Learning how to comport oneself, however, required significant trial-and-error. Richards’ 
field journals document fascinating confrontations between Ganda landlords and migrant settlers 
that illustrate the rough edges of assimilation. At a meeting of landowners in Buddu, for 
example, Richards’ interview was cut short by a young Rwandan man who loudly demanded to 
be let in to the hall. Dressed in a kansu, he informed the meeting attendees that he had “been here 
many years” farming his own kibanja, and had no intention of either returning to Rwanda or 
working for the Ganda. When several landowners began to mock him angrily, saying “He can’t 
even talk Luganda!,” another Rwandan man who had been watching the confrontation from the 
back row quickly stood up and came to his compatriot’s defense. “Can we be sent back?” he 
asked. “If so, will [you] pay us for our land and houses?”57 While many migrants tried to keep a 
low profile, others challenged Ganda condescension by highlighting their accomplishments, 
family ties, and tenure claims. An anonymous editorialist wrote to the Uganda Herald to say that 
he “protested against the common statement by Ganda that the Government was taking the 
money ‘earned’ by the sweat of their brows and pointed out that it was, after all, the sweat of 
Ruanda brows that was in question!”58 Bursting into lukiko meetings uninvited, shouting pointed 
questions from the sidelines, and hauling abusive landlords to court, migrants openly challenged 
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114 
 
the boundaries of moral community in mid-century Buganda, employing their knowledge of 
Ganda society to make arguments about their place within it.  
The Public Square 
The muruka lukiko, or parish council, was a critical site for both migrant education and self-
assertion. Its weekly meetings provided a public venue where African residents might bring their 
disputes, both large and small, to the attention of their local administrators. Doyle has argued that 
low-level chiefs used the council as a space for disciplining foreigners and inculcating them with 
an appreciation for empisa, or Ganda behavioral norms.59 Indeed, Aidan Southall and Peter 
Gutkind, in their 1957 ethnography of urban governance in Kampala, found that miruka chiefs 
often believed that they bore some responsibility for “civilizing” migrants.60 According to one 
chief they interviewed, practicing good empisa involved, among other things,  
“the paying of poll-tax, raising an alarm when someone was attacked, bringing a culprit 
to the chief, asking for permits and not doing anything without permission, eating only 
Ganda foods, being clean in the use of latrines and bathrooms, speaking Luganda, 
greeting people and respecting those in authority.”61  
 
The lukiko held significant political and economic sway over residents, most especially in 
the rural areas where most chiefs and headmen were powerful landlords, but it was not a one-
way street. It was not simply a place where Ganda imparted their values onto presumed 
foreigners. Migrants could also use the courts to assert themselves and protect their interests in 
an increasingly heterogeneous society. Muruka jurisprudence, in other words, was not only a site 
of discipline, but of negotiation as well.  
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The council was made up of the muruka chief, his appointed headmen, and a clerk who 
(in theory) recorded the assembly’s proceedings. While the muruka chief had historically served 
both administrative and judicial functions, his role had since changed under the Protectorate 
state. Under Protectorate law, the council was an executive body whose primary responsibility 
was to collect taxes and implement government policy. Legally, it did not have constitutional 
authority to preside over court cases, but in practice, muruka council meetings frequently 
doubled as hearings for local disputes. These disputes covered a wide range of questions, from 
land tenure to child custody to witchcraft accusations. However, the chief was limited in what he 
could do, because he could not enforce a judgment. In the case of civil disputes, if he failed to 
bring about a resolution through arbitration, he would have to refer it to the gombolola court, the 
lowest-level native court recognized under Protectorate law; all criminal disputes had to be 
referred immediately to the police. Despite the chief’s dubious judicial authority, local residents 
nevertheless brought their cases to the lukiko for arbitration. Southall and Gutkind found that in 
Mengo parish, the council heard sixty cases over the course of the year, of which only eleven 
were referred to the gombolola court. The parish court, then, served a practical if poorly 
recognized and legally questionable role in the Buganda Native Court system. 
The relative informality and dubious legal authority of the muruka court arguably 
contributed to its accessibility for migrants. For example, Gutkind recorded an incident in 
Mulago in which a Rwandan woman “in great agitation” stormed into the lukiko meeting and 
demanded that her case be heard immediately. That the plaintiff was both female and Rwandan 
was not in itself unusual, at least in this part of Buganda: over 40% of cases recorded in the 
Mulago council diary during the 1950s were brought by non-Ganda.62 What was unusual was the 
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woman’s boldness. Instead of politely kneeling and waiting for the council to recognize her (as 
was custom), she marched up to the council’s table and interrupted the chief who was in the 
middle of other lukiko business. Before the chief could even respond, another man—the 
woman’s husband—came charging into the hall and attempted to drag his wife away bodily; she 
responded to his assault by hitting him repeatedly until he let her go. The court, rather than 
arresting or dismissing the couple, agreed to hear their case there and then.63  
Indeed, the muruka council meetings provided a source of entertainment and information 
for local residents, and even those who did not bring a case themselves could still attend and 
enjoy the show. Richards and Southall and Gutkind all noted the frequent presence of bystanders 
at council gatherings, who came either because they were interested in a specific case, or because 
they wanted to “simply sit and listen and watch life pass along the street.”64 The court was in 
many ways a stage where jealous lovers, conniving neighbors, and abused tenants could voice 
grievances against local residents known to the community. In Mulago, general attendance at 
lukiko meetings appears to have been relatively low most weeks, but a spectacular case might 
draw a crowd of several hundred people. Over 150 people showed up to witness the hearing of a 
man accused of bewitching his neighbor, for example, and raised a protest when the council 
refused to hear the case.65  
Many middle-class and wealthy Baganda viewed the muruka court and its raucous 
hearings with disdain, but this did not prevent tenants from using it to hold landlords accountable 
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to the law.66 Two Barundi approached Richards and Mukwaya while they are conducting 
fieldwork in Sabawali muruka, Buddu, asking for advice about their landlord. The men owned 
contiguous bibanja, which they had occupied for six years, and they had busulu and nvujju 
tickets to prove their tenancy. However, their landlord sold the land to another Muganda, who 
was now trying to force the men out without proper compensation. Mukwaya and Richards urged 
them to take their case to the muruka chief, reminding them that under the law, a landlord can 
only evict a kibanja tenant if the tenant has failed to develop the land or had nowhere else to live. 
“Mukwaya reminds me afterwards that the compensation price is fixed now. It is a shilling a tree. 
He thinks the muruka would have to award them at least this sum in court.”67 
The court was not accessible to everyone, however. All official business had to be carried 
out in Luganda without the aid of translators. This could cause some difficulty for non-Ganda 
settlers who spoke a different Bantu language like Runyankole or Kinyarwanda, especially if 
they were new to the area. For many northern Ugandans, however, who spoke non-Bantu 
languages, the Luganda requirement was a far more formidable deterrent. Gutkind and his 
research team attended nearly a hundred lukiko meetings over the course of two years, and in all 
that time they only witnessed one non-Bantu-speaking plaintiff, a Luo man complaining of 
missing property, bring his case to court. Despite living in a diverse neighborhood where 
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someone might surely have served as translator, the court nevertheless “forced [the plaintiff] to 
communicate...in Luganda.”68 
The parish council and court provided a potential avenue for asserting oneself in 
Buganda, but migrants who wished to remain on good terms with local Ganda authorities also 
needed to learn how to navigate complicated expectations about gift-giving and patronage. 
Kawalya Kagwa, the retired Katikiro and son of Apollo Kagwa, told Richards that  
“in my father’s day…peasants used to bring him presents of their crops; beans and 
bananas and beer. Everything! A man would be ashamed not to bring some of his food to 
the omwami. He would not like to go a month without bringing anything.  
 
R: What did they get in return?  
 
KK: They got their land. And of course their chief gave them things like bark-cloth and 
so on.” 
  
When Richards pressed him on contemporary “gifts” expected by landlords, suggesting 
that landlords with valuable land would not be happy with their 8/50 a year in rent plus envujo, 
he replied, “Well that is what they got by the case taken to London. You may have heard of it? 
The bataka were angry because the land had been given out by the Europeans with ‘individual 
land tenure.’”69 
 British researchers found little consensus on the subject of gift-giving. This was 
unsurprising, of course, given that the practice was technically illegal. Interlocutors who had 
something to gain from gift-giving would therefore have ample reason to dismiss its importance, 
while tenants might be more inclined to exaggeration.70 That the practice continued to be an 
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important facet of Ganda life, however, there was little doubt. Newly-arrived migrants had to 
find their place quickly in the moral economy of gift-giving if they hoped to find a place to stay. 
Low-paid chiefs and their unpaid headmen, who bore the brunt of a parish’s administrative labor, 
supplemented their incomes with bribes from squatters, sex workers, and unlicensed brewers. 
Landlords, meanwhile, consolidated their power through these exchanges.71 
Marriage and Clan 
The public square was not the only venue for Rwandan self-making and integration. They also 
negotiated identity in their changing domestic worlds. Relationships of clan and kin, and love 
and lust, offered hidden pathways into 1950s Buganda life. Even as the public square became 
increasingly hostile, Rwandans were making themselves at home with Ganda lovers, spouses, 
friends, and employers. While Richards’ interlocutors, both Ganda and foreign, frequently 
disparaged intermarriage as untenable, substantial evidence suggests that the social reality was 
far more complex. Much of this complexity had to do with the fact that Ganda women enjoyed 
considerable economic freedom in comparison to their counterparts elsewhere in East Africa. If 
Buganda’s unique land-market did not discriminate on the basis of origins, it also did not 
discriminate on the basis of gender. Women could inherit land from their late husbands and 
fathers, and could then use this land to grow profitable crops. As Doyle has argued, women’s 
relative access to productive resources granted them greater independence from family and clan, 
and this had important ramifications for Buganda’s sexual economy and social networks.72 Paulo 
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Kabano, for example, lived with his Ganda partner for many years before they married.73 This 
would not have been surprising to Richards, who found that “co-habitation” between Ganda and 
non-Ganda partners was relatively common.74 These relationships were typically long-term and 
exclusive, and could be found in both urban and rural areas. Many of these relationships 
produced children, who were often given Ganda names even if the father was a foreigner.75  
Richards believed that genuine integration into a local clan was rare, perhaps even 
impossible. A man might memorize clan lineages, adopt a clan name and observe certain 
avoidances, but Ganda interviewees insisted that they always saw through such performances. 
Indeed, Richards’ notebooks are replete with references to “incredulous sniggers” when migrants 
attempted to lay claim to local clan identities.76 “Their biggest vice was adopting the ways of the 
Baganda and naming their children with the same names as Baganda,” one elderly woman told 
me, adding that many migrants simply took the name of their employers: 
“Some used to take the names of their masters’ children and called their children those 
names, so that they may be counted as Ugandans or be ‘born’ into that clan. For example 
if there master's name was Nsubuga, they named their female child Nansubuga, etc. They 
wanted to adopt the ways of their masters.”77 
 
 While some migrants built kinship ties with their employers through the adoption of their 
clan, this was not the only means of re-identification. Paulo did not adopt the clan of his 
employer even though he worked as a houseboy for over two decades. Born a member of the 
                                                 
73 Interview: P.K., Mukono District, September 11, 2013. 
74 Richards, Economic Development, 178. 
75 Shane Doyle, “Parish Baptism Registers, Vital Registration and Fixing Identities in Uganda,” in Registration and 
Recognition: documenting the person in world history, eds. Keith Breckenridge and Simon Szreter (Oxford: 
Published for the British Academy by the Oxford University Press, 2012), 283-90.  
76 Richards, Economic Development, 176.       
77 Interview: N.F., Mukono District, September 12, 2013. 
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Abasinga clan in Ruanda, he later reassigned himself to the Ganda Ab’yente clan. Yet Paulo 
insisted that his change in name was superficial, not substantive: Ab’yente, he said, was the 
Luganda translation for Abasinga. Both names referred to members of the “cow clan,” which 
could be found (he claimed) in Uganda and Rwanda. “It wasn’t copying. It wasn’t copying 
because a cow is called a cow like how you hear ab’ente in Buganda, some of the people of the 
nte clan do not like cows.” Paulo’s wife, Nalongo, concurred that the two were “similar.” The 
two clans, however, have little historical relationship to one another. They share similar totemic 
avoidances—the Ab’yente refrain from eating certain kinds of beef, as do Abasinga—but here 
the similarities end. Paulo offered no evidence for his claims. Richards found that many migrants 
tried to “pass” as members of a Ganda clan by memorizing complex genealogies and referencing 
clan lands (butaka), but Paulo did neither. His was not a “clever ruse,” but a statement of what 
was, for him, a simple social fact: He was Abasinga from Rwanda, which was the same as 
Ab’yente in Buganda. The effort at translation, however, was a source of amusement for his wife, 
who was herself Muganda. “Nte!” she exclaimed during our interview while laughing good-
humoredly. “He is Kakooza!” Kakooza is a name given to male members of the Nte clan, and 
Paulo had evidently taken the name for himself. “Even [our] child here is Kakooza,” Nalongo 
explained. Paulo, in other words, insisted he was both Rwandan and a member of a Ganda clan, 
but had passed the latter identity on to his child.  
Paulo was not unique in his naming practices. Shane Doyle has found, in a review of 
thousands of entries in baptismal registries in the Catholic Church archives, that parents with 
non-Ganda-sounding names apparently adopted new names over time. Richards might have 
dismissed such naming practices with skepticism, but she also found cases of self-identifying 
migrants who claimed a Ganda clan on the grounds that it was the same as their own back home. 
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In Busiro, for example, she and her EASIR colleague Mukwaya visited a man whom they knew 
to be a Tanganyikan settler, and saw that he had a picture of a lion with a Ganda proverb hanging 
on his wall. Her journal records the conversation that ensued: “Mukwaya asks him if he honours 
the lion [is a member of the Ganda Mpologoma clan]. He says, Yes. I, knowing him to be a 
Munyamwesi [from Tanganyika], ask if the clans are the same. He looks annoyed and says that 
they are the same everywhere all over Africa.”78 
*** 
Paulo visited his parents’ farm in Ruhengeri for the last time in January 1957, but by that 
point, Rwanda was no longer home. He had acquired a kibanja in Mukono, and was making a 
decent salary working for a powerful patron. And, he said, “there were no disturbances” in 
Buganda as there were in Rwanda. Indeed, 1957 was a difficult year for Belgian Ruanda, and 
Paulo was not the only person to pull up stakes (see Chapter Four).79 Paulo was proud of his 
connections and accomplishments in Buganda. Yet, for all of his work of reinvention, he never 
denied where he came from: he was from Ruhengeri, he spoke Luganda with an unmistakable 
Rwandan accent, and he grinned when his wife laughed openly at his claims to be a member of 
the Ganda nte clan.  
 
 
                                                 
78 LSE Richards 7/18, Immigrant Labour Survey: Interview with Musigiri for Musisi mutala, Sabagabo muruka, 
Mumyuka Gombolola, Busiro, 26-27 November, 1950. 
79 Colonial authorities confirm at annual labor conventions that the number of people leaving Rwanda for Uganda 
was increasing. See TNA CO 822/1131: Uganda: Labour Agreement with Ruanda-Urundi, 1956; Minutes of a 
Meeting between a Mission from the Government of Ruanda-Urundi, and representatives of the Governments of 
Tanganyika Territory and Uganda Protectorate regarding Migrant Labour, November 30-December 3, 1954. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the efforts of Banyarwanda migrants to settle in Buganda. Buganda 
represented a political alternative to life in Ruanda-Urundi, an imagined refuge from famine, 
coerced labor, and state-sponsored violence at the hands of Tutsi chiefs. Two critical factors—a 
generous land tenure system, on the one hand, and the government’s lax approach to population 
management, on the other—facilitated Rwandan settlement, but these were insufficient 
protections against the tide of Ganda nativism. Buganda had its possibilities, but also its 
hierarchies. Landlords, chiefs, and employers possessed considerable means to make life difficult 
for migrants, especially those who struggled to speak Luganda or who were naive of local laws. 
Newcomers had to study their hosts carefully if they were to navigate social norms and the 
everyday politics of gift-giving, dispute settlement, and civic engagement.  
British and Baganda officials downplayed these political dimensions of Rwandan 
migration, choosing instead to frame Banyarwanda as “labor migrants” (or “wives of laborers”—
Chapter Three), but the reality was that Uganda was a refuge for Rwandans long before the 
outbreak of the 1959 revolution. Much of the literature on the Rwandan diaspora has emphasized 
the success of migrant integration in colonial Buganda. In this way, scholars have used pre-1959 
“migrants” as a foil to post-1959 “refugees,” contrasting the assimilability of the former with the 
political incongruity of the latter. This framework depoliticizes colonial migrants and their 
motivations for relocating to Uganda, at the same time that it flattens what was in fact a highly 
uneven and irregular process of settlement and integration. Uganda’s Rwandan refugee problem 
cannot be divorced from longer histories of politicized migration and population management. 
This elision also minimizes the role of the state in shaping regional mobility patterns over time. 
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The Protectorate, while not actively recruiting within Ruanda-Urundi, went to great lengths to 
clear the roads of physical and legal obstacles. 
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Chapter 3: Women’s Work: Gendering the Banyarwanda Diaspora 
 
Not all migrant women were prostitutes. This was one of the conclusions drawn by 
anthropologist Audrey Richards during her 1950-1 study of Banyarwanda1 labor migration to the 
Uganda Protectorate. Richards’ research team, commissioned by the Protectorate administration 
and financed by the Colonial Office, based their findings on 200 interviews that they conducted 
with migrant women from Ruanda-Urundi at government transit camps along the highway 
connecting central Uganda to the Rwanda border. When asked why they traveled, the majority of 
respondents replied that they were going to visit family, or to find husbands. Still others said that 
they were in the process of permanently relocating to Uganda, often (but not always) to join 
spouses, siblings, parents, and adult children who had gone before them.2 These answers, 
combined with overwhelming statistical evidence and two years of ethnographic observation, 
pointed to a demographic phenomenon of which the colonial authorities had long been aware but 
only faintly understood: migrants from Ruanda-Urundi were putting down permanent roots in 
Uganda, and an observable increase in women’s mobility was symptomatic of this trend. 
                                                 
1 During most of the colonial period, the British typically referred to all Kinyarwanda-speaking migrants from the 
Mandated Territory of Ruanda-Urundi (present-day Rwanda and Burundi) as "Banyarwanda," an ethnic neologism 
that masked more than it revealed. Distinguishing between Rwandans and Burundians in the historical record is 
therefore not always possible. For this reason, I use the label of "Banyarwanda" to refer to migrants from the 
Belgian Territory, unless my source directs me to a more suitable alternative (See Mukamusana's story, for 
example). That said, all available sources—colonial demographers, anthropologists, and church records—indicate 
that more Rwandans than Burundians settled in Uganda, with the 1959 Uganda census recording 350,000 
permanently-settled Rwandan migrants in Buganda, against 150,000 Burundians. See J-P Chrétien, "Des Sedentaires 
Devenus Migrants: Les Motifs des départs des Burundais et des Rwandais vers l'Uganda (1920-1960)," Cultures et 
développement: Revue internationale des sciences du développement, 10:1 (1978): 71-101. 
2 Audrey Richards, ed., Economic Development and Tribal Change: A Study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda 
(Cambridge, U.K.: W. Heffer & Sons, Ltd., 1954), 72-74.  
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Government officials knew that the Protectorate's lucrative cash-crop economy had depended on 
Banyarwanda labor since the mid-1920s, but until World War II they had assumed that the 
annual circuit of seasonal workers was predominantly male and temporary. New census data 
published in 1948, however, found that Uganda was home to over 289,000 Banyarwanda 
residents, of whom 122,000 (42.3%) were women and girls.3  
Women and girls played important roles in Banyarwanda migrant communities in 
Uganda, even if colonial authorities initially failed to register their presence. This chapter 
documents the poorly understood history of Banyarwanda women’s migration and their 
contributions to an imagined diaspora community in Uganda. I argue that women’s labor—paid 
and unpaid, licit and illicit, formal and informal, public and private—not only contributed to 
household wealth and the colonial economy, it made a Banyarwanda diaspora possible, 
thinkable. Women were the key alliance builders between families and clans in societies that 
practiced patriarchal (and often virilocal) marriage. Famine, economic deprivation, and political 
oppression in Ruanda-Urundi prompted significant emigration of Banyarwanda men from the 
1920s onwards, and women’s mobility linked the disparate parts of this diffuse diaspora 
together.  
Yet it would be wrong to assume—as colonial authorities often did—that women only 
moved at the behest of brothers, husbands, uncles, and sons. As this chapter reveals, many 
women left home as a means of survival, when life in Ruanda-Urundi was no longer tenable. 
Still others took to the road to create, manage, and maintain their invaluable social networks—
networks that gave them access to land, social security, and affective support in uncertain 
                                                 
3 East Africa High Commission, “African population of Uganda Protectorate; geographical and tribal studies,” in 
East African population census, 1948 (Nairobi: East African Statistical Department, 1953).  
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times—as well as to take advantage of the unique economic opportunities that Uganda offered. 
In the process, they made critical decisions about family, property, language, and comportment 
that would leave a lasting imprint on what it meant to be Banyarwanda, both abroad and in 
Ruanda-Urundi.  
An emphasis on women’s mobility and identification work complicates male-centered 
histories of migration and ethnicity in East and Central Africa.4 Recent scholarship on migrant 
welfare associations and ethnic societies has done much to illuminate the ways in which migrant 
men, displaced from their natal homes, sought to control women’s mobility and reproductive 
labor as a means of preserving collective identity and honor.5 While this scholarship has 
pluralized our understanding of masculinity and migration, it remains preoccupied with male 
agency. An overemphasis on men’s work as ethnic entrepreneurs in diasporas caricaturizes 
women’s contributions by forcing them into an artificial binary of complicity or resistance. 
Women feature as either the silent damsels in distress, left to fend for themselves on the family 
homestead, or as the rebellious, promiscuous urbanites who refused to accommodate patriarchal 
demands. By centering women’s stories and demonstrating how women often operated within 
the bounds of social expectations, this chapter moves beyond the resistance paradigm towards a 
more nuanced understanding of gender, mobility, and ethnicity in the colonial period.  
                                                 
4 For a useful comparative case in West Africa, see Marie Rodet, Les migrantes ignorees du Haut-Senegal (1900-
1946) (Paris: Karthala, 2009). 
5 See for example Derek R. Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival: a History of Dissent, C. 1935-
1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); John Lonsdale, “KAU’s Cultures: Imaginations of 
Community and Constructions of Leadership in Kenya after the Second World War,” Journal of African Cultural 
Studies 13:1 (2000), 107-124; Luise White, The Comforts of Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1990). White's well-known work did much to illuminate women's mobility and labor in 
colonial East Africa, but her focus was on sex work (and the reactions of cultural associations).  
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Building on the work of Jan Shetler,6 I argue that women—imagined by contemporaries 
and scholars alike as objects of control in men’s ethnicity projects—actively participated in the 
reconfiguration of Banyarwanda identities and gender relations in colonial Uganda. In contrast to 
their male counterparts, women proved far more flexible in their identification work. Because 
marriage was often vital to their economic survival, women had to adapt themselves to new 
cultural and linguistic settings. The three biographies highlighted in this chapter show women as 
adept language learners and cultural intermediaries, appropriating the ways of their matrimonial 
household in order to gain social currency. This process has wrongly been described as one of 
erasure and loss,7 rather than adaptation and convergence. Without ignoring the power 
inequalities that structured women’s lives and options, this chapter calls attention to women’s 
creative labor, and the ways in which they navigated new milieux without abandoning the 
languages, practices, and relationships that helped to define them.  
Three lines of historical inquiry animate this chapter. The first examines how gendered 
assumptions about labor and Protectorate interpretations of Banyarwanda migration worked in 
tandem to make women’s mobility seem exceptional. The second draws on oral histories to 
consider how, through their language acquisition, relationship decisions, long-distance travel, 
and everyday labor, women helped reimagine Banyarwanda identity in diaspora. The third and 
final line of inquiry considers how changing economic trends and new land tenure practices in 
Uganda intersected with Rwandan migration patterns to alter gender relations and gendered 
notions of respectability. 
                                                 
6 Jan Bender Shetler, ed., Gendering Ethnicity in African Women's Lives (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
2015). 
7 See for example Leroy Vail, The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1991). 
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This chapter proceeds in four sections. Part one traces broad trends in the history of 
women’s labor and migration in Uganda and their impact on gender relations. Part two, 
organized around the story of Mukamusana, examines how women rebuilt their lives in Uganda 
after fleeing horrific famine in Rwanda. British and Belgian responses to cyclical famine form 
the basis of part three, and colonial correspondence about the case of one widowed mother, 
Nyirambonwa, demonstrates the intimate social consequences that attended the state’s 
exceptionalizing discourse around women’s mobility. Finally, part four highlights, through 
Dorcas's journey, the unexpected ways in which women could carve out places for themselves in 
post-World War II Buganda. 
Broad Trends 
The abolition of kasanvu, combined with cash-crop production and Buganda’s changing land 
market, altered the role and value of women’s work. Women historically shouldered the 
responsibility of subsistence farming across much of Uganda and eastern Africa, growing food 
on land provided to them by their husbands and fathers. Women typically retained control over 
the fruit of their labor, storing their produce in their own granaries and portioning out food to 
their own children as they saw fit. When the Protectorate distributed cottonseed to African chiefs 
on an experimental basis in the first decade of the twentieth century, African women provided 
most of the labor needed to prepare the soil, plant the seed, weed the fields, and harvest the bolls. 
Women continued to play this essential role in cotton production throughout the 1910s, but in so 
doing, they compromised their ability to produce food for their families. Meanwhile, chiefs, 
husbands, and fathers assumed control of the final product, selling cotton grown by their wives 
and pocketing the profits.8 European and African men therefore benefitted enormously from 
                                                 
8 Carol Summers, “Force and Colonial Development in Eastern Uganda,” in East Africa in Transition: Communities, 
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women’s labor. Cotton provided individual African farmers with an unprecedented source of 
wealth, and the cumulative prosperity of Baganda cultivators in turn provided for the 
Protectorate’s financial success.9  
Ironically, most colonial observers coded cash crop production as a fundamentally male 
enterprise, despite its reliance on women’s labor. In an important government report produced in 
1938, the Uganda Labour Commission observed, “The consensus of opinion…is that, in the 
present state of social development and taking the Protectorate as a whole, about two-thirds of all 
agricultural work—that is in both subsistence and economic crop production—is performed by 
the women and children.”10 Having acknowledged the centrality of women’s labor to agricultural 
production, the authors nevertheless maintained a strange commitment to upholding cash-
cropping as a male project: “In general terms, it is held to be a fair presentation of the division of 
labour to attribute to the men all work upon the cash crops…and to the women and children all 
work on the food crops; since it is thought that the help undoubtedly given by the men with the 
food crops is approximately equivalent to that undoubtedly given by the rest of the family with 
the cash crops.”11 
Despite official dismissals of their contributions, the Protectorate’s dependency on 
female labor was evident in the ways that British and Baganda men sought to discipline women 
workers. Carol Summers has documented the rise of court-ordered corporal punishments meted 
                                                 
Cultures, and Change, ed. J.M. Bahemuka and J.L. Brockington (Nairobi, Kenya: Acton Publishers, 2002), 186-87. 
9 C.C. Wrigley, Crops and Wealth in Uganda: A Short Agrarian History (Kampala: East African Institute of Social 
Research, 1959), 20-22. 
10 Uganda, Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Labour Situation in the Uganda Protectorate, 1938 
(Entebbe: Government Printer, 1938), 32.  
11 Ibid., 33. 
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out to “disobedient women” in Eastern Province during the 1920s, a trend that corresponded with 
the abolition of kasanvu. This was not a colonial translation of precolonial practice, she argues, 
but a colonial solution to a modern problem: the need for labor to drive capitalist enterprise. 
British officials were not allowed to flog women, per orders of the Colonial Office, nor were 
they permitted to force African farmers to grow cotton. Many Uganda authorities, however, were 
willing to turn a blind eye to the actions of the semi-autonomous Native Courts, which doled out 
lashes to women defendants with increasing regularity from 1923 onwards. In Teso District 
alone, the Governor of Uganda reported that over 920 women had received court-ordered 
floggings over a period of two years; in the neighboring district of Bugwere, almost 300 women 
were whipped during a thirteen-month period.12 Without recourse to forcible conscription of 
male labor, African chiefs depended on private African growers to develop the cotton industry, 
and women’s unpaid “domestic” work was critical to its success. In the eyes of Protectorate 
officials, Christian missionaries, and their menfolk, women who refused to grow cash crops 
constituted a threat to the Protectorate’s economic progress.  
Growing numbers of migrant men from Ankole, Kigezi, and Ruanda-Urundi provided a 
solution to tense gender relations in central Uganda from the mid-1920s onwards. Even modest 
Baganda farmers could afford to hire Banyarwanda laborers to tend their fields and herds, which 
eased women’s workloads.13 Now, instead of going to the fields before sunrise to dig, Baganda 
women could take on the managerial role of field supervisor, overseeing the household’s hired 
                                                 
12 Summers, “Force,” 184. 
13 A. Mafeje and A.I. Richards, “The Commercial Farmer and His Labour Supply,” in Subsistence to Commercial 
Farming in Present-Day Buganda: An Economic and Anthropological Survey, ed. A.I. Richards, Ford Sturrock, and 
Jean M. Fortt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 179. 
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help.14 Migrant men, meanwhile, assumed a lower status in this shifting social hierarchy, taking 
on the jobs that no self-respecting Muganda man (or woman) would want to do.15 “They even 
worked in toilets,” one elderly woman recalled of laborers who worked for her husband, 
grimacing. “It was their job, even emptying latrines and doing that sort of work...[everyone] 
knew that kind of work was meant for Banyarwanda.”16 Migrant men, particularly those 
associated with “non-martial” groups like Banyarwanda, were targets of an emasculating 
discourse that associated their low socio-economic status with an assumed sexual meekness, 
even impotency. British officials regularly compared the “docility” of Banyarwanda men to the 
“virility” of migrants from the Sudan and northern Uganda.17 This attitude was also apparent in 
Baganda employers. As one private employer told Richards in 1951: “He [my hired worker] is a 
very good man. When he has done his garden work, he washes up our teacups like a woman. He 
does not want a wife and he hasn’t been home for a holiday in eight years.”18  
The feminization and de-sexualization of migrant men paralleled a seemingly 
contradictory development: the emergence of labor migration as a means of men’s self-
actualization. Contrast the emasculating discourse of Buganda employers with the triumphant 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 187-88. 
15 Richards, Economic Development, 161-67. 
16 Interview: N.F., Mukono District, September 12, 2013. 
17 See for example, Uganda, Report of Committee of Enquiry, 1938, 22: “The Banyaruanda are not, as a whole, so 
well-equipped to look after themselves. They are strangers in a strange land and have not in general the same virile 
character as the Nilotics. Thus they are much more open to exploitation and victimization in the course of their long 
tramp into Uganda and their search for work.” 
18 Richards, Economic Development, 162. 
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ways in which one retired labor migrant, “Semana,”19 recounted his life history to American 
anthropologist Helen Codere: 
“...I decided to go to Uganda [at the age of 12] because I did not like the life of a [Hutu] 
cultivator. But I went without saying goodbye to my papa. He had 400 francs in a box in 
a suitcase and I decided to steal it. On my colline [hill] there were some other young men 
and we had promised one another that we would go away together...It was two o'clock in 
the morning and I went to my friends. They got their baggage in order and we smoked 
and then we left.”20 
 
Semana framed his story about leaving home as a rite of passage in which he defied his 
father's wishes, stole his father's money, and set out on a journey that would turn him and his 
fellow age-mates into men. One can imagine the youthful, male space of that early morning 
gathering, in which the boys passed around a pipe to quiet their stomachs and steady their nerves 
for the long road ahead. Semana made it to Buganda after four days of difficult travel, where he 
found work with a Ganda shopkeeper. He remained in Uganda with this same employer for three 
years, during which time he managed to save 5,000 francs. He describes his return to his father's 
house in triumphant terms: 
“My parents were very happy to see me. At the moment I had gone away it had been with 
much fear. My parents gave me beer and a lot of food...After I had rested I told my 
parents what my trip had been like and about everything I had seen over there...I gave my 
mother 200 francs and two robes to help her out. I gave my papa 500 francs and a khaki 
shirt. My parents were very pleased with me and thanked me joyfully.”21 
 
Semana, returning home to play the part of the dutiful and successful son, concludes his 
autobiography by explaining how he was able, with the money he had saved, to build his own 
house, get married, and open his own shop. His father, meanwhile, whose 400 francs had 
                                                 
19 Interview with “Semana,” full text published in Helen Codere, The Biography of an African Society, Rwanda, 
1900-60: Based on forty-eight Rwandan autobiographies (Tervuren: Musée Royal de l’Afrique Centrale, 1973), 
240-42.  
20 Codere, Biography, 240.  
21 Ibid., 241. 
134 
 
financed Semana’s journey, is now cast in the role of dependent—an old man who benefits from 
his grown son’s hard work and prosperity. Likewise, Semana does so well with his shop that he 
is able to hire day laborers to tend his fields, relieving his wife of her hard agricultural labor. He 
is the hero of his own story, overcoming difficult odds to achieve the life he wants. His exposure 
to new places and ideas enables him to chart a different course for his life: he will not be a 
farmer like his father, but a shopkeeper. One also detects in his story, recounted in the 
momentous years of the Rwanda revolution, a rejection of the emasculating, racialized categories 
ascribed to him since birth: He refuses to be the subservient Hutu client. His father will rest 
contented in his retirement. His wife will be a woman of means, who manages her fields and her 
workers. Labor migration had given him the ultimate bootstrap.  
Semana’s story is a clear example of the kinds of socio-economic possibilities that drew 
Banyarwanda migrants to Buganda. Yet unlike Semana, many migrants could not use the wealth 
they accumulated abroad to build the lives they wanted at home. Given the option of remaining 
in Ruanda-Urundi or taking up rented plots in Uganda, many would ultimately choose the latter. 
Between 1939 and 1959, the number of settled and long-term Banyarwanda migrants in Buganda 
would increase five-fold, with Uganda census takers counting 216,896 individuals in 1959.22 
Buganda’s gravitational pull had consequences for Banyarwanda settlement patterns in the 
border districts as well. An unpublished migrant population study, written by Rhona Ross and 
Cyril Sofer and commissioned by the Uganda Government, found that the greatest 
concentrations of Banyarwanda-identifying women resided in Kigezi and Ankole, where long 
histories of cross-border marriage and migration had led to the formation of substantial 
                                                 
22 Uganda, Uganda Census 1959: African Population (Nairobi: Statistics Branch, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
1961), 36. 
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Kinyarwanda-speaking communities. In both districts, in fact, Banyarwanda women 
outnumbered their male counterparts: in Kigezi, the study counted 43,453 men against 52,699 
women (1:1.212). Many of those in Kigezi were likely part of an older settled community that 
predated the Uganda-Rwanda border (although this was certainly not the case for everyone—see 
Mukamusana’s story). The farther one moved from the border, however, the larger the 
concentrations of first-generation migrants became. In Ankole, for example, the ratio of men to 
women was smaller than it was in Kigezi (16,954 men to 17,887 women, or 1:1.055), but the 
number of first-generation migrant women was larger. Ross and Sofer found that nearly two-
thirds of all Banyarwanda in Ankole had been born in Ruanda-Urundi, indicating much more 
recent settlement. This trend persisted as one moved in a north-eastward arc around Lake 
Victoria, cresting in Buganda before tapering off in Busoga District, in the Eastern Province. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the study’s major statistical findings. 
Ross and Sofer’s study contributed to a growing colonial consensus at mid-century 
around the numerical significance of women’s migration. Their calculations mirrored the 
findings of the most recent government census, conducted two years prior. They also formed the 
basis for Audrey Richards’ subsequent study, which in turn supported Ross and Sofer’s claims 
about Banyarwanda settlement being a recent demographic phenomenon. While these figures are 
imperfect,23 as ballpark metrics they raise an important question: How had so many women 
travelled to Uganda undetected?  
 
                                                 
23 See Richards 1954, Appendix A for critical evaluation of the 1948 census data; see also C.J. Martin, “The East 
African Population Census, 1948: Planning and Enumeration,” Population Studies 3:3 (1949), 303-320; and R.R. 
Kuczynski, Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire, vol. 1, East Africa, (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1948). 
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 Banyarwanda Barundi 
  Male     Female Total   Male Female Total 
Kigezi 43,453 52,699  (54%) 96,152 13 10  (43%) 23 
Ankole 16,954 17,887  (51%) 34,841 42 40  (49%) 82 
Masaka 
Buganda 
38,776 24,696 (38%) 63,472 9,241 3,607  (28%) 12,848 
Mengo 
Buganda 
61,684 24,446  (28%) 86,130 31,716 9,660  (23%) 41,376 
Busoga 2,774 711  (20%) 3,485 987 48  (4%) 1,035 
Total 163,641 120,439 (42%) 284,080 41,999 13,365 (24%) 55,364 
Table 1: Summary of statistical data collected by Ross and Sofer in 1950.24 
Part of the answer to this question had to do with the limits of colonial demography (see 
Chapter Two). Protectorate authorities did not even attempt to disaggregate their statistics by sex 
until 1951, thus adding to government uncertainty about women’s migration.25 Before this, 
official reports and internal correspondence make only passing reference to women’s mobility. 
In 1943, for example, during the Ruzagayura famine in Rwanda, the Director of Labor wrote that 
the Protectorate had received an “influx of many women and children and infirm men,” but he 
did not provide an actual figure. British officials, when they did acknowledge the presence of 
women among migrant populations, almost always referred to them as the wives and dependents 
                                                 
24 KigDA Immigration Box 4, File LAB.1/10i, Survey of Banyaruanda Complex; Rhona Ross and Cyril Sofer, 
“Survey of the Banyaruanda Complex,” 18-21.  
25 Uganda Protectorate, Annual Report of the Labour Department, 1951 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1952), 26. 
137 
 
of “labor migrants” (who were assumed to be male). In 1947, for instance, the Labour 
Commissioner wrongly concluded that, although “accurate figures of wives and children who 
accompany seasonal workers to their employment would be very difficult to obtain…[i]t is clear 
that the proportion is very small.” He expressed equal doubt about the contributions of women to 
the workforce, assuring his colleagues that “[t]he aspect of women workers, whether the wives of 
migratory employees or not, does not arise to any appreciable extent.”26 In light of these 
persistent dismissals issued by the Labor Department, the findings of the 1948 census, which 
reported large numbers of Banyarwanda women living across western and central Uganda, likely 
shocked the Labour Commissioner’s office.  
But another key reason for colonial ignorance had arguably to do with the ways that 
Protectorate officials framed women’s mobility as an exceptional phenomenon. Casting men as 
“migrant laborers,” they relegated women to the role of auxiliaries and dependents, no matter 
their material contributions. In so doing, British officials failed to integrate women’s mobility 
into a more comprehensive understanding of Banyarwanda migration. Women responded to the 
same factors that drove men’s migration. Men might enjoy the ease of mobility that the labor 
migrant label afforded, but their turn to seasonal wage work was a consequence of material and 
political hardship at home. Both men and women moved to survive, in other words, but British 
and Belgian authorities only recognized the former as legitimate laborers. In times of relative 
plenty, the British took little notice of women’s mobility, tolerating it so as not to discourage the 
continued flow of male labor. In times of famine, however, they interpreted women migrants as 
signs that all was not well in Belgian territory.  
                                                 
26 Uganda Protectorate, Annual Report of the Labour Department, 1947 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1949), 12. 
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The following biographies explore the lives of women who settled (or tried to settle) 
across southwestern and central Uganda between 1928 and 1945. They call attention to the ways 
in which women maneuvered their complex social worlds to maximize their advantages in 
difficult times. Because they often depended on men for access to land, relationships figure 
prominently in their stories, but one should not interpret these relationships as prefixed givens: 
women had to choose which relationships they prioritized, and these choices had significant 
implications for the changing social landscape of the Banyarwanda diaspora.  
“She was pure Mukiga”: Mukamusana’s Journey 
Surviving the Rwakayihura Famine, 1927-29 
In the latter half of the 1920s, eastern Rwanda suffered a devastating famine known as 
Rwakayihura.27 An estimated 35,000 to 40,000 people perished over a period of eighteen months 
between 1927 and 1929, while as many as 100,000 people fled to neighboring British 
territories.28 While men were more likely to flee than women,29 the Rwakayihura famine was the 
first time that European authorities and missionaries observed the mass movement of women and 
children out of Rwanda.30 The following biography traces the journey of a young 
Munyarwanda31 woman named Mukamusana, who left her home in Rukira, eastern Rwanda, 
                                                 
27 According to Anne Cornet (1996:2 ff 5), who is in turn interpreting a line from the anonymously penned Histoire 
et chronologie du Ruanda (1956:12), Rwakayihura ("of Kayihura") appears to have been named after a chief, 
Kayihura, whose hill was allegedly the first to be impacted by the famine. See Cornet, Histoire d'une famine: 
Rwanda 1927-30: Crise alimentaire entre tradition et modernité (Enquêtes et documents d'histoire africain 13, 
Louvain-la-Neuve: Centre d'histoire de l'Afrique, Université catholique de Louvain, 1996). 
28 Cornet, D’une Famine Rwanda, 39.  
29 Ibid., 10.  
30 Rapport sur l’Administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l’année 1928 (Brussels: Établissements Émile 
Bruylant, 1929), 72. 
31 This was the term that her daughter used to describe her, in contradistinction to “Tutsi” and “Rwandese.” 
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during the height of the famine. Her story, which is based primarily on the memories of her 
surviving daughter, Doreen, shines light on the gendered possibilities and vulnerabilities that 
shaped the lives of these “famine refugees.”32 Her successful resettlement in Uganda also points 
to the creative means by which migrant women reimagined their communities and repositioned 
their social worlds in geo-political space. Doreen insisted that her mother ultimately shed her 
“Rwanda-ness” and became “pure Mukiga,” an assimilation process that included learning 
Rukiga, acquiring a Mukiga husband, and adopting Kiga manners and work habits. Yet life is 
never so compartmentalized, and this emerges in the messy details that frame Doreen’s account 
of her mother’s life.33  
Leaving Rwanda 
The decision to leave home could not have been easy. Mukamusana, a new mother, was still 
breastfeeding, and the route to Uganda was long. Actually, no roads existed in eastern Rwanda, 
as the Belgians had not seen any use for them in this part of the Territory.34 The only way out 
was to travel on foot through waterless hill country, with the occasional help of a worn cattle 
track or footpath. Worse, the journey would force Mukamusana’s body to divert precious 
                                                 
32 The British used this term frequently in their correspondence during the period. Legally, the term was 
meaningless.  
33 Mukamusana’s biography is based on a series of interviews that I held with her 75 year old daughter, “Doreen,” 
between August 1 and September 24, 2013. All interviews took place in Doreen’s home in Bukinda County, Kabale 
District (formerly Kigezi District). I have changed the names of private individuals to protect anonymity. Doreen 
reports that her mother died in the late 1980s. 
34 The Belgians had constructed over 1,000 kilometers of roads in western Rwanda, because they wanted to draw 
labor from the Mandated Territories to their plantations and mines in Congo. Eastern Rwanda was entirely excluded 
from this infrastructural development, and the lack of roads had dire consequences for famine victims, preventing 
early escape and delaying the delivery of life-saving food aid. See Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of 
Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 244-50. 
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calories away from the work of producing the milk her baby needed to survive. We can assume 
that she decided to leave when she saw no other option.35  
Mukamusana traveled with her sister and several other women, without male 
companions. She had brothers, but they remained in Rwanda, most likely because they had land 
and families in their home province of Rukira; they would not want to risk the journey—or their 
homesteads—if they had any chance of surviving where they were. As for the father of 
Mukamusana’s child, it is possible that she had the baby out of wedlock and was leaving to 
escape stigma. It is more probable that she had been married, and her husband either died in the 
famine or abandoned the family when he could no longer care for them. As a young widow or 
divorcée,36 Mukamusana would have had the option of returning to her father’s house if he was 
still alive, but remaining in Rukira during the crisis would severely limit her chances of finding a 
new husband (and thus renewed access to her own land).37 So many people had left after the 
rains failed three seasons in a row that by 1928 only the very young and the very old remained.38 
Mukamusana’s group likely had little to keep them at home. 
Indeed, missionary accounts paint a grim picture of eastern Rwanda in 1928. A Protestant 
missionary doctor named Joe Church, based in Gahini, reported to the London Times that “an 
average of about 1,000 a week” passed by his hospital “en route for Uganda,” and that “day after 
                                                 
35 For a comparative example, see Jeanne Penvenne, Women, migration & the cashew economy in Southern 
Mozambique: 1945-1975 (Woodbridge, Suffolk: James Currey, 2015), 121-54. 
36 It is perhaps relevant that in our first interview, Doreen stated that her mother came from Rwamagana, and in our 
second interview, that she came from Kiramuruzi. Kiramuruzi is north of Lake Muhazi, while Rwamagana is just to 
the south. Mukamusana may have been born in one place, and married in the second—this would account for the 
small discrepancy. 
37 Jennie Burnet, Genocide Lives in Us: Women, Memory, and Silence in Rwanda (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2012), 42-43. 
38 Rapport sur l’Administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l’année 1928 (Brussels: Établissements Émile 
Bruylant, 1929), 72. 
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day one sees them staggering out of the country, with all their goods and chattels, and with 
scarcely sufficient strength to carry their loads.”39 Scenes from the mission hospital, which 
served as a feeding station at the epicenter of the famine, were truly horrifying, with people 
dying daily from organ failure and disease. “Needless to say it is impossible to keep the place 
clean,” the distressed doctor wrote during an outbreak of dysentery in February 1929, “and 
people, especially children, are actually dying from jiggers. They burrow into their fingers, toes, 
elbows, knees and buttocks, until the children are absolutely helpless and unable to walk or feed 
themselves properly.”40 The movement of women out of their homes in search of food and 
assistance indicated the degree of social disruption caused by famine. As the missionary 
observed, “A few months ago it was a rare thing for a woman to leave the seclusion of her hut 
and come work for us, but now we have about one hundred every day.”41  
Mukamusana and her party headed north because one of the women had a grandmother in 
Kandago parish, Kigezi District. Doreen does not know how long her mother’s journey took, or 
whether the other women travelers had children with them as well, but the going would have 
been slow without adequate food and water supplies, and slower still if young children were 
present. That the entire group survived the journey is remarkable. As the women made their way 
out of the famine’s radius, they eventually found accommodation with Bakiga families in 
southern Uganda who had food to spare, and who were willing to give the travelers a place to 
stay in exchange for domestic labor. The party made their way from homestead to homestead, 
exchanging household chores for food and a bed for the night. Eventually, they reached 
                                                 
39 Joe Church, “A Stricken Land,” Times, April 16, 1929, accessed 19 May 2016, The Times Digital Archive. 
40 Joe Church, “News from Gahini and Belgian Ruanda from Dr. Church,” Ruanda Notes 28 (April 22, 1929), 24. 
41 Ibid. 
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Kandago, where they stayed for some time. Their presence was conspicuous, however, for grown 
women were, in Doreen’s colorful phrase, “like food ready for eating” (ebykurya bihire).42 Local 
men took notice, and began to approach the women’s hosts with marriage propositions. Soon, 
Mukamusana’s host family arranged for her to become the third wife of a Mukiga farmer named 
Rugwisa.  
Mukamusana’s marriage highlights an important way in which women’s mobility could 
complicate processes of social reproduction in patriarchal communities. The exchange of women 
in marriage between families mediated alliances between men and structured the distribution of 
land across clans.43 A girl who left her father’s homestead, or a woman who left her husband’s, 
for the sake of survival, forced the reconfiguration of her social field. Journeys undertaken for 
food and shelter brought women into contact with new potential families and new potential 
suitors, who in turn stood to benefit from migrant women’s vulnerability as well as their 
productive and reproductive labor. Thus Mukamusana’s displacement resulted, not only in her 
own relocation, but in the removal of her male kin from key decisions about her marriage. A 
prime example: Rugwisa did not have to provide bridewealth. When asked why this was the 
case, Doreen replied, “Can you pay for something you have found by the roadside?” When 
Mukamusana’s brothers came to visit her several years later, they had no power to demand 
payment, because they had not been present to negotiate the engagement. Even if they had been, 
the famine had been so catastrophic that women’s families were poorly positioned to demand a 
                                                 
42 Doreen may have been paraphrasing a Rukiga proverb: “When ripe, a banana is eaten and a girl is married” 
(Enyamwonyo ku ekura eriibwa, omwishiki ku akura ashwerwa). Marius Cisternino, The Proverbs of Kigezi and 
Ankole (Kampala: Comboni Missionaries, 1987), 348. 
43 Danielle de Lame, A hill among a thousand: transformations and ruptures in rural Rwanda. (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 2005); Christopher C. Taylor, Milk, honey, and money: changing concepts in Rwandan healing 
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992). 
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sizeable bridewealth. Not only had the famine weakened them economically, but the presence of 
a colonial border further disrupted their bargaining power. Kigezi authorities responded to the 
famine in Rwanda by restricting food exports, and this in turn impacted currency rates and other 
forms of cross-border exchange. During the 1943-44 famine colonial officers in Kigezi observed 
that, “the severity of the famine in Belgian Rwanda and the magnitude of the temptation to 
export foodstuffs to that country may be assessed by the fact that a wife could be bought for a 
basket of maize.”44  
Mukamusana’s union with Rugwisa granted her access to his land, which in turn allowed 
her to remain in Uganda long after male famine refugees had returned home.45 Doreen, however, 
insists that her mother’s successful integration had more to do with her ability to cultivate that 
land, rather than with the gift of land itself. In Doreen’s eyes, Mukamusana negotiated her place 
of belonging among Bakiga farmers because she knew how to work hard in the fields and she 
had a taste for local food. This differentiated her from Rwandan pastoralists46 who sought refuge 
in southern Uganda, both in the late 1920s and after. This latter group, according to Doreen, were 
“Rwandese” who “depended on milk,” and who ultimately failed to acclimate to life in Kigezi 
because they “did not like digging” or “eating sweet potatoes.” Kigezi, she said, became a place 
of asylum for “Banyarwanda”—people who, in Doreen’s vocabulary, knew how to cultivate land 
and lived on agricultural produce—while the neighboring Uganda district of Ankole attracted 
                                                 
44 Uganda Protectorate, Special report—“Western Province (including Northern Province): Survey of the War Years 
1939-1946” (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1948), 83. 
45 KigDA Immigration Box 8, File 112: “Native Affairs: Repatriation of Banyarwanda, etc., etc.,” 1930-1949. 
Memo from the Secretariat to “Adams”, 13 Feb. 1931. 
46 See Introduction for an explanation of my use of ethnic and national categories. Here, I use "Rwandans" because 
that was the word Doreen repeatedly used.  
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milk-drinking “Rwandese,” because it was a “place with many cows.”47 Thus, while Rugwisa’s 
marriage proposal and land offer was critical to Mukamusana’s survival in southern Uganda, her 
cultivating skills, comportment, and taste were equally important. Intermarriage, in other words, 
was not an automatic guarantee of belonging and acceptance.  
Intermarriage also did not signal the loss of a woman’s previous identity. Mukamusana 
continued to speak Kinyarwanda with her sister and her children, and she made regular visits to 
her family in Rwanda. Her brothers, likewise, would visit her in Kigezi, bringing her news from 
home. Doreen recalled many nights gathered around the fire with her uncles, who would swap 
jokes, stories, and gossip with her mother and her aunt. Her father was always absent from these 
gatherings, for as the dignified head of household, he was expected to take his meals alone in the 
courtyard.48 Mukamusana’s cooking fire (amahéga) thus became an important place where she 
renewed her ties to Rwanda and where her children had opportunity to practice their 
Kinyarwanda and hear about their mother’s natal home. Moreover, the regular traffic of 
Kinyarwanda-speaking visitors to Rugwisa’s homestead meant that neighbors were continually 
reminded of the family’s Rwandan connections. Doreen was vague on whether her mother ever 
faced discrimination on account of her language and identity, but she did acknowledge that 
migrant wives were sometimes abused by their husbands and by members of the community. 
“Abusive husbands would get drunk,” she recalled, “And they would say [to their Rwandan 
wives], ‘Ah, no wonder you made this mistake! You are a traveler!’” Mukamusana’s reputation 
                                                 
47 Here, one easily reads the terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi” into Doreen’s narrative, but it is important to note that 
Doreen herself never used these terms, even when they were suggested. All people who came from Rwanda were, in 
Doreen’s vocabulary, “Banyarwanda,” but those who were rich, owned cattle, and subsisted on a diet of milk were 
further differentiated by the label “Rwandese.” 
48 May Edel confirms this practice in her study of 1930s Kigezi. See M.M. Edel, The Chiga of Uganda (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 59. 
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also meant that her home became a stop-over for later groups of Banyarwanda migrants and 
refugees, who were directed to Rugwisa’s courtyard by locals who knew about the family. 
Through language and a careful cultivation of multiple relationships, Mukamusana managed a 
life that was complicated, but not severed by, the border.  
Mukamusana’s journey, together with her daughter’s memory and self-identification 
work, raises important questions about the ways in which ethnicity and belonging constitute 
historical, gendered processes. Doreen argued that her mother was a fully-integrated member of 
her father’s household, that she became “Mukiga” (even if she maintained links to Rwanda). 
This narrative framing, however, may have more to do with Doreen’s own self-identification 
than her mother’s. Doreen’s self-fashioning rested heavily on the identity of her father, Rugwisa, 
and her association to his clan, the Abasiga. She is Ugandan, she claimed, because her father was 
Ugandan, and “children always take the father’s clan.” Doreen could have easily established her 
Ugandan-ness on legal grounds, because the constitution only requires that an individual have 
one Ugandan parent or grandparent in order to claim Ugandan citizenship.49 Yet for Doreen and 
many of the second-generation migrants with whom I spoke, the litmus test for nationality was 
paternal descent. 
As for Mukamusana, it is impossible to know for certain how she self-identified, but the 
fact that she came from a predominantly agricultural family suggests that she may, possibly, 
have understood herself to be Hutu. But here a word of caution is necessary: Mukamusana left 
Rwanda three years before the Belgian government started to systematically assign Hutu and 
Tutsi identities. Furthermore, she came from a region, Rukira, that had long been on the fringes 
                                                 
49 See Ch. 10, Art. 2 of Uganda, Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (Entebbe: Uganda Print. And Pub. Corp., 
1995): "…every person born in Uganda one of whose parents or grandparents is or was a member of any of the 
indigenous communities existing and residing with the borders of Uganda as at the first day of February, 1926..."  
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of empire, both Rwandan and European, meaning that local affinity to either the Rwandan court 
or the Belgian government was weak.50 Most likely, Doreen’s choice of terminology reflected 
her own history with charged labels: born and raised on the Rwanda border, Doreen witnessed 
multiple episodes of violent displacement over the course of her life. Rwanda’s political troubles 
often drew southern Ugandans into the fray (Chapter Four), with Ugandan chiefs sometimes 
joining sides with either Hutu or Tutsi. It is therefore conceivable that Doreen would want to 
remove her mother’s memory from this violent past by refusing labels that were otherwise 
available to her. 
Regardless of what she intended or how she actually felt, Mukamusana’s life was 
fundamentally structured by the border. Doreen claimed her mother became Mukiga—a 
statement suggesting an erasure of prior identifications—but Mukamusana maintained key 
practices that continued to connect her to Rwanda. She visited her brothers in Rukira, and they in 
turn visited her. The family hearth, where women and their children and their relatives gathered, 
was an especially important space for remembering the past, gossiping about the present, and 
planning for the future. Out of the embers, families recreated kinship after dislocation. Whenever 
troubles came to Rwanda, refugees found their way to Mukamusana’s home, either because 
neighbors directed them there, or because they knew about Mukamusana’s home through 
connections in Rwanda. Through these exchanges, Doreen acquired a working knowledge of her 
mother’s language, even if she herself did not self-identify as anything other than Ugandan. The 
mother’s line is obfuscated, but it is not erased, and this distinction is important: Mukamusana 
                                                 
50 The British had actually acquired this territory from the Belgians for a brief period after the First World War—
that was how the Uganda-based Church Missionary Society was able to plant a mission station in Gahini. See David 
S Newbury, "The Rwakayihura famine of 1928-29: A nexus of colonial rule in Rwanda," in Histoire sociale de 
l'Afrique de l'Est (XIX-XX siècle): Actes du Colloque de Bujumbura (17-24 Octobre 1989) (Paris: Karthala, 1991), 
269-85. 
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did not shed her ethnic identity, but reconfigured it in the service of her own survival. Her 
flexible identification also opened up spaces for other Banyarwanda to follow—her language 
skills and her reputation as a Munyarwanda served as signposts that guided others to places of 
asylum in times of famine and war.  
Closing the Border to “Labor migrants and their families”: Nyirambonwa’s Story 
Escaping the Ruzagayura Famine, 1942-44 
The 1927-29 Rwakayihura famine that drove Mukamusana from her home was a watershed 
moment in Ruanda-Urundi’s history, one that brought many of Belgium’s failings as a colonial 
power to light. It took both the British and the Belgians by surprise, and was a source of 
international embarrassment for the latter. Feeling alienated before the League of Nations and 
rebuked by the world press, the Mandate authorities moved quickly to salvage their reputation, 
instituting a raft of far-reaching measures aimed at preventing future famines (see Chapter One). 
Yet these reforms, which included local government restructuring, infrastructure development, 
and public health improvement, were couched in the racist, civilizing logics of the empire. 
According to this framework, African laziness and irrationality, rather than extractive colonial 
practices, had brought about the food crisis. If only the native could be taught to work hard, save 
for the future, and contribute to the material development of the territory, then Ruanda-Urundi 
would not suffer such severe famines.51 The government’s anti-famine measures, unsurprisingly, 
translated into ever-increasing demands on African time, money, and labor, wringing the peasant 
classes for what remaining resources they had. Adding insult to injury, the reforms proved 
ineffective in actually preventing famine.  
                                                 
51 Pedersen, The Guardians, 250-53. 
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This became clear twelve years later, in mid-1942, when Rwanda was beset by an even 
worse crisis than Rwakayihura: the Ruzagayura famine. Over 300,000 people died within a 
period of two years, primarily in Rwanda’s northeastern territories, making Ruzagayura ten 
times deadlier than Rwakayihura.52 The Belgian response was slow and fumbling, only bringing 
in emergency food relief in late 1943, by which point many people had either died or fled the 
country.53 Of those who fled, many headed to Uganda, where they hoped to find shelter with 
family and friends who had migrated earlier.  
The resultant exodus was a source of grave concern for the British and the Belgians, 
albeit for different reasons. Noting an “unusual” increase in the number of “women and children 
and infirm men” on the road from Rwanda to Buganda, the British feared that they would be 
forced to provide humanitarian care to these “famine refugees” at a time when their own food 
sources and cash reserves were running low.54 They were also worried that any humanitarian 
service, such as emergency medical care or food relief, might be interpreted by the Belgians as a 
ruse designed to lure precious male labor over the border. As the Chief Secretary had warned in 
1931, “we have always been a bit nervous that our actions in feeding those Belgian refugees [in 
1928 and 1929]…might be construed as a bait to tempt natives from them to us, to settler, for our 
labor purposes…”55 The Protectorate’s desire to prevent the immigration of “ineffectuals” thus 
coincided, perversely, with their wish to maintain good diplomatic relations with the Belgians.  
                                                 
52 Dantès Singiza, “La Famine Ruzagayura, Rwanda 1943-44: Causes, consequences, et reactions des autorites” 
(MA Thesis, Univerité de Liège, 2011), 94. 
53 Catharine Newbury, Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1988), 158. 
54 Uganda, Annual Report of the Inspectorate of Labour, 1943 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1944), 5. 
55 KigDA Immigration Box 8, File 112, Native Affairs: Repatriation of Banyarwanda, etc., etc., 1930-1949. Memo 
from the Secretariat to “Adams”, 13 Feb. 1931. 
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The Belgians, meanwhile, were far less worried about the departure of starving women 
and children, but they did resent the loss of male labor. These concerns led the two colonial 
powers to take the extraordinary step of closing the Uganda-Rwanda border for the first quarter 
of 1944. The Governor of Uganda, Charles Dundas, initiated the closure in December 1943, 
informing the Belgian authorities that as of January 1, “women and children [will] no longer [be] 
acceptable as immigrants into Uganda.”56 The Belgians agreed to the closure, and added that 
labor migrants (men) should also be prevented from traveling to Uganda until the crisis had 
passed.57 
The British recognized that many people they turned away at the border were, in colonial 
parlance, “refugees.” This was the actual term that officials on the ground and in London used to 
describe famine victims. In September 1942, for example, when rumors of a mounting food 
crisis in Rwanda first began to circulate through colonial channels in Uganda, the Colonial 
Office reached out to Sir Granville Orde-Browne, the empire’s leading authority on labor 
migration, for advice. He responded by urging the Uganda authorities to take the rumors “of 
refugees from famine” seriously, in light of the region’s perennial food shortages. “The 
Banyaruanda are very liable to famine,” he conceded, “and they flock over to Tanganyika and 
Uganda in search of work, or really, food...We had immense difficulties with them in 
Tanganyika in 1930, when they flooded over uncontrolled, and died in numbers.”58 Britain’s 
recognition of the life-threatening conditions that prompted people to leave Rwanda, however, 
                                                 
56 TNA CO 536/213/4, Uganda: Labour Conditions, 1943; Decode of telegram to British Consul General [from 
Governor of Uganda], Leopoldville, 5 December, 1943. 
57 Uganda, Annual Report of the Inspectorate of Labour, 1944 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1945), 3-4. 
58 TNA CO 536/209/6, Labour Conditions, 1942-43; Orde-Brown to E.L. Scott, Notes section to file, 30 September 
1942. 
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resulted in very few humanitarian ends. To be called a “refugee,” in this circumstance, was to be 
identified as a candidate for deportation, not protection. “Unaccompanied” women and children 
were particularly vulnerable to this kind of negative labeling, because officials assumed that they 
could not possibly be anything other than victims.  
The story of Nyirambonwa, a widowed mother of three who was intercepted by District 
officials in Kabale in February 1944, highlights the gendered consequences of this border 
closure. Colonial authorities did not actually have the power to systematically seal their mutual 
boundary, but they could at various moments use force to exclude those deemed undesirable. 
Women migrants, already disregarded in colonial labor policy as mere auxiliaries to male 
workers, were particularly undesirable in times of famine because they were not valued as a 
potential labor source. This helps to explain why Protectorate officials ultimately chose to deport 
Nyirambonwa in May, after she had recovered from malnutrition in Kabale Hospital and after 
Uganda had lifted their side of the border closure. While the government welcomed the swift 
resumption of male labor from April 1944 onwards,59 women like Nyirambonwa were classed as 
“undesirables” and returned to Rwanda.  
Nyirambonwa and her three small children were admitted to Kabale Hospital in a 
“starving state” in late February 1944.60 According to the hospital administrator’s report, the 
woman’s husband had died two years prior. The deceased was originally from Astrida (Butare) 
in southern Rwanda, but had moved his family to the northern territory of Byumba sometime 
                                                 
59 UNA C.3360, Labour: Proposed Conference with Belgian Authorities re: Banyarwanda Migration, 1948; 
Memorandum on Proposed Discussions in Immigrant Labour from Ruanda-Urundi, based on discussions between 
authorities for Uganda and Tanganyika Territory in January 1947. 
60 KigDA Immigration Box 8, File 112: “Native Affairs: Repatriation of Banyarwanda, etc., etc.,” 1930-1949; N.S. 
(but from a medical worker or administrator at Kabale Hospital), “Nyirambonwa, Rwanda Immigrant, Widow” 
(n.d., first half of 1944). 
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around 1941 or 1942. The report does not say why the family relocated, but one possible reason 
was that they had fallen out of favor with the local chief. The United Council of Protestant 
Churches in Ruanda-Urundi, writing in 1944, observed “widespread” abuses on the part of native 
authorities towards their subjects, including everything from,  
“excessive forced labour, to constant beatings for minor offences, to demands for cows, 
etc.…so that their lives become unbearable. These are not matters of offences against the 
law, but of personal vendettas. Against this the native has usually no effective court of 
appeal, and his only refuge is to leave his home for another s/chefferie or Province.”61 
 
Whatever the case, Nyirambonwa’s husband died before he had succeeded in establishing 
a new home in Byumba, leaving his wife and children stranded and without means of support. 
Nyirambonwa’s own parents had died many years before, and she did not have any close 
relatives remaining in Rwanda. She therefore decided to return to Astrida, “the original home of 
[her] husband,” possibly in hopes of finding support from her in-laws. On reaching Astrida, 
however, she failed to find anyone who was willing or able to take her in: her late husband's 
parents were dead, and no other close relative remained. As a landless widow in those desperate 
circumstances, Nyirambonwa may have turned to sex work in Astrida town, or she may have 
hired her labor to a European or Asian family.62 Whatever her choice, life in the town soon 
became “impossible” according to her hospital discharge papers, and she decided to leave 
Rwanda for good. She had a brother, she said, who had migrated to Uganda years before, taking 
two of her own children with him.63 She believed that they were living in a place called 
                                                 
61 Archives of the Church of Uganda Online, Ruanda Mission 1944, “Memorandum by The United Council of 
Protestant Churches Ruanda-Urundi,” n.d. [but 1944]. http://primarysources.brillonline.com/browse/archives-of-the-
church-of-uganda/archives-of-the-bishop-of-uganda/regional-activitiesassociated-regions/ruanda-mission-
1944;cuacua1cua1260484  
62 Helen Codere, Biography, 144-47 and 299. 
63 If the family was poor, it is entirely possible that Nyirambonwa’s brother offered to adopt two of her children, 
thus distributing the burden of care more evenly across the family; it is also probable that these two children were 
the result of a previous marriage, and were sent away when Nyirambonwa remarried (ensuring that they did not 
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Kyamaganda, in Masaka District, Buganda.64 With this destination in mind, she set out for the 
border. 
How the family managed to reach Kabale is a mystery. They would have had to travel 
over 200 kilometers on foot during the height of Ruzagayura, passing through the northeast, 
where the famine was most severe. They reached the Ugandan border in February 1944, only to 
find that the border was closed. It is possible that Nyirambonwa circumvented the customs post 
and border guards who stood watch at Katuna, the main port of entry between Kabale and 
northern Rwanda, but this would have required her to pass through steep hill country—a 
daunting challenge for an adult suffering from extreme malnutrition, and likely impossible for 
her three small children. More likely, the border guards, who had seen many famine refugees 
cross through Katuna, took pity on the family and brought them to the hospital.65  
Regardless of how they made it to Kabale, Nyirambonwa and her children spent the next 
ten weeks convalescing at the District Hospital. By May, they had regained some of their body 
weight and were well enough to travel. Nyirambonwa’s desire to continue on to Masaka seems 
quite clear in the archival record, rising from the details of the hospital administrator’s report in 
the names of her brother, Furasisco Nyakabwa, and her older children, Mbuguje and 
Musaniwabo. Indeed, the detail of the hospital report suggests that the administrator was also 
                                                 
inherit their step-father’s property). Other research participants told similar stories of fosterage. See for example 
Théress’ story, Chapter Five. 
64 It is difficult to say why she returned to Astrida when she had close relatives in Buganda. It is possible that she 
was unaware of the fact that her in-laws were dead before going to Astrida. Likewise, she may not have known her 
brother's precise whereabouts when she was in Byumba. 
65 In early December 1943, shortly after the Governor of Uganda had announced the border closure (but before it 
went into effect), the Governor General for Ruanda-Urundi requested that during the first 2-3 weeks of the closure, 
“necessitous cases will be allowed to enter Uganda when they are not in fit condition to make the return journey.” 
TNA CO 536/213/4, Uganda: Labour Conditions, 1943; British Consul General, Leopoldville to Governor of 
Uganda, December 6, 1943. 
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operating on the assumption—or perhaps the hope—that the District Office would send word to 
officials at Kyamaganda, asking whether they knew the whereabouts of Nyirambonwa’s family.  
The District Commissioner (DC) for Kigezi, however, was not interested in facilitating 
Nyirambonwa’s onward journey. Despite the fact that the Protectorate had reopened the border 
to migrants a month earlier—and despite the fact that Nyirambonwa had recovered much of her 
physical strength—the DC still viewed her as “destitute” and “ineffectual,” someone who would 
likely become a burden on state resources if allowed to stay in Uganda. He therefore responded 
to the hospital report by ordering the family’s immediate removal to Rwanda. In a formal letter 
to the Belgian Administrateur du Territoire (AT), Ruhengeri, dated 3 May 1944, the DC 
announced that he was returning “a Munyaruanda vagrant widow with 3 small children,” to 
Astrida. In contrast to the hospital report, which was careful to state that Astrida had been the 
home of Nyirambonwa’s husband (not necessarily hers), and which gave the names of her next 
of kin in Masaka, the DC’s letter simply requested the Belgian official to make arrangements for 
the family’s repatriation.66 
Why did the colonial authorities choose repatriation over settlement? Some additional 
context here is helpful. To begin, the war years witnessed a renewed commitment to anti-
vagrancy measures on the part of East African governments. The Buganda kingdom, in fact, 
passed its own ant-vagrancy legislation in 1940, aimed at checking the population of 
“unemployed and destitute natives…collecting at various big centres, particularly Mengo, Mpigi, 
and Masaka, where they prey upon the local inhabitants and give considerable trouble to the 
                                                 
66 KigDA Immigration Box 8, File 112, Native Affairs: Repatriation of Banyarwanda, etc., etc., 1930-1949; Letter from the 
DC Kigezi (D.K. Burner) to Monsieur L’Administrateur Territorial, Ruhengeri, 3 May 1944. 
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authorities.”67 Kigezi District, moreover, had played a key role in the Protectorate’s evolving 
deportation process. Sharing borders with Congo and Rwanda, it was the port of entry for the 
majority of Uganda’s migrant workers. As such, Kigezi officials were responsible not only for 
enforcing Protectorate policy (such as the border closure), but also for providing operational 
support for other districts’ deportation cases. If a magistrate in Buganda convicted a 
Munyarwanda migrant of vagrancy, for example, he would forward the guilty party to the Kigezi 
District offices in Kabale, where the DC would be responsible for arranging their transport back 
to Ruanda-Urundi.68 This process was expensive, time-consuming, and involved, requiring close 
coordination between many local government workers operating on slender budgets and spread 
across wide swathes of rural countryside. Buses did not exist in western Uganda until the mid-
1940s, meaning that the DC had to negotiate rides and itineraries for deportees with commercial 
lorry drivers.69 Sometimes, officials in the central and eastern Districts sent deportation 
candidates to Kabale in error because they were ignorant of the country’s basic geography (see 
Chapter One). “There is no means of transport between Kabale and Kigali,” wrote the obviously 
tired DC Kigezi to the DC Busoga in June 1937, in a letter begging his colleague not to send a 
Kigali-bound amputee to his office. “[And i]t is doubtful if he could walk [there] with only one 
leg.”70 Through the DC’s correspondence with other Protectorate agents throughout the late 
                                                 
67 TNA CO 859/79/8, Memo by Attorney-General, Uganda, 4 January, 1941, quoted in A. Burton and P. Ocobock, 
“The ‘Traveling Native’: Vagrancy and Colonial Control in British East Africa,” in Cast Out: Vagrancy and 
Homelessness in Global and Historical Perspective, ed. by A.L. Beier and Paul Ocobock (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 2008), 294. 
68 KigDA Immigration Box 1, File MIG.2/1, “Repatriation of Africans (Destitutes),” 1935-43; Commissioner of 
Police, Kampala to DC Kigezi, “Edward Awago-Jaluo - Your 393/189 d/d 28.4.37,” 30 April 1937. 
69 See for example KigDA Immigration Box 8, File 112, “Native Affairs: Repatriation of Banyarwanda, etc., etc.,” 
1930-1949; DC Ankole to Labour Officer, Masaka, Repatriation of Incurables, 23 January 1946.  
70 KigDA Immigration Box 1, File MIG.2/1, “Repatriation of Africans (Destitutes),” 1935-43; DC Kigezi to DC 
Busoga, 19 June 1937. 
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1930s and early ‘40s, Kigezi emerges as a kind of receptacle for wasted and wasting human 
bodies—“a dumping ground for undesirables,”71 in the DC’s words. In his mind, Nyirambonwa 
and her children represented more disposal72 work for his office.  
Nyirambonwa’s story reveals the intimate human costs of the Protectorate’s labor market 
and colonial officials’ gendered valuations of productive work. Had she been permitted to 
continue on to Masaka, she could have contributed to her brother’s household income through 
farming and domestic labor. The DC Kigezi, however, framing Nyirambonwa as a helpless 
victim, ordered the family to board a lorry bound for Ruhengeri, the nearest Rwanda town, 
sometime in late May. Once in Ruhengeri, the Belgian Territorial Administrator would be 
responsible for arranging for her onward journey to Astrida. Yet without access to land, the 
family’s survival would depend on Nyirambonwa’s ability to earn cash wages in a town that was 
still reeling from the effects of famine.  
This micro-history also points to the difficult social choices that women had to make for 
the sake of their survival and the survival of their children. As Rwandan families spread out 
across eastern Africa in search of food, land, and jobs, women had to choose which relationships 
to prioritize, for reasons both affective and material. Nyirambonwa was unsuccessful in her 
attempt to reach Masaka, but details of her long and circuitous journey suggest important 
relational work. When her husband died in 1942, she did not go to Masaka where her brother and 
older children lived, but to Astrida. What prompted this decision? Perhaps she hoped to find a 
relative of her late husband who would be willing to take care of her three young children, giving 
                                                 
71 KigDA Immigration Box 1, File MIG.2/1, “Repatriation of Africans (Destitutes),” 1935-43; DC Kigezi to 
Registrar, H.M. High Court, Kampala, 15 November 1939. 
72 Ibid. 
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them a brighter future than the one she could provide. Perhaps she feared that her brother would 
not share his land with her, given that he was already supporting her older two children. Then 
again, maybe Nyirambonwa did not want to leave the country of her birth. It is also possible that 
the man she named as her “brother” was not an actual kin relation, but an acquaintance or fellow 
clan member whom she hoped might be willing to take her in. It is impossible to know the 
reason, but what the sources do show is that she had options, meager though they were. Her 
winding path across Rwanda and Uganda implies a careful calculation of risk and prioritization 
of relationships. Women did not simply follow their men. They made strategic choices about 
when to leave and with whom, where to go and which relationships to pursue. These choices not 
only had profound consequences for their families and social networks, but for the widening 
geography of the diaspora as well. 
“Mine was bustowa”: Dorcas’s Journey 
Settling in Buganda after World War II 
In times of scarcity and war, colonial authorities interpreted the actions of migrant women 
through the lens of dependency and victimhood, but a closer analysis of individual journeys 
highlights women’s resourcefulness. Their creativity and strategic social maneuverings, 
however, had limits, as witnessed in Nyirambonwa’s cruel deportation. Indeed, women faced 
many gendered constraints on their mobility. At the same time they chose to migrate, they could 
also, by virtue of their marginalized position, be forced to move against their will. “Dorcas” was 
kidnapped by her husband and brought to Uganda in 1945. Her story, like Nyirambonwa’s, 
underscores the particular vulnerability and limited agency of women migrants. Yet, her ability 
to remain in Uganda after her husband’s death in 1955 demonstrates how changing land and 
migration policies opened up new, unexpected spaces for women settlers. 
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Dorcas73 came to Uganda at the end of World War II, soon after colonial officials 
reopened the border to migration. She was fifteen years old, an orphan, and newly married to a 
man named Karwemera. Dorcas and Karwemera both hailed from the same hill in Gitarama 
province, central Rwanda, but Karwemera was older and had spent much of his youth in Uganda 
as a migrant worker. He had spent so much time abroad that his childhood friends and family 
members had taken to calling him “Muganda,” in recognition of his social and physical 
relocation.  
The couple married quickly and without ceremony. “It was not a wedding,” Dorcas says. 
“He and my brothers just agreed on the bride price, and that was it. I went with him.” Dorcas 
knew that her new husband was preparing to return to Uganda shortly, but she assumed that she 
would remain in Gitarama like many migrants’ wives did. What she did not know was that her 
brothers had agreed to send her away with Karwemera when he left, and that they had devised a 
plan to trick her into going. “They said to me, ‘Let us escort this Muganda [to Kigali],’” Dorcas 
recalls of the day she left home.  
“So they lied to me until we reached Kigali, and then they got out [of the lorry]…I 
thought they were coming back, but then the car [we were in] started to leave. I started 
crying…I wanted them to open and let me pass. ‘Where have my brothers gone?’ I asked. 
‘We will go together,’ Karwemera told me. ‘Where is my oldest brother?!’ ‘We will go 
together, dear.’ I cried all the way here. One month passed and I was still crying” 
(laughs). 
 
Karwemera brought Dorcas to the sub-county of Kyagwe, in eastern Buganda kingdom, 
where he had his own plot of land and a house. There was little Dorcas could do to resist her own 
kidnapping. Her parents and her aunts were dead, leaving her at the mercy of her older brothers 
                                                 
73 This story is based on a series of interviews that I held with “Dorcas” in September 2013, at her home in Mukono 
District. As with Doreen’s story of Mukamusana, I have changed the names of private individuals to protect 
anonymity.  
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who controlled access to the family land. If she refused the marriage, she would have few 
respectable options. If she tried to escape from Karwemera, she had no money to pay for her 
journey back home and, in any case, her childhood home no longer welcomed her. Her location 
in the network of familial power relations had shifted irrevocably with Karwemera’s marriage 
proposal, foreclosing the possibility of remaining in Gitarama. She knew that she could not go 
back. 
On her arrival in Kyagwe, Dorcas faced another startling revelation: Karwemera already 
had a Munyarwanda wife and two children. They lived in a beautiful house that he had built for 
them, with a four-sided roof made of thatch. “It was a mwamba house,” Dorcas recalls with 
evident admiration. Owning a mwamba was a sign of one’s prosperity and social rank, as only 
chiefs and wealthier peasants could afford to build one. The wealthier one was, the better 
materials they could use. Karwemera had built his out of mud and thatch, but the size of the 
house and the shape of the roof was what set his homestead apart from those of his poorer 
neighbors. “It was a proper house,” Dorcas says, nodding. “But mine was bustowa [bu-store],” a 
Luganda neologism likely drawn from the English word for “store house”: a small hut with a 
single-sided roof. As Karwemera’s wife, Dorcas was entitled to her own hut and garden, but she 
could not expect to have a better home than her rival co-wife. The hierarchy of her new 
matrimonial family could not have been more obvious.  
Kyagwe was home to the Asian-owned Lugazi Sugar Plantation, which was the second 
largest employer in the Protectorate, employing 8,500-9,000 workers by 1950. The Protectorate’s 
largest employer and Lugazi’s rival, Kakira Sugar Works, was only fifty kilometers down the 
road, and together the two companies attracted tens of thousands of seasonal labor migrants to 
the area every year. While Karwemera may have reached Kyagwe on foot, he more likely arrived 
159 
 
via recruiters seeking laborers for Kakira or Lugazi. The sugar companies kept recruiting agents 
permanently stationed at Mbarara and Masaka towns, where they worked diligently to intercept 
migrants en route to Buganda. In exchange for free transportation, a blanket, and guaranteed 
employment with daily meal rations, recruited workers signed a contract pledging two years of 
service. That was how most Banyarwanda ended up in Kyagwe, rather than Mengo or Masaka, 
which were closer to the Rwanda border. Once in Kyagwe, however, most contracted laborers 
abandoned their posts before their two year commitments were up, because they found that they 
could make better money doing much lighter work for private Baganda farmers in the area.  
Dorcas represented Karwemera’s crowning success as an industrious migrant. Few men 
in Rwanda, whether Hutu or Tutsi, could afford to have multiple wives. But his good fortune in 
Buganda had afforded him, like Semana (pp. 13-14), an escape from the drudgery of peasant life 
in Belgian Rwanda. By the time he married Dorcas, Karwemera had already saved enough 
money to establish himself as a well-to-do peasant farmer in Kyagwe. He had rented his own 
land (kibanja) and purchased several head of cattle, and he had paid the bride price and built a 
mwamba house for his first wife. The couple had two children, who Karwemera sent to school 
with money he earned raising cotton. The addition of a second wife to his household was a 
symbol of his wealth, but also a reason for his continued prosperity: With two wives, he could 
devote all of his time to growing cash crops, while the women grew food. The diversification of 
household labor promoted the family’s further accumulation of wealth and served as a stabilizing 
force against crop failure, inflation, and the changing price of cotton on the world market. 
Dorcas’ introduction to life in Kyagwe was difficult. She was the second wife living in a 
visibly inferior house, in the middle of a predominantly Baganda village, with no support except 
her husband. Her co-wife actively disliked her, and went out of her way to remind Dorcas of her 
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place in the household hierarchy. She did not speak a word of Luganda or English, making her 
all the more dependent on Karwemera, who spent most of his days in his cotton fields, away 
from the house. That first year was isolating and lonely, an emotional pain made worse by the 
physical exhaustion of her first pregnancy and by the expectation that she would cultivate her 
own garden without any help or guidance. “I knew how to dig from growing up in Rwanda,” she 
said, “But not seriously. That was when I learned to dig seriously.” Dorcas stated that her life 
began to improve as she came to accept that Kyagwe was her new home. Her co-wife hated her, 
but she did not have to share a home with her. She could work hard in her garden, practice her 
Luganda, and show respect to other people in her village.  
Dorcas’s biography shows how women could negotiate new places for themselves in 
Buganda within the parameters of significant power inequalities. Structurally, she had very little 
control over her life. Brought to Uganda against her will, her experiences in many ways reflected 
colonial assumptions about female dependency and male initiative: she came to Uganda because 
her husband willed it. She made it work because she had to, focusing her energies on the few 
things over which she had control: raising children, tending gardens, practicing Luganda, and 
visiting neighbors. When Karwemera died in 1955, however, her position changed. Because his 
first wife had passed away several years earlier, and because all of his children were small, 
Karwemera left Dorcas all of his property when he died. And so, despite the fact that she was a 
woman and a foreigner, Dorcas inherited her husband’s wealth, thanks to Buganda property laws 
that protected all kibanja tenants, regardless of gender, ethnicity or birthplace.  
Those first few years after Karwemera’s passing were exceptionally difficult, because she 
was left to look after four small children alone. She eventually did remarry, but not until her two 
oldest children were grown. Her second husband, Alain, was a Kinyarwanda-speaking migrant 
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from Burundi, who had moved to Kyagwe in the late 1950s. Their union produced no children, 
but Alain’s companionship made her happy, and her land was sufficient for the two of them and 
her two youngest children. As the years progressed and illness and arthritis began to limit 
Dorcas’s mobility, Alain took over all cultivation duties. The two of them continue to live in 
Kyagwe, on Dorcas’s land. 
Conclusion 
Between 1928 and 1945, Rwandan women moved to Uganda in incredible numbers. Their 
departure from Ruanda-Urundi was symptomatic of mounting economic and political tensions in 
the Belgian Territory, tensions that would eventually erupt in the revolution of 1959 (see Chapter 
Four). In leaving home, however, women were doing more than escaping hardship or following 
husbands: they were forcing the reconfiguration of their social networks. This was rarely their 
intent, of course, but it was a consequence of decisions they made. Dislocated from familiar 
patriarchal geographies, they had to negotiate new pathways to land and livelihood, and this 
required careful relational work, not only with their menfolk, but also with the new communities 
in which they found themselves. In so doing, women were not shedding their old identities, but 
repositioning themselves in social space. They maintained their Kinyarwanda and taught it to 
their children while diligently learning new languages. They contributed to their husbands’ 
household wealth while remaining in contact with family back home. Their resettlement in 
Uganda can therefore hardly be described as a process of erasure, but of creativity and pragmatic 
flexibility. 
Their capacity for creative adaptation, however, had painful limits. In particular, 
structural forces exposed women to violence and deprivation that men could avoid. 
Nyirambonwa’s detainment and subsequent deportation at the hands of anxious British 
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authorities is a case in point. Women were largely invisible to Uganda officials throughout the 
first half of the twentieth century, but this invisibility was conditional on government 
assessments of scarcity. In times of relative plenty, the Protectorate rarely noticed women 
migrants, even though they were certainly present in seasonal migration flows; when they did 
notice women, they categorized them as dependents of Banyarwanda men, and as by-products of 
Uganda’s dependency on foreign labor. In times of famine, however, the government lost faith in 
the ability of migrant men to look after their wives and children. Banyarwanda women, at that 
point, ceased to be invisible in government eyes, because they represented a potential drain on 
colonial resources rather than a source of valuable labor.  
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Chapter 4: The Making of a Refugee Family 
 
 
In the pre-dawn hours of November 12, 1959, Alonso Kahima, a medical dresser with the 
Ruanda Mission Hospital at Shyira in northwestern Ruanda, helped his wife and children climb 
into the bed of a waiting lorry. Across the valley on the opposite hill, Tutsi homesteads burned, 
casting the nighttime landscape in a strange, flickering glow. Fighting had erupted six days prior, 
and seemingly without warning. Kahima wasn’t sure who started it—the mission was awash in 
rumor—but he did know one thing: several of his neighbors, both Hutu and Tutsi, were among 
the bands of assailants who moved through the hills each night, hunting down Tutsi chiefs and 
other persons believed to be supporters of the radical monarchist party, the Union Nationale 
Rwandaise (UNAR). Kahima was not UNAR, but he was Tutsi and he worked for the Anglican 
mission, which was widely regarded as allies of the monarchy. Consequently, after that first 
terrible night, he moved his family from their small farm on the side of Shyira hill to the station 
grounds at the 1,000-foot summit, where other families were also gathering.1 The following day, 
protesters began a sustained assault on the hill, setting fire to the homes of mission workers. In 
an instant, the Kahimas lost the earthly treasures that had taken them decades to accumulate: 
their house with the good roof of corrugated iron, their coffee trees, and their cow and calf. On 
                                                 
1 For a description of Shyira hill, see Rev. E.R. Langston to Rev. B.R. Isaac, “What God Has Wrought,” Ruanda 
Notes v. 6, No. 131 (25 December 1955), 2. For images of Shyira Hospital, see Ruanda Notes Nos. 95 (February 
1947) and 98 (November 1947).  
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November 10, the Belgian government sent in Congolese troops to guard the station.2 The 
following day, the British missionaries appealed to the Belgian authorities for help in organizing 
an evacuation to Uganda—if not for the thousands of people now sheltering on the Mission’s 
hill, then at least for the station’s most vulnerable families.3 Kahima, an aging father of eight 
with advanced rheumatoid arthritis and few material options, was among the first to leave.4 
Overseeing the evacuation was one Rev. Andereya Sabune, an ordained pastor and a 
long-term missionary with the Ruanda Mission. Like Kahima, he identified as Tutsi, but the 
cleric enjoyed certain protections that his colleague did not. To begin with, he had been born and 
raised in Bufumbira, and was the son of a Ugandan chief. He was educated, able-bodied, and 
middle class. As the head African pastor at Shyira, he was a highly visible figure in his 
community and could often be seen traversing the district’s steep hills either on foot or in his 
Volkswagen Beetle as he made his rounds to the Mission’s 200 village out-stations. By all 
accounts it appears he was well-liked, and was known to use his position at Shyira to advocate 
for better pay and work conditions for African staff, both Hutu and Tutsi. He was a supporter of 
the monarchy, however, and this could have been a liability. In fact, he initially left with the 
caravan for the safety of his wife and children. Yet the family returned to Shyira within a matter 
of weeks, at the request of Sabune’s Hutu colleagues. His popularity and perceived outsider 
status, it seemed, were enough to mitigate his Tutsi-ness and royalist politics—at least for a little 
                                                 
2 “Trouble at Shyira,” Ruanda Notes No. 147 (Mar-May 1960), 4. 
3 CUA-1, Series Administrative/Governing Bodies, Box 254, Folder 1462, “Ruanda-Urundi and Bishop Brazier, 
1959”; Minutes of the Emergency Executive Committee held at Ibuye, 17th November 1959. 
4 Kahima’s history is based on interviews that I conducted with a surviving relative as well as archival sources. I 
have changed his name and certain minor details of his story to protect his identity. 
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while.5 The Sabunes were able to remain at Shyira for another three years, long after most Tutsi 
families had fled. 
This chapter is a social history of displacement, told through the intersecting journeys of 
the Kahima and Sabune families during the Rwandan revolution (c. 1959-61) and its aftermath. 
The two families were among the estimated 50,000-70,000 people, predominantly Tutsi, who 
sought refuge in Uganda between 1959 and 1964.6 Following the routes of earlier labor migrants 
and famine refugees—some of whom had been their kith and kin—they found their way to safer 
harbors in Kigezi, Ankole, and Buganda. Many would take up permanent residence in Uganda, 
but as we will see, their ability to recreate home after displacement was contingent on a host of 
different factors. Sabune, for example, was able to use his familial origins, social capital, and 
Anglican connections to secure citizenship for himself and his family when they eventually left 
Shyira in 1962. Although his wife, Ayirini, was from Congo, she was able to receive citizenship 
through Sabune.  
The same could not be said for Kahima and his wife, Joyce. Kahima’s trouble lay in his 
weak social position and murky personal history. He had lived in Uganda for decades prior to 
moving to Shyira, and evidently had the documents to prove it.7 Yet local Ugandan officials 
ultimately could not determine his birthplace, either by reference to a birth certificate or an 
                                                 
5 Interview, Charles Sabune, July 2015. Information on Andereya’s life comes from interviews that I conducted with 
his surviving children (Charles, Petero, and Harriet) as well as his half-brother, Dr. Herbert Nsanzemuhire. The 
family has spent many years conducting an extensive oral history and genealogy of their family, and they graciously 
shared their findings with me. I have supplemented this oral history with insights gleaned from the Church of 
Uganda Archives at Mukono, the Kabale District Archives, and copies of the Ruanda Notes, held at the Cambridge 
Centre for World Christianity at Cambridge. I shared all archival documents concerning Sabune with his surviving 
family. 
6 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 164. 
7 KigDA Immigration Box 3, ADM 23/1i, Control of Entry into Uganda of Refugees—Ruanda Refugees, 1961-
1962. 
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authoritative witness like a chief, and this contributed to his eventual reclassification as a 
“refugee” in 1962.8 His wife was Ugandan, having been born and raised in Kisoro, Bufumbira, 
but Ugandan women could not help their foreign spouses secure citizenship—the 1962 
Citizenship Act only provided a naturalization option for non-Ugandan women married to 
Ugandan men.9 Kahima therefore had no options when, in a chance encounter, a Kigezi District 
official ordered his immediate removal to a government refugee camp in 1964.10 In that moment, 
it did not matter that Kahima had spent the majority of his childhood and adult life in Kabale, or 
that his spouse was Ugandan. In the eyes of a swiftly evolving state, Kahima became an outsider.  
The experiences of the Sabune and Kahima families open up questions about the 
temporality of place and the meaning of the border at independence. The attenuation of “home” 
was a long and alinear process, one that did not look the same for everyone. How did Shyira 
change for Kahima and Sabune, both before and during the war? How do we account for their 
diverse experiences of place? Similarly, how do we explain the unevenness of their abilities to 
reclaim place in Uganda? In answering these questions, I ground my analysis in Doreen 
Massey’s assertion that place cannot be fixed. Place, like identity, is relational, contingent.11 The 
state’s imposition of national borders, refugee laws, and documentation regimes constituted an 
effort to fix people in time and space, to define “Uganda” as a place that was different from 
Rwanda. Yet the state could not monopolize the work of place-making, because people’s lives 
                                                 
8 KigDA Immigration Box 3, ADM 23, Control of Entry into Uganda of Refugees, 1962-1964. 
9 The Uganda Citizenship Act, 1962, Section 3. See also Bronwen Manby’s analysis of independence-era citizenship 
laws in Africa: Bronwen Manby, Citizenship Law in Africa: A Comparative Study (Oxford: African Book 
Collective, 2012), 5, Project MUSE. 
10 KigDA Immigration Box 9, 123, Refugees, 1964-1987. 
11 Doreen Massey, Space, Place, and Gender (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 168-169. 
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always exceeded the state. Kahima and Sabune were part of kin and religious networks that 
spanned the border like human bridges. New government interventions were part of place-as-
process, because they effected these social relations across space, but they were not 
determinative. The experience of place, like the experience of displacement, never tracked 
perfectly with chronologies of war and state-making. People’s social histories were just as 
important, if not more so, in the loss and reclamation of place. 
Paying attention to the temporality of place allows us to identify the factors that either 
facilitated or hindered people’s ability to relocate after the Rwandan revolution. In so doing we 
are able to divorce our understanding of displacement from static notions of place. Following the 
cross-border lives of the Kahima and Sabune families, I demonstrate how they made and remade 
their homes time and again. I also show how, at a particular moment in space, changing 
immigration and citizenship policies overwhelmed and immobilized the social resources of one 
family, but not the other. Dislocation was not an equalizer. 
In what follows, I draw on oral histories, local government archives, missionary journals 
and private family papers to trace the journeys of Kahima and Sabune from Bufumbira to Shyira 
and back again. Part One, “Building Cross-Border Lives,” tells the story of the Ruanda Mission 
and how Sabune and Kahima made their homes in Shyira. Part Two, “Losing Place,” chronicles 
their respective experiences of the war and the circumstances surrounding their displacement. 
Part Three, “Borders,” shifts to Kigezi District in Uganda and the efforts of refugees to negotiate 
asylum as they waited for the opportunity to return to Rwanda. The conclusion returns to Sabune 
and Kahima and their respective fates. 
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Part I: Building Cross-Border Lives 
Before examining the Kahima and Sabune families’ experience of the revolution, it is first 
important to situate their war-time migrations within longer, multi-generational histories of 
regional mobility. Migration was a time-honored strategy that members from both families had 
used at various points in their lives to evade danger and maximize opportunities. These prior 
experiences and shared narratives informed how each family navigated the border during the 
war. They also, critically, provided a fund of intellectual and emotional resources on which 
members might draw to help them make sense of their new circumstances. In highlighting the 
continuity of migration, however, it is also important to acknowledge that the experience of 
violent displacement at the end of the colonial era was anything but ordinary for those who lived 
through it. Fleeing the country was truly frightening, especially since the political significance of 
their flight was unclear. The meaning of the border was changing rapidly between 1959 and 
1964, often in unpredictable ways, raising new obstacles for some while facilitating the mobility 
of others. Understanding prior histories of border-crossing is necessary if we are to appreciate 
how people’s relationship to the border changed after 1959. 
Recalling from Chapter One, the northern periphery of the Rwandan kingdom was, by the 
turn of the twentieth century, a densely populated and heterogeneous region. Older networks of 
clan, kin, and trade overlay more recent configurations of political territory and tribute; these 
lines of communication shaped how people responded to dangerous situations like war, disease, 
and domestic disputes. The advent of colonial borders rarely destroyed these networks but 
instead augmented existing linkages. In some cases, they generated new possibilities for 
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connection and mobility.12 New religious circuits, for example, were particularly important for 
Kahima and Sabune, whose travels across central Africa coincided with the expansion of the 
Ruanda Mission and its parent organization, the Church Missionary Society (CMS). Both men 
were Kinyarwanda-speaking Tutsi who had grown up between southern Uganda and northern 
Ruanda, and both had found employment with the Ruanda Mission during the 1920s—Sabune as 
a teacher and Kahima as a medical orderly. Their ability to move back and forth across the 
border must be understood within the context of the CMS-Ruanda Mission’s peculiar trans-
border history and organization. A few brief words about the history of the Mission are therefore 
in order. 
The Ruanda Mission 
Despite its name, the Ruanda Mission originated in Uganda. Its founders were two British 
doctors named Leonard Sharp and Algernon “Algie” Stanley-Smith,13 who first came to Uganda 
at the end of World War I as missionaries with the CMS, an Anglican organization with 
headquarters in London and stations across the Empire. Their true ambition, however, was not to 
remain in Uganda, a country they regarded as already “reached,” but to do “pioneer” evangelism 
in Ruanda-Urundi, which was by then a League of Nations Trust Territory under Belgian 
trusteeship. The Belgian authorities denied their initial request for permission to enter Ruanda, 
however, leaving Sharp and Stanley-Smith to look for an alternative site on the Uganda side of 
the border. They found it in Kigezi, a rugged, up-country District that until 1911 had been 
divided between British Uganda and German Ruanda. The missionaries reasoned that, if they 
                                                 
12 Jesper Bjarnesen and Henrik Vigh, “Introduction: The Dialectics of Displacement and Emplacement,” Conflict 
and Society 1 (June 2016), 9. 
13 KigDA: Annual Report for Kigezi District 1921-1923, DC Kigezi to PC-Western Province, Fort Portal, 20 April 
1921. 
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could not go to Ruanda immediately, then perhaps they might begin their work among the 
Kinyarwanda-speaking Banyarwanda who were settled just across the border in Uganda.14 In 
1921, they laid the foundations for a hospital and a boys’ boarding school in the district capital of 
Kabale, as well as a second boarding school in Kisoro, Bufumbira saza.15 
In 1923, the British Protectorate gained control of a small part of eastern Ruanda, at 
which point the CMS doctors seized the opportunity to plant a second mission station in what 
was now British territory. Joined by another CMS missionary doctor named Joe Church, they 
constructed a hospital at Gahini, near Lake Muhazi. In 1924, the British returned Gahini to the 
Belgians, but the missionaries were allowed to keep the Gahini station. In 1931, the Ruanda 
Mission expanded further, building hospital stations at Shyria, in northwest Ruhengeri Province, 
and at Kigeme, in the south near Astrida (Butare). Four years later, the Ruanda Mission 
expanded yet again, this time into Urundi with another three hospital stations at Ibuye, Matana, 
and Buhiga. By the mid-1930s, then, the Ruanda Mission comprised seven major stations spread 
across two empires and three territories, with African and European staff circulating regularly 
between them. 
A driving force behind much of this circulation was a new piety movement known as 
Abalokole—literally, the born-agains—and remembered today as the East African Revival. 
Originating in Gahini in the mid-1930s, the Abalokole believed that eternal salvation rests in 
Christ alone, and that one must be “born again” through the acknowledgement of one’s sinful 
nature and the acceptance of Christ as Lord and Savior. Once saved, it was incumbent upon the 
                                                 
14 Kevin Ward, “Revival, Mission and Church in Kigezi, Rwanda and Burundi,” in The East African Revival: 
History and Legacies, eds. Kevin Ward and Emma Wild-Wood (New York: Routledge, 2012), 14-15. 
15 Algernon Stanley-Smith, Ruanda Notes v. 1, no. 3 (15 September 1921). 
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born again to share her story with the world, in hopes that others might be saved, too. The 
Abalokole were convinced that they were living in Biblical end times, that the risen Christ would 
soon return to earth to judge the living and the dead, and that those who had not been saved 
would spend eternity in hell, a place of unending, physical torment. On the basis of these 
convictions, converts took to the road as missionaries, traveling extensively across eastern and 
central Africa to spread their message. For them, the community forged around individual 
commitments to a personal Christ transcended human divisions of nationality, race, and 
politics—or at least it was supposed to.  
For all of their egalitarian rhetoric, however, white missionaries with the Ruanda Mission 
demonstrated an unspoken preference for Tutsi in both their missional aims and hiring practices, 
believing that the conversion of the aristocracy would lead to the conversion of the masses.16 The 
Church Missionary Society had used this approach with great success in Uganda, but it failed to 
bear fruit in Ruanda, at least as far as numbers went. Most chiefs and notables instead joined the 
Catholic Church, with a significant rise in baptisms during the 1930s.17 Nevertheless, the Ruanda 
Mission continued to pursue the aristocracy until the revolution. Whereas their Catholic rivals 
were beginning, after World War II, to rethink their own Tutsi-biases and reach out to the Hutu 
masses, the Anglicans maintained a steady faith in the Tutsi as the country’s destined leaders. 
“They have an innate capacity to rule born of centuries of experience,” wrote Stanley-Smith in 
1958. “Will it be selfish, domineering, cruel and corrupt as in the past, or will it be in the highest 
interests of all, enlightened and pure? The answer to this will depend on whether men are found 
                                                 
16 Ward, “Revival,” 26. The white missionary staff came largely from England’s upper crust, and their class politics 
informed their preference for elite Tutsi. See Timothy Longman, Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 80. 
17 Linden, Church and Revolution, 208. The Catholic Church’s remarkable increase during the 1930s was commonly 
referred to as la tornade.  
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whose first loyalty is Christ, and whose mastering motive is loving service.” Reflecting the 
attitudes of many of his white colleagues, Stanley-Smith believed that Tutsi political dominance 
was inevitable, and that the Ruanda Mission therefore had a duty to convert as many Tutsi elite 
as they could to ensure the future peace of the country.18  
An even greater irony of the Ruanda Mission’s trickle-down evangelism was that, rather 
than attracting nobles and chiefs, they were actually drawing in Tutsi and Hutu peasants who, 
witnessing the abuses of Catholic chiefs and the seeming complicity of the Catholic Missions, 
turned to Protestantism as a political and spiritual alternative. Between 1936 and 1958, Protestant 
numbers grew by a factor of ten, from 20,600 adherents across all Protestant missions in 1936 to 
over 220,000 in 1958; the Ruanda Mission alone counted 100,000 converts spread across 1,700 
churches in Ruanda-Urundi.19 The station at Shyira experienced similar growth, growing from 
2,000 adherents in 1941 to 10,000 in 1949.20 While the Mission did not break down its statistics 
by ethnicity, it was widely regarded as a Hutu organization until the early 1950s, despite the 
predominance of Tutsi schoolmasters, clergy, and hospital workers.21 In the build-up to the 
revolution, however, this perception would change, and the Anglicans would come to be viewed 
as an ally of a conservative Tutsi agenda. We will return to this point presently. 
 
                                                 
18 Dr. A. Stanley-Smith, “The Political Set-Up of Ruanda-Urundi,” Ruanda Notes No. 142 (November 1958-January 
1959), 6. 
19 The Ruanda Mission was not the only Protestant organization in Ruanda-Urundi. They were joined by the Seventh 
Day Adventists and the Belgian Protestant Mission, among several others. For general Protestant figures, see JJ 
Carney, Rwanda Before the Genocide: Catholic Politics and Ethnic Discourse in the Late Colonial Era (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 36, 41. For Ruanda Mission numbers, see Rev. Jim Brazier, Annual Report for 
1957-58, Ruanda Notes No. 140 (Annual Review for 1957-58), 6. 
20 Lt. Col. G.C. Grimshaw, “Report on Ruanda,” Ruanda Notes (February 1950), 2. 
21 Ward, “Revival,” 25. 
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Sabune 
Andereya Sabune was born in Bufumbira, at a place called Busanza, sometime during the 
early twentieth century. His paternal grandfather, Nyarushumba, had been a lesser chief in 
northern Ruanda, near what later became Gatsibo, during the reign of Rwabugiri (c. 1860-1895). 
As a lesser chief, he was responsible for collecting tribute for the chief above him, and that chief 
was Rwabugiri’s son, Nyindo, who ruled over Bufumbira (see Chapter 1). It was through this 
political connection that Nyarushumba developed friendships with other chiefs and notables in 
Bufumbira. It was also how he met his first wife, a woman whose name the surviving family can 
no longer remember. She went back to Nyarushumba’s home after they married, and she bore 
him a son named Karera. Karera was Sabune’s father. 
When Karera was about five years old, his mother took him back to her people in 
Busanza, Bufumbira, without Nyarushumba. Family believe that Nyarushumba may have died 
during a smallpox epidemic, but no one really knows for sure. A competing theory is that he had 
fallen out of good graces with Rwabugiri and had subsequently committed suicide. Whatever the 
case, sometime during the late 1880s, the young Karera came to live in Bufumbira. His mother 
died soon afterwards, and one of her kinsmen adopted Karera. A few years later, when Karera 
was a teenager, he was adopted by yet another family: the local chief of Busanza and his wife, 
who were childless. Karera became the chief’s son, and when the chief died, Karera inherited his 
position. This was sometime around the year 1900, when Busanza (like all of Bufumbira) was 
still part of German Ruanda. 
Karera ultimately married four women, who bore him many children. His firstborn son, 
Sehene, grew up to become the muruka (parish) chief of Busanza once it passed to the British 
Protectorate in 1911. Sabune was the second-born, and this birth-order was important: When 
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CMS missionaries Sharp and Stanley-Smith first came to Busanza shortly after World War I, 
Karera was willing to let Sabune attend their boarding school. Sehene, however, was to remain at 
home, where he was being groomed for the chieftaincy. This was the beginning of Sabune’s 
religious career. 
Sabune completed his primary studies and religious education in 1927, at which point he 
moved from southern Uganda to northern Ruanda to start working as a teacher for the Ruanda 
Mission station in Gahini. After two years at Gahini, he moved back to Bufumbira, where he met 
and married his first wife, a Hutu woman named Malisa, and began to work as a clerk for a sub-
county chief.22 Malisa, however, died soon after they settled, while she was in labor with their 
first child. The loss of his young wife and baby triggered a crisis of faith for Sabune, who 
subsequently left the church and turned to drink. He lost his job as a clerk and spent several 
months in prison when he was caught stealing money from the sub-county cash-box to support 
his habit. It was during his detention that he recommitted his life to God. Upon his release from 
prison, he returned to the Ruanda Mission. 
The story of how Sabune met his second wife, Ayirini, offers further insight into the 
kinds of cross-border networks that women and men were part of during the interwar years, and 
bears comparison to the journeys of women discussed in Chapter Three. Ayirini was born and 
raised in Bwisha, a predominantly Hutu chieftaincy that had been part of the Rwandan kingdom 
until 1920, when the Belgians incorporated it into eastern Congo. When Ayirini reached puberty, 
her father arranged for her to marry the chief of Bwisha, Ndeze. Displeased with the 
engagement, Ayirini decided to run away. Her older sister, Dorokasi, had recently married a man 
                                                 
22 Recall that 1927 marked the beginning of the Rwakayihura famine in eastern Ruanda, and that the Mission at 
Gahini distributed government relief. If family members are correct in their assertions that Sabune returned from 
Gahini in 1928, it may have been the famine that prompted him to relocate. 
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in Busanza just over the border in Uganda, and so that was where she went. What she did not 
know was that Dorokasi was wed to Sehene, Karera’s son, and that Sabune was visiting them. 
Reaching Dorokasi’s house, she found her brother-in-law, Sehene, sitting in the courtyard with 
his brother, Sabune. Sabune, smitten, then went to his father and asked him to arrange for his 
marriage to Ayirini.23 The couple married shortly thereafter.  
Over the next two decades, Sabune and Ayirini traveled widely across Uganda and 
Ruanda-Urundi in the service of the Ruanda Mission. Sabune first took a teaching position at the 
station at Matana,24 and later spent time in Ibuye where he completed his religious training and 
received his ordination.25 Sometime during the early 1940s, the family moved again, this time to 
Shyira, where they would remain until 1962. 
Kahima 
Kahima’s early history is a bit more difficult to trace, at least as far as his birthplace is 
concerned. He has left a much lighter footprint in the archives, and my knowledge of his birth 
and childhood is based largely on the memories of his surviving son, who is now an old man 
himself. His son insists he came from Bufumbira, but at least one missionary source states that 
he was from “Ruanda” (but whether the missionary meant British Ruanda, Belgian Ruanda, or 
German Ruanda is impossible to tell). In any case, Kahima was born before colonial borders 
existed, to Kinyarwanda-speaking farmers who made their living growing sweet potatoes, 
                                                 
23. CUA-1, Administrative/Governing Bodies Box 258, Folder 1477, “Ruanda Mission, 1937”; “Notes and 
Suggestions on the case of Andereya Sabune,” n.d. 
24. CUA-1, Administrative/Governing Bodies Box 258, Folder 1477, “Ruanda Mission, 1937”; “Grade ‘C’ Teachers 
working in Ruanda-Urundi,” n.d. 
25. CUA-1, Administrative/Governing Bodies, Box 261, Folder 1487, “Ruanda Mission, 1947”; Minutes of the 
Standing Committee of the Diocesan Council held at Kabale 25th-30th September, 1947. 
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sorghum, and pulses somewhere along the steep, lava-strewn foothills of the Virunga mountain 
chain. Whether his family had been in the region before the creation of the border is difficult to 
say. They may have been there for generations, but more likely they had been displaced from a 
neighboring area, either during Rwabugiri’s wars of expansion or the later German pacification 
phase. It is also difficult to know whether Kahima grew up identifying as Tutsi, or whether this 
was a label he adopted later in his life. If he grew up in Bufumbira, British officers would have 
likely counted Kahima’s father as a member of the Banyarwanda “tribe” in their tax registers. 
Growing up in the 1910s, Kahima would not have gone to school, since the only schools at that 
time were run by the Catholic and Protestant missions and were generally accessible only to the 
elite. Kahima came of age sometime around the end of World War I, when the Belgians took 
control of Ruanda-Urundi. He married a girl from a nearby village, and likely settled down to 
farm as his parents had done.  
Kahima’s son does not know how he came to be employed with the Ruanda Mission, but 
a likely scenario was that he was a patient at Kigezi Mission Hospital in Kabale and that during 
his convalescence he managed to convince the missionaries to hire him to help out around the 
station. As a medical assistant, Kahima would have received much of his biomedical training on 
the job, under the tutelage of missionary doctors and nurses and from more experienced African 
colleagues. He may have also been sent for further training at either Mukono, in Buganda, or 
Ibuye, in northern Urundi.26 Kahima worked at Kabale throughout the interwar period, but was 
eventually transferred to Gahini in 1941 when the Ruanda Mission was forced to close Kigezi 
Mission Hospital due to financial pressures.27 After a year in Gahini, he was transferred once 
                                                 
26 Ruanda Notes v. 6, no. 133 (Review of 1955-56), 24. 
27 CUA-1 Administrative/Governing Bodies Box 84, Folder 611; Rt.-Rev. PJ Brazier to DC Kabale, 5 October 1956.  
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again to Shyira, where he and his wife, Joyce, would remain with their children until the 
outbreak of the Rwandan revolution.  
Difficult Beginnings 
The Kahima and Sabune families arrived in Shyira to set up their new homes in the early 1940s, 
during a period of tremendous social, political, and demographic change. The region was already 
known to be “notoriously unruly,” given its long history of resistance to both the Mwami and the 
Belgian administration, but the 1940s were especially volatile due to war-time extractions and 
environmental disaster.28 Between 1942 and 1944, the devastating Ruzagayura famine swept 
through much of Ruanda, killing as many as 300,000 people and displacing many more. Food 
shortages were not as bad in the northwest as they were elsewhere, but Ruhengeri province still 
witnessed widespread starvation and displacement, and Shyira was right in the thick of it. In 
December 1943, the Belgian administration made Shyira station a relief center, responsible for 
distributing government food to thousands of people in their district. Three to four times a week, 
lorries carrying flour, dried beans, and powdered milk would arrive from Congo and wind their 
way up the hairpin turns of Shyira hill. The delivery then needed to be inventoried, off-loaded, 
and safely stored. Each day, the Mission distributed dry food to those who were strong enough to 
carry it back to their homes, but prepared other food to serve people who were convalescing at 
the station because they were too weak to make repeated trips to and from Shyira.  
The everyday work of running a relief center was all-consuming. Sabune and Kahima 
were kept busy from sunrise to sundown with cooking and distributing food, managing crowds, 
organizing stores, and making unending trips to the valley to fetch water. The station’s regular 
                                                 
28 Bishop Jim Brazier, “A Survey of the Situation,” Ruanda Notes v. 7, no. 147 (Mar-May 1960), 14 [letter dated 30 
December 1959]. 
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itinerary of classes, medical rounds, and Bible study was replaced with a twice-a-day feeding 
schedule. The drum-beats that once announced the commencement of morning lessons and 
neonatal clinics and afternoon tea now alerted listeners to the arrival of a new shipment or the 
beginning of food distribution.29 To accommodate the crowds, the station worked out a rotating 
schedule with the surrounding chiefs so that certain villages came to the station on certain days. 
This helped with crowd control, but it also meant that the station had to keep registers to ensure 
that the right people received food on the right days. The Mission’s head doctor, Godfrey 
Hindley, supervised the distribution lines to ensure that the government’s limited relief supplies 
went only to the neediest patients. Those he deemed “fit” would be turned away, and hospital 
dressers like Kahima would be on hand to enforce his decisions.30 Sabune would have also been 
responsible for providing pastoral care to people as they waited in the courtyard for food or news 
or medical attention, or when they were gathered around their campfires in the evening. “All 
normal work has naturally ceased,” wrote Hilda Langston, the mission’s head teacher, “and we 
have had to call on everyone to do his bit to cook, organize everything, fetch water or firewood, 
and dispense the food. It is an enormous and tiring all-day job…”31  
The Mission’s relief work impacted its relationships to Ruhengeri’s small and 
conservative Tutsi elite, who had to coordinate with Shyira staff to distribute aid. In the 
aftermath of the famine, these connections further led to a substantial increase in the number of 
                                                 
29 Missionaries made frequent mention of the use of drums to mark out time during the day. See for example Ruanda 
Notes No. 139 (February-April 1958). 
30 The chiefs were supposed to pre-select those who were to receive government rations before sending them on to 
Shyira, but the missionaries reported that each day involved “…any amount of weeding out, for some would come 
who are not starving and though this is done in the first place by the chiefs they may miss out some” (Hilda 
Langston, Shyira, 23 December 1943, Ruanda Notes No. 85 (May 1944), 14). 
31 Hilda Langston, Shyira, 23 December 1943, in Ruanda Notes No. 85 (May 1944), 13. 
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elite Tutsi students at the mission school. Hilda Langston, writing in mid-1944, praised God for 
“so wonderfully open[ing] the door…to the Batutsi around us,” so that “…instead of having only 
one or two from this ruling class, we now have over twenty out of fifty boarders, while in the 
boys’ school nearly all are Batutsi.”32 In January 1945, when Shyira hosted a convention for the 
entire Ruanda Mission, many unaffiliated Batutsi from Ruhengeri also attended, some of whom 
“came right to the Lord, confessing their sins.”33  
In brief, Kahima and Sabune came to settle in Shyira at a time when life for the 
community was far from “normal.” They got to know their new neighbors, supervisors, 
colleagues and chiefs in the midst of profound crisis, one that reconfigured social relationships 
and political networks across the region. They laid the foundations for their houses, collected 
wages from their employer, and enrolled their children in the Mission school at the same time 
that many people were leaving for Uganda and Congo in search of food. Finally, while all 
Mission staff experienced some degree of deprivation during the famine, their basic physical 
survival was ensured by virtue of their connection to the station. In other words, the famine 
created opportunities for employment and material survival for some people at the same time that 
it forced others to flee. Displacement and new beginnings coincided. 
Over the next fifteen years, the Kahima and Sabune families became well-established at 
Shyira and thoroughly enmeshed in the Ruanda Mission’s social and institutional networks. 
Kahima and Joyce had a small farm not far from the station, and their children attended the 
                                                 
32 Hilda Langston, Shyira, 25 May 1944, in Ruanda Notes No. 86 (August 1944), 9-10. European missionaries 
likened Ruzagayura to the Rwakayihura famine of 1927, another disaster in which the Ruanda Mission collaborated 
with the Belgian authorities to distribute emergency relief, that time out of the station at Gahini. Numerous African 
leaders emerged out of Gahini during the 1930s and ‘40s, having first developed relationships with the Mission 
during the famine. See for example Jim Brazier, 21 October 1955, Ruanda Notes No. 130 (November 1955-January 
1956), 6. 
33 Ruanda Notes No. 87 (January 1945), 5-6. 
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mission school. Sabune and Ayirini lived on the station itself, and their youngest children 
attended school with the Kahima children. Their two eldest sons, after completing their primary 
education at Shyira, moved on to Buganda to attend secondary school. Their linguistic 
proficiencies and cultural identifications deepened their connections to northern Ruanda even 
further, and it appears that neither family had any intention of returning to Uganda in the near 
future. Kahima apparently had no property in Uganda, and Sabune, in a demonstration of his 
renewed commitment to the faith, had sold his land inheritance in Busanza and given the money 
to the mission. “Home,” for the moment, was in Ruanda. 
Part II: Losing Place 
In her ethnography of internal displacement in Columbia, Mateja Celestina asks, When does 
displacement ‘start’? State actors and policy experts often frame forced migration as an 
immediate, perhaps even unthinking, reaction to life-threatening violence. Conversely, they 
assume that repatriation to one’s former physical home is the best possible solution to 
displacement. Yet if place is processual—if it is, as Massey contends, “formed out of the 
particular set of social relations which interact at a particular location”—then this problem-
solution narrative no longer holds. Shyira as a place was not the same before and after the 
revolution, because violence radically reconfigured its social relations and its social space. 
Changes in social space, however, did not have the same ramifications for the all of the actors 
involved. Kahima and Sabune experienced what Celestina calls “displacement before 
displacement” in different ways and at different rates. Furthermore, while violence played a 
significant role in their loss of place, it was not the only factor. To understand their individual 
trajectories, we must first understand their locations in social space before the outbreak of war.  
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In the section that follows, I trace Shyira Mission’s evolution between World War II and 
the end of the Rwandan Revolution to illustrate this process of “displacement before 
displacement.” I will first show how Shyira, in the decade after World War II, came to be 
perceived as a Tutsi establishment—a place for Tutsi—despite the fact that most of its converts, 
students and patients were Hutu. I will then turn to the revolution to explore how the station 
changed during the war, and how these changes affected the experience of place for two Tutsi 
families, the Sabunes and the Kahimas. Finally, pushing Celestina’s discussion of displacement-
as-process even further, I will highlight the alinearity of displacement: In the midst of 
displacement, people also experienced moments of familiarity, hope, and promise. The Sabune 
family was able to return to Shyira after their first departure and claim the station as their home 
for another three years. Paying attention to the wax and wane of “home” disrupts linear 
narratives of war and state-formation, and reminds us that, for those who lived this history, the 
end of empire was anything but certain.34  
Shyira, 1945-5635 
World War II was a watershed in Rwandan political history, as it was throughout Africa. Few 
Rwandans served in the military, but their labor fed Belgium’s wartime demand for agricultural 
produce. The Ruzagayura famine was, in many ways, a consequence of western Europe’s 
willingness to wring their colonies of food, stimulants, and textiles. Spared the violence of the 
warfront, the people of Ruanda confronted devastating hunger at home in addition to political 
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abuse at the hands of chiefs, who relied on corporal punishment to extract their requisite quotas. 
These experiences gave rise to growing rural resentment among all peasants, both Hutu and 
Tutsi, and this resentment provided a critical backdrop for the generation that came of age during 
the 1940s. 
The war was also a watershed in terms of the political conversations it helped initiate. 
This is not to say that the war politicized Africans in Ruanda, but rather, the war put Belgium in 
a new position vis-à-vis its empire and its European counterparts. Before the war, Belgium could 
perpetually defer conversations about possible postcolonial futures; after the war, Ruanda-
Urundi became a Trust Territory of the United Nations, and the Belgians, in their new role as 
“tutors,” were charged with preparing the twinned colonies for independence. Although Belgium 
was predictably slow in introducing political reforms, the UN provided African activists with 
new forums for protest and exchange, which they could use to hold Belgium accountable. These 
forums included the UN offices in Geneva and New York, which received petitions and 
committees throughout the 1950s and ‘60s, as well as the UN Visiting Missions that toured the 
country every three years between 1947 and 1961 to ensure that the Belgians were fulfilling their 
obligations as a Trust Authority.  
Under pressure to enact meaningful change, yet reticent to initiate political reform, the 
Belgians spent the latter years of the 1940s engaged in socioeconomic projects, arguing that 
Ruanda-Urundi needed “development” before it would be ready for democratic governance. 
These projects, while intended to forestall independence, were not insignificant. Building crews 
became a familiar sight across the country, as Belgium pumped money into new roads, schools, 
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and hospitals.36 Catholic and Protestant missions, which had long provided the bulk of Ruanda’s 
education and health services, now became virtual contractors of the state, receiving grants and 
subsidies from the government to expand their programs and facilities. To ensure minimum 
standards in education, the administration set up a Directorate of Education, which immediately 
began to churn out new regulations governing syllabi, academic calendars, school accreditation, 
teacher certification, and building codes.37  
In addition to these government initiatives, the country was also experiencing significant 
changes in the private sector as European investors flocked to Ruanda-Urundi after the war. 
Ruhengeri was beset by mining prospectors from all over Europe, who came in search of tin ore, 
coltan, and wolframite.38 Ruhengeri town (the capital of Ruhengeri province) grew rapidly after 
1945, powered by new injections of capital from state and private interests. More Africans, 
including Christians at Shyira, acquired lorries, sewing machines, and livestock, which they used 
to generate income.39 The Ruanda Notes reported that, across its stations, the word on 
everyone’s tongue was amajyambere, “progress.” Everywhere, signs of new life could be seen 
after years of famine and war: urban centers were growing, more towns had electricity, 
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tarmacked roads, and piped water, and more children were going to school.40 The pace of these 
developments was hectic, sometimes frantic. In the words of one missionary, “Developments 
which took fifty years in Uganda and five hundred or more in England, are being rushed through 
here in five years.”41 
The government’s development craze had significant consequences for a place like 
Shyira, especially coming so soon after the Ruzagayura famine. Now, instead of famine relief, 
the Mission at Shyira was responsible for distributing education and medicine. On the station 
grounds itself, new grants from the government allowed the hospital to increase its number of 
beds and medical services. By the mid-1950s, Shyira hospital was treating 48,000 out-patients 
and 1,400 in-patients every year.42 Pre- and neo-natal clinics were among the most popular 
hospital services during this time, in which staff examined 500 mothers and their babies every 
week.43 Adding to these thousands of patients who made their way up and down the hill every 
week, the station’s Day and Boarding school catered to 400 primary students who attended 
classes 221 days out of the year per government regulations.44 
Off the station hill, the Mission’s reach was also expanding. Before World War II, 
Shyira’s entire education program consisted of a small boarding school and day school at the 
mission station, as well as thirty-six “out-schools” scattered across Ruhengeri. The station 
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schools catered to roughly eighty students and were staffed by European and African teachers; 
the out-schools, meanwhile, were run by village evangelists with little to no pedagogical 
training.45 By the end of the 1950s, Shyira oversaw 230 out-schools, thirteen of which were 
officially recognized as schools (rather than mere catechist centers) by the government.46  
If Ruzagayura had opened up new relationships between Shyira Protestants, Belgian 
administrators, and the Tutsi establishment, the post-war development craze served to deepen 
and formalize these relationships. While still dwarfed in comparison to the power and influence 
of the Catholic Church, the Anglicans’ newfound access to state resources allowed the stations to 
expand their influence and increase their following.47 The Mission’s growing influence was 
evident in its climbing number of adherents, particularly among the elite. Before the war, only 
one local sub-chief identified as Protestant, against five Catholic sub-chiefs. The station counted 
approximately 2,000 converts and followers, who collectively tithed about 3,000 francs (£22.5) 
to the Mission every year. By the end of the 1940s, multiple chiefs had converted to 
Protestantism and the Mission counted 10,000 adherents who tithed 80,000 francs per year.48 
While these numbers weren’t “spectacular” when compared to the Catholic church, missionaries 
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at Shyira still viewed them as evidence of “the Kingdom of God being established in this country 
in spite of all the growing turmoil of nationalism and social advance.”49  
European missionary writings in this period highlighted the excitement of the time, but 
their breathless accounts often failed to take note of the tremendous downsides that accompanied 
the new resource flows, consumption patterns, and public services. The construction of new 
schools, hospitals, roads, and mine shafts required significant inputs of manual labor, sending the 
missions, government, and private investors scrambling to drum up the necessary workers.50 
While this competition helped improve African wages, the Belgian administration often off-set 
these gains by raising taxes.51 To this, the administration added new famine crop requirements in 
the wake of Ruzagayura, and also began to impose exceedingly strict regulations on cash crop 
cultivation.52 Missionaries became fond of decrying the African’s newfound “materialism” that 
led to constant “busyness,” but this was actually a symptom of the increasing labor and taxation 
demands that accompanied the Belgians’ post-war “progress” regime.53 
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In 1952, the administration announced a ten-year plan for political devolution, beginning 
with the creation, in 1953, of advisory councils for all levels of government. Each sub-
chieftaincy was to have a consultative body consisting of five to nine members, initially selected 
by the government but later to be determined by democratic elections. The sub-chieftaincy 
councils would then select the advisory councils for the chiefdoms, and the chiefdoms would 
select representatives for the provincial councils. At the very top of this pyramid was the Conseil 
Supérieur du Pays (CSP), which consisted of representatives from each of the ten provincial 
councils as well as nineteen additional members drawn from the nobility and political elite.54 
While the reforms did make the sub-chieftaincy councils slightly more representative, the overall 
effect was to retrench the Tutsi establishment. The councils generally voted for Tutsi candidates 
from particular lineages, resulting in a CSP that was 90.6% Tutsi.55 In this way, the introduction 
of advisory councils served to heighten political resentment across the country, particularly in 
places like Ruhengeri, where the Tutsi constituted an even smaller minority than they were 
elsewhere in Ruanda.  
The government’s next step in democratic reform was likewise disappointing. In 1956, 
Ruanda held its first democratic elections, in which all men had the opportunity to vote for the 
office of sub-chief and sub-chief councilor. In some places, the elections did, in fact, result in 
modestly impressive gains for Hutu candidates. In Ruhengeri, for example, Tutsi incumbents lost 
twenty percent of their positions to Hutu challengers.56 But on the whole, the political privilege 
of the Tutsi elite remained intact. Worse, the lackluster outcome of the elections left a bitter taste 
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in the mouths of Hutu politicians, at the same time that it put the Tutsi establishment on the 
defensive. The elections, rather than introducing fresh notes of representative governance, left 
both sides feeling betrayed.57  
At Shyira, the stress of the times began to take its toll on African staff, whose labor 
underwrote the Mission’s expansion. Missionary work had once allowed village evangelists to 
claim exemption from forced labor quotas, but now that most labor requisitions had been 
replaced with taxation, this was no longer the case. Bishop Brazier, writing in 1958, commented 
that the “evangelist [today] often works far from home, has little time to grow cash crops, and 
makes less money than a laborer.”58 Indeed, African teachers, nurses, evangelists, and orderlies 
at Shyira could expect to earn more doing comparable work for either the government or the 
Catholic Church.59 Many struggled to simply feed themselves, particularly in times of food 
shortages,60 while others fell into debt.61  
These struggles were further exacerbated by the prevalence of land disputes in Ruhengeri 
between Tutsi and Hutu. Prior to colonial rule, the distribution of land in the northwest was 
controlled by wealthy Hutu lineages who were headed by patrons known as abakonde. At the 
turn of the century, incoming Tutsi chiefs, backed by German guns, wrested control of these 
lands, turning patrons into clients and creating a source of deep-seated anger that only grew 
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worse as time progressed and the population expanded. By the late 1950s, Ruhengeri had some 
of the highest population densities in the country, exceeding 200 people per square kilometer in 
some areas.62 Protracted legal disputes over land, grounded in this history of disenfranchisement, 
became an everyday matter for Belgian officials, who often decided in favor of Tutsi litigants. In 
response, some of the province’s more powerful abakonde began to organize themselves 
politically, often with support from the Catholic mission at Rwaza, only a few miles down the 
road from Shyira. Balthazar Bicamumpaka, the Hutu head of the Singa clan and a close friend of 
Rwaza, rose to prominence during this time and began to openly challenge the decisions of 
Belgian and Tutsi administrators. In 1956, when the Ruhengeri Resident attempted to replace an 
unpopular sub-chief with a new Tutsi candidate, 250 Singa men, likely operating under 
Bicamumpaka’s orders, first destroyed the home of the local sub-chief and then raided the 
offices of the Ruhengeri Resident.63 After 1957, the abakonde simply began to annex Tutsi 
pasture outright.64 
While the Europeans with the Ruanda Mission rarely discussed these matters publicly, 
the intensity of the land issue in Ruhengeri would have affected the Christians at Shyira, 
especially those who lived away from the Mission hill. In 1957, for example, Hindley reported 
that one of their senior evangelists “had his house burned down twice in three months.” He did 
not provide an explanation for the attack, saying only that “the trials which the evangelists on the 
hills contend with are very hard.”65 As a result of these privations, some left the Mission to find 
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safer and better-paying jobs elsewhere, leaving European missionaries to lament the failure of 
African zeal.  
The struggle for material and social survival, however, was about more than wages or 
spiritual commitment. European missionaries and ranking African clergy were bound up in local 
relations of patronage, whether they wanted to be or not. Much like their Catholic counterparts, 
they were expected to take care of their clients—i.e., the teachers, clergy, day laborers, 
evangelists and adherents upon whose labor and tithes the Mission depended.66 The Mission’s 
inability to pay competitive wages may have reflected hard financial realities, but this did not 
absolve them of their obligations. Nor could it silence the growing complaint among African 
workers that the Mission, for all of its rhetoric about equality, was committed to racialized pay 
scales. In late 1956, the Rev. Sabune found himself at the center of an explosive confrontation 
with European leadership over the rates of pay for African teachers. Sabune had been part of the 
Ruanda Mission’s wages committee for over a decade, and had become increasingly critical of 
the disparities in pay for African and European staff. When the teachers were denied yet another 
pay raise in 1956, Sabune attempted to correct the matter himself, first by supplementing their 
wages with tithe money, and then with money out of his own pocket. In the end, the European 
headmistress was relocated to Uganda and six African teachers resigned in protest. Shyira’s head 
missionary, Godfrey Hindley, framed the resignations in terms of spiritual warfare: “many in the 
Church have found the way of God too hard…[and have] allowed the devil to deceive them into 
thinking that the mission was not doing all that it should for them.”67 Sabune was nearly 
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dismissed after the incident, and according to his family, was forced to publicly repent of his 
“sins.” Indeed, Mission leadership was quick to dismiss the incident as evidence of spiritual 
weakness and African materialism. In the words of Bishop Brazier, the question of “pay” was 
becoming “a focal point of all thought and interest,” and was a source of ongoing “discontent 
and distrust” between European and African staff. “As long as the Foreign Mission has to 
continue as an employer,” he sighed, “there will be this tension between black and white.”68 Yet 
the issue was not about the wages themselves, but the Mission’s refusal to address racial 
disparity.  
Tensions between European and African staff were further complicated by the 
widespread perception that the Ruanda Mission, and Shyira in particular, favored the Tutsi. Their 
staff was overwhelmingly Tutsi. Their boarding school catered to elite Tutsi families. While the 
majority of their converts and hospital patients were Hutu, the Ruanda Mission reserved their 
most coveted positions and resources for Tutsi. Moreover, as the country’s political climate grew 
increasingly tense in the late 1950s, the Mission remained silent on some of the most pressing 
questions of the day, and this silence was often interpreted as tacit support for the status quo. 
They refused to discuss Hutu grievances against the Tutsi political establishment. Their silence 
was all the more startling when compared to the Catholic Church, which became increasingly 
outspoken on what it referred to as “social justice” after World War II. While Catholic presses in 
Ruanda churned out page after page of vernacular text documenting Tutsi crimes, the Anglicans 
continued to insist that the Mwami was a unifying figure and that the Tutsi were best equipped to 
lead. They continued to cultivate their relationship with the royal court throughout the 
revolution, at one point even helping the Mwami smuggle the Queen Mother and the kalinga 
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drums—the symbol of the monarchy—to Uganda.69 It was therefore little surprise that many 
Hutu around Shyira began to believe that the Ruanda Mission had sided with the Tutsi.70 
The Mission’s treatment of the Hutu-Tutsi question became a major liability for Shyira 
station after 1956 as the pace of political change in Ruanda quickened and questions about Tutsi 
privilege took on new urgency. After the disappointment of the 1956 elections, the Hutu counter-
elite, comprising Hutu seminarians and middle-class traders, began to realize that the Belgians’ 
plan for reform was not preparing the country for true democracy, but for a continuation of 
minority dominance. Hutu fears about the possible machinations of Tutsi conservatives were 
further elevated by the release, in February 1957, of the CSP’s Mise au Point (Statement of 
Views). In this document, prepared for the UN Visiting Mission, the Tutsi-dominated council 
urged the UN to oversee the rapid transfer of power from the Belgian authorities to the 
indigenous elite.71 Their call for self-governance actively ignored the growing cleavage between 
Hutu and Tutsi, at the same time that it failed to address the yawning class divisions between the 
urban elite and the rural poor. Rather than speaking to the emerging Hutu-Tutsi question directly, 
the CSP adopted a universalizing rhetoric that sought to bury internal critique.72  
A month later, in March 1957, nine Hutu intellectuals responded to the Mise au Point 
with a Note on the social aspect of the indigenous racial problem in Rwanda, which became 
known simply as the Bahutu Manifesto. In contrast to the CSP’s universalism, the Manifesto 
decried Hutu exploitation at the hands of Tutsi, both historically and in the present. The 
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country’s problem was not purely Belgian rule, they argued, but the “political monopoly of one 
race, the Tutsi race,” which had become “a social and political monopoly.”73 It is important to 
note here that the Manifesto was not calling for Tutsi expulsion, but for democratic governance 
and social justice. The danger of the statement, however, lie in its cooptation of the Hamitic 
thesis, or the idea that Tutsi constituted a separate, alien race from the Hutu and Twa. And so, 
while the Manifesto promoted numerous progressive ideals, it also contained the seeds of an 
irredentism that would soon take on new and terrifying dimensions as the crisis in Ruanda grew.  
The Mise au Point and the Bahutu Manifesto outlined the two poles of late colonial 
politics in Ruanda. On the one hand was the conservative Tutsi line, which supported the rapid 
transfer of power to the monarchy and leading chiefs, who were (they claimed) in the best 
position to govern a united, independent Ruanda. These aims came to be embodied in the 
political ideology of the Union National Rwandaise (UNAR). On the other hand, the republican 
camp advocated for the end of the monarchy and the creation of a republic. Proponents of this 
aim called for a longer decolonization process that would allow time for Hutu subjects to acquire 
the training and experience they needed to play their full, representative part in democratic 
governance. This was the objective of the Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu, or 
Parmehutu. The UNAR framed Ruanda’s troubles in terms of white colonial rule; Parmehutu 
emphasized the importance of Hutu-Tutsi conflict. In between these two poles, of course, was 
room for considerable nuance, and rival political parties formed in 1957 and 1958 to give voice 
to more moderate positions. The Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse, or 
APROMOSA, was one such organization, at least initially. Led by ex-seminarian Joseph Gitera, 
APROMOSA sought to unite the peasantry across ethnic lines to support republican 
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governance.74 In other words, the dangerous language of racial supremacy, latent in UNAR and 
Parmehutu ideologies, did not represent the many moderate voices calling for reform at the end 
of the 1950s. Similarly, one could be a Tutsi and support the abolition of the monarchy; likewise, 
one could be Hutu and support the Mwami. As time went on, however, the UNAR and 
Parmehutu drowned out these more moderate positions, becoming more radical and more violent 
in their political outlook and strategy. 
War 
According to nearly every historical account, the Social Revolution “began” on November 1, 
1959. The potential for violent conflict between monarchists and republicans, however, had been 
years in the making. In May 1958, a group of Tutsi elders representing the royal court publicly 
ridiculed the notion, proffered by moderates of all stripes, that the Hutu and Tutsi were one 
people. “Since our kings conquered the country and the Hutu and killed their petty kings,” they 
asked rhetorically, “how can they claim to be our brothers?”75 The Belgian administration, after 
decades of supporting Tutsi rule, began to make public statements suggesting that their 
sympathies were changing, setting the more militant monarchists on edge. Tutsi suspicions of the 
Belgians continued to grow until, in July 1959, Mwami Rudahigwa died under mysterious 
circumstances, leading many of his supporters to believe that the colonial administration had 
assassinated him. Conservatives responded by rushing through the appointment of Jean-Baptiste 
Ndahindurwa Kigeri V as the new Mwami, publicly declaring him king before the Belgians had 
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given their consent. This made the Belgians look weak, and gave Hutu nationalists the 
impression that the monarchists were calling the shots.76  
September and October were subsequently tense months filled with public meetings and 
demonstrations carried out by APROMOSA, UNAR, and Parmehutu. Political moderates like 
Chief Bwanakweri, the founder of the small Rassamblement Démocratique Rwandais (RADER) 
party, were sidelined as the rhetoric of the three major parties became increasingly divisive and 
polarizing.77 Belgian authorities, trying desperately to stay ahead of the game, bungled their 
response by trying to silence popular leaders of the UNAR, a move that permanently destroyed 
their relationship with conservative Tutsi.  
By late October, the situation in Ruanda had reached a breaking point. The final straw 
came on November 1, when a group of UNAR youth attacked a popular Hutu sub-chief in 
Gitarama province named Dominique Mbonyumutwa.78 The chief survived the assault, but 
rumor quickly spread that he had died of his injuries, leading to clashes between Parmehutu and 
UNAR supporters the next day. From Gitarama, the violence spread north and west to Kisenyi, 
Ruhengeri, and Byumba—all provinces with a strong Parmehutu presence and an exceptionally 
small corps of Tutsi officials. By November 8, the fighting had reached Mulera, on the Ugandan 
border, and by the ninth it had engulfed Nyanza, the seat of the Tutsi monarchy. By the end of 
the month, all provinces but three (Butare, Cyangugu, and Kibungo) were reporting significant 
outbreaks.79 The Belgians initially dismissed the popular uprisings as “riots” promulgated by 
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“incendiaries,” but the situation was far graver than the colonial administration was ready to 
admit. The power of the revolution rested on popular resentment that was both deep-seated and 
widespread.80 
Europeans at Shyira claimed that their station came under attack when they started 
sheltering refugees, but as we have seen, local people had reasons to distrust the mission. The 
catalyst appears to have been the disappearance of Yona Sekimonyo, a popular headmaster at 
Shyira and one of the Mission’s few Hutu staff members. Sekimonyo went missing on 
November 6 when the fighting began, and rumors spread that “the Batutsi” at Shyira had 
murdered him (he would later send word to the Mission that he had gone into hiding following a 
credible threat to his life). On November 7, armed bands began to move up the station hill from 
the valley below, setting fire to the homes of African staff. As the mission’s courtyard, hospital, 
and classroom block began to fill with frightened people, Josephine Stancliffe and Doreen 
Peck—the only two European missionaries then at Shyira—decided one of them should take the 
station’s car and go for help at the next mission station at Gahini, a full day’s journey to the east. 
Stancliffe drew the short-straw, and that afternoon she and two Hutu evangelists escaped down 
the hill in the Mission’s Volkswagen. 
Meanwhile, Peck remained at Shyira, accompanied by Edreda, the Hutu wife of the 
senior evangelist. That night, the local Tutsi sub-chief and his wife appeared at Peck’s door, 
seeking shelter, and she allowed them to hide in her bedroom. The next morning, on November 
8, a “very large band” of “armed raiders” entered the Mission compound and demanded that 
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Peck and Edreda produce Sekimonyo “alive within two hours, [or] they would attack the 
Mission, get the refugees, and sack the houses and their goods.” Peck did not know what had 
happened to Sekimonyo, but fortunately the band did not return when they said that they would; 
a sudden, torrential downpour seems to have disrupted their plans. In the interim, Sekimonyo 
sent a handwritten note to Peck, which she then used to demonstrate proof-of-life when the band 
came back in the late evening. With this assurance, the band dispersed, and did not return.81 
The next three days were filled with frantic activity as mission staff struggled to find 
solutions for the people who were now encamped at the station. Stancliffe returned from Gahini 
on the 8th, together with Rev. Sabune (who had been visiting in Gahini) and another European 
missionary named Ted Sisley. On the 9th, missionaries Harold Adeney and Bryan Isaac, then in 
Burundi, received a telegram from Stancliffe informing them of the situation. They set out for 
Shyira, bringing with them a Hutu ordinand-in-training named Andereya Pfukuri, who hailed 
from Ruhengeri. Crossing into Ruanda from the south, they made their way to Butare, where 
they found Belgian convoys barricading the roads heading north. The country was now under 
martial law, and all travel between provinces needed to be cleared with the administration. 
Adeney managed to get a permit, and he, Isaac, and Pfukuri continued their journey north, now 
with an armed military escort. Arriving in Shyira late on the 10th, they found that the local 
Belgian administrator had sent a platoon of Congolese soldiers to guard the hill, but the fighting 
in Ruhengeri was so bad that they could not be spared for more than a night. The Shyira 
leadership, fearing what might happen once the soldiers left, decided that they would try and 
evacuate as many people as they could to Uganda. Adeney went to see the administrator in 
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Ruhengeri town the following day, who agreed to loan seven lorries with armed guards to the 
station, and also sent word to the Ugandan government of the plan. 
The missionaries informed the refugees of the evacuation plan that very day. Leaving 
would not be easy: Thousands of people had sought asylum at the station, but the armed caravan 
only had room for several hundred. This meant that, even in the midst of a profoundly dangerous 
situation, careful thought had to be given to evacuation plans. According to the missionary 
accounts, “The night was a busy one as people decided who was to go and who was to stay,” 
which suggests that, among other things, people’s social relationships influenced collective 
decisions about departure. Shyira staff gave preference to individuals who were unpopular with 
the local community, and whose continued presence at the Mission was fast becoming a liability. 
The Tutsi sub-chief and his wife, for example, were granted passage to Uganda. A number of 
Shyira teachers and clergy who were particularly outspoken in their support of the UNAR were 
also included in the caravan for this reason.82 And still others, like Kahima, who had either been 
caught in the wrong place at the wrong time or had been victims of personal vendettas, were 
allowed onto the lorries. More than half of those who were evacuated that night were children.83  
To Kigezi 
The caravan set off before dawn, arriving at the Uganda border in the late morning to find the 
Protectorate government on high alert. The outbreak of violence in Ruhengeri had caught them 
off-guard, and they were now scrambling to keep pace with the events as they unfolded. The 
Kigezi District Council, while receiving news updates from Entebbe about the happenings in 
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149 (September-November 1960), 4. 
83 “Refugees Enter Uganda,” London Times, 13 November 1959, 12. 
199 
 
Kigali, knew far less about what was happening just over the border. Most areas remained quiet. 
A senior chief reporting on his visit to the Katuna Customs Post, near Kabale township, claimed 
that “there is no disturbance of any kind on our boundary…[but the border guards] hear also such 
romous [rumors] like ourselves, that the fight is happening in Rugengere [sic].”84 The news 
coming out of Bufumbira in western Kigezi, however, was disconcerting. There, Saza Chief 
Rukeribuga reported that some of his own people—“Bahutu and Batutsi from Bufumbira”—
were crossing into Ruanda “to help their fellow kinsmen” on both sides of the fight.85 At least six 
people from Uganda were thought to have died in these skirmishes, and authorities believed that 
Parmehutu agents were involved.86 On November 10, Chief Rukeribuga issued an urgent request 
for police reinforcements to guard the main border station that stood between Kisoro and 
Ruhengeri. The District Commissioner responded by sending an entire platoon. 
The Shyira caravan were thus greeted by forty-five police officers when they finally 
reached the border after a long and harrowing night. The police captain ordered the passengers to 
disembark while he radioed the Kigezi District Commissioner’s office in Kabale, who then had 
to radio the Governor’s office in Entebbe to request clearance. The hold-up was worrying, 
because the European staff at Shyira had worked closely with the Belgian administration to 
organize the evacuation and had received special permission from the DC Kigezi only the day 
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before.87 But this was a strange moment, and the local government’s response was rather 
disjointed and ad hoc. And so the evacuees settled down on the side of the road to wait.  
After several hours, the police captain received word from the DC: the Shyira evacuees 
could proceed to Kisoro town where they would be able to camp for the night at Seseme, the 
Anglican boarding school that Sabune had attended back in the 1920s. The next day—and for the 
rest of that month—the Ruanda Mission worked together with Kigezi officials, the Uganda Red 
Cross, and local churches to provide blankets, food, and clothing. Women connected to the local 
chapter of the Mother’s Union, an Anglican organization, cooked comforting meals of sweet 
potatoes and peas for the evacuees, who were otherwise dependent on the government’s stores of 
stale maize flour.88 Clergy and staff attached to the Ruanda Mission’s hospital and schools in 
Kigezi came by to visit and commiserate with their friends and colleagues. In the evenings, Rev. 
Sabune and Doreen Peck led prayers before bed, and the headmaster at Seseme played music on 
the school’s gramophone. Despite the exceptional circumstances that had brought them to 
Kisoro, the evacuees found comfort in familiar faces, food, hymns, and prayers. Kahima’s son, 
who was about ten at the time, actually remembers this week as a time of great fun, of riding in 
lorries and sleeping outside and seeing new country.89 
Yet for the adults, the uncertainty was painful. No one knew what came next. Some 
thought the Mwami would be able to quell the attacks, but others had heard that the Belgians 
were now fighting on the side of Parmehutu. Others said the opposite. Chief Rukeribuga, who 
had been a friend of the late Mwami Rudahigwa, told people that the Hutu were afraid that the 
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Belgians were about to turn the country over to the Tutsi for good.90 And against these larger 
political questions, evacuees also worried about the more mundane problems of survival. If they 
stayed, how long could they rely on the Mission and the Protectorate for food and shelter? If they 
returned, how would they feed themselves if the bands of raiders had slashed their crops and 
killed their livestock? In a region of endemic food shortages, this was no small consideration.91 
For the Rev. Sabune and Ayirini, the return to Kigezi was sobering, but not as 
disheartening as it was for Kahima and Joyce. The Sabunes no longer had property in Uganda, 
but they found ready support from Sabune’s brother, who was now a parish chief who could 
afford to take care of them during this period of transition. Yet the Sabunes, it turned out, were 
not long for Uganda. At the end of November, a contingent of Hutu evangelists and teachers 
from Shyira came to Busanza to ask the Reverend to return to his old job. It appears that they 
journeyed to Uganda to ask several of the departed Tutsi clergy to come back, though others 
were explicitly discouraged from doing so “as they were unacceptable to the local people.”92  
Return to Shyira 
The Rev. Sabune and his family came home to Shyira in early December to find that a kind of 
normalcy had returned to the station’s everyday rhythms. Joining him was Asanasiyo Karasanyi, 
the station’s head male nurse and a thirty-four year veteran of the Ruanda Mission. He and 
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Sabune, along with two senior teachers at the mission school, were Tutsi. Yona Sekimonyo, the 
Hutu headmaster, also came out of hiding, and he and his wife were busily rebuilding their house 
that had been destroyed in the uprising. Stancliffe resumed her post as head nurse, and in March 
1960, Harold Adeney was transferred from Ibuye to Shyira to take over the role as station 
physician. The hospital reopened its doors; students returned to their studies. New Hutu 
administrators took over the posts of vacated chiefs, but Adeney reported that many of them 
were “really saved people” who “used their influence to promote tolerance and... stave off 
violence.”93  
Sabune, in fact, counted one of the new government officials as family. His eldest 
daughter, Perusi, who by that point was grown and working as a nurse at Shyira, married Félix 
Kagaba, a Hutu and a ranking member of the Forestry Department. Ties of family and faith cut 
across painful histories and structural violence, offering the comforts of familiarity in the midst 
of uncertainty and disruption. The everyday routines of going to class, making hospital rounds, 
delivering babies, observing Communion, visiting neighbors, tending fields, collecting firewood, 
and preparing evening meals reconstituted the station as a recognizable place for those who 
remained, even if questions still hung in the air.  
Ironically, the uprising actually reversed Sabune’s material prospects at Shyira. Only a 
few weeks earlier, on October 14, the Bishop of Ruanda-Urundi, Jim Brazier, had written to the 
Bishop of Uganda, Leslie Brown, to say that Shyira had five pastors when it could only afford 
three.94 Sabune had been a thorn in Brazier’s side ever since the 1956 incident over teacher 
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salary,95 and if anyone was to be fired or demoted, Sabune was a likely candidate. The 
November uprisings, however, disrupted these tensions and redirected Sabune’s career path. 
After several of his colleagues fled to Uganda, reducing the Shyira mission’s staff, Sabune 
became the station’s head African pastor. 
Yet, despite the reversal of certain fortunes, the events of November had left local society 
upturned. Shyira was still familiar enough, but it was not the same. Many Tutsi families were 
gone, and those who remained felt insecure. Over time, most would leave Shyira once again, 
slipping away unannounced in the middle of the night. Local residents and Hutu mission staff 
continued to express their support of Sabune and his Tutsi colleagues, all the while making it 
clear that certain people would not be welcomed back. Hospital admissions went down, and 
rumors circulated that people were refusing to seek medical care on account of Tutsi staff.96 
Across the wider Ruanda Mission network, fissures between Tutsi and Hutu continued to grow 
over the coming year. In October 1960, Godfrey Hindley reported that the “divisions...created by 
the political parties have begun to infiltrate into the life of the Church and, as never before, we 
find ourselves considering whether a certain worker can be appointed to a particular job 
according to his race.”97 
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Countrywide, Rwanda underwent a series of dramatic administrative changes. “Each 
election, each discussion of Ruanda affairs at the United Nations Council, each suspected 
interference from neighboring states, produces its fresh outburst of violence.” Material 
deprivation sharpened the edge of political antagonisms. The Ruanda franc plummeted to nearly 
half its pre-Revolution value in the lead up to national independence.98 Then came news of the 
coup and the abolition of the monarchy, with reports that Kigeri had fled to Congo.  
Even Sabune’s Hutu colleagues began to complain openly that he allowed too many Tutsi 
relatives to visit the station. Around the same time, Sabune’s younger children began to come 
home with stories of schoolyard bullies and ethnic taunts. Then his older son, James, who was a 
secondary student at Mbarara High School in Uganda, was assaulted by a Rwandan border guard 
when he tried to come home for the Christmas holiday. He reported to his father that the soldier 
had struck him across the face, demanding, “You Mututsi, what are you going to do in 
Rwanda?”99  
Yet in the face of these unnerving incidents, Sabune still found reasons to hope. The 
Mission organized youth outings on either side of the border, with girls from the Ruanda side 
traveling to Kabale to join their peers for a camp-out, while a similar event for Rwandan and 
Ugandan boys was held at Gahini.100 Hospital admissions for 1961 showed significant 
improvement over the figures for 1960, and Shyira’s primary and secondary schools boasted a 
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population of 9,000 students.101 Sabune reported that Protestants at Shyira continued to pool 
their resources to build schools, churches, and houses for teachers and pastors, often with high-
quality iron-sheeting, rather than thatch. That same year, Protestant Church membership grew by 
2,850 souls.102 
Despite these promising signs, however, Sabune and Ayirini’s overall sense of security at 
Shyira continued to deteriorate. By mid-1961, a rift developed between Sekimonyo, the Hutu 
headmaster, and the rest of the mission staff. Adeney explained that that the headmaster had 
proposed a “course of action” that, “while greatly popular with local political leaders,” would 
have compromised the station’s ability to “keep[...] the Lord’s Day holy.” As a result of this 
division, Sekimonyo stopped attending weekly staff meetings, and the rift in the Shyira 
leadership began to affect the relationship between school curriculum and church teaching.103  
That same year, a few days before Christmas, unknown assailants murdered Shyira’s MP, 
a devout Protestant who served as Director for a number of Mission schools, while he was on his 
way home one evening. Roadblocks, military checkpoints, and new pass requirements made 
travel between jurisdictions difficult; night travel was banned.104 Sabune and his Tutsi colleagues 
became the targets of rumors and political intimidation, to the point that they began to fear for 
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their lives. Meanwhile, European missionaries reported that many Hutu Christians felt increasing 
pressure to keep their distance from the mission and its Tutsi staff.105 
The final straw, however, came in April 1962, after Tutsi refugees based in Uganda 
launched a series of raids into northern Rwanda (see Chapter Five). Although small in scale, the 
attacks came at a moment of heightened political uncertainty, when both Uganda and Rwanda 
were on the cusp of national independence. Popular sentiment towards the refugee diaspora, 
which had until then fluctuated between cautious ambivalence and a genuine desire for 
conciliation, hardened into outright animosity. Neighbors who had once been friendly to the 
Sabunes began to say things like, “These inyenzi, these refugee raiders, these are Sabune’s sons!” 
It was then that the reverend and his wife knew: The home they had built over the course of 
twenty years was no longer theirs, because it no longer existed. Ties to family, to place, to faith, 
to language—these bonds were no longer sufficient in the face of malignant identity politics. 
Even the factors that had once set Sabune and Ayirini apart from Rwandan troubles—their 
identification as Ugandan and Congolese, respectively—could no longer protect them or their 
children from irredentist attacks. Sabune’s Ugandan background, once a positive identifier, was 
now a liability, because his neighbors associated it with a dangerous refugee presence just across 
the border. It was time to go. 
The Alinearity of Place 
The displacement of the Sabune family was a drawn-out process, one that could be disrupted by 
moments of hope and encouragement. Their beginnings in Shyira, ironically, coincided with a 
period of widespread dislocation and upheaval. Rev. Sabune’s initial job security, in fact, was 
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tied to the station’s desperate need for personnel to manage famine relief. His position at Shyira 
was again secured in 1959, when the outbreak of war forced some of his colleagues to flee, 
obviating the Mission’s need to reduce its African staff. In the early days of the revolution, his 
friendships with Hutu clergy and staff made it possible for the family to remain at Shyira, despite 
the fact that he was Tutsi and from Uganda. His identification became a liability, however, as the 
geography of the conflict shifted. By 1962, the threat posed by Tutsi refugees in Uganda came to 
color Sabune’s local reputation and friendships. His decision to flee cannot therefore be framed 
in simple fight-flight paradigms, but must be understood as the culmination of multiple 
considerations, personal and political. This multiplicity of considerations helps explain the 
alinear quality of home’s attenuation over time.  
Part III: Borders 
So far, this chapter has followed the experiences of those who managed to remain in Rwanda 
throughout the course of the war, showing how they negotiated the spatial and existential 
uncertainty that accompanied what Celestina calls “displacement before displacement.” But what 
happened to those evacuees who remained in Uganda? Part III returns to Kahima and Joyce and 
their escape with the Ruanda Mission’s evacuation caravan in November 1959. Kahima was 
initially able to animate faith and kinship networks to secure asylum in Kigezi, moving between 
his wife’s extended family and the Anglican church to access material and emotional support. 
Over the course of four years, he and Joyce built a new home for themselves on land loaned to 
them by the church. State laws governing migration and asylum changed rapidly during this 
time, but Kahima was able to comply with each new dictate, first registering as a “Tutsi alien” in 
1960 and then as an “alien refugee” in 1962. When the Protectorate opened its first refugee camp 
in 1961, officials declared that displaced people like Kahima who were “living with friends and 
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relatives”—a ubiquitous phrase in policy discussions at this time—would be allowed to continue 
living as private residents. Kahima was not, in fact, living with his blood relatives, but church 
leaders stood in as “family” whenever government officials came around to inspect Kahima’s 
documents. The Anglican church, in other words, mediated Kahima’s relationship to the state.  
Kahima’s luck changed in 1964, however, when growing security concerns led the 
newly-independent government to reverse its policy on encampment. Certain groups of refugees 
had led a series of escalating attacks on Rwanda from secret bases in Uganda, culminating in a 
catastrophic battle between guerilla fighters and the Rwandan military in December 1963. The 
Rwandan military quickly defeated the invading militias and then launched a counter-assault on 
Tutsi citizens, killing over 8,000 people—the majority of whom were unarmed civilians. In 
response to the attack, Ugandan leaders decided that all refugees, regardless of circumstance, 
must be separated from the general public and relocated to a government settlement away from 
the border. Many refugees managed to evade the new order by taking advantage of the state’s 
weak bureaucratic infrastructure, but Kahima was not so fortunate. A district official, having 
records of Kahima’s refugee status, ordered Kahima, Joyce, and their children to board a bus 
bound for Oruchinga Valley Refugee Settlement. Church authorities attempted to intervene, but 
this time, they were not successful.  
Kahima and Joyce’s story is important because it demonstrates, in real time, how one 
family’s relationship to the border evolved during decolonization. As with the Sabunes in Shyira, 
the Kahima family’s experience of Kigezi was a mix of both possibility and precarity. Even as 
Ugandan laws curtailed the family’s political options, government policy concerning the “rights” 
of refugees living with family and friends drew them closer to Anglican leaders who advocated 
on their behalf. Thus the family developed even stronger ties with Ugandan Christians who 
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helped them belong to a local community in Kigezi at the same time that their compliance with 
Ugandan law gradually undermined their right to legal residency. The Rwandan Revolution, in 
short, initiated social and political processes that reconfigured how people could relate to and 
move across the border.  
In what follows, I call attention to the temporality of the social, political, and legal 
relationships that constituted the Uganda borderland as a place. Protectorate authorities, lacking 
the legal tools and precedent they needed to define and address Rwandan displacement, hastily 
crafted new laws to help them separate refugees from the rest of the general populace. The law 
did not have the power to completely reorganize social space—it could not fully disentangle 
people like Kahima from deeper histories of connection and mobility—but it could, at certain 
junctures, undermine one’s ability to belong. This final part therefore moves between the 
experiences of the Kahimas and the politics of immigration control in late colonial Uganda. 
From “Evacuees” to “Batutsi Aliens” 
In late 1959, the Uganda government was uncertain about how to proceed. The DC Kigezi had, 
with the Governor’s permission, allowed the evacuees to enter, but whether they would allow 
them to remain was an open question. Legally, the government had few means to refuse them. 
The Shyira evacuees were, technically speaking, no different from the tens of thousands of 
Rwandan migrant laborers who entered the country every year (and who continued to do so 
throughout the war). African labor migrants arriving in Uganda were not required to furnish 
identification information or register their names at border posts, nor did they need permits to 
stay in the country.106 The British administration had, at various times, attempted to coordinate 
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pass systems with the Belgian authorities in Congo and Ruanda-Urundi,107 but had always failed 
to enforce them (see Chapter Two). Africans normally resident in Belgian territories were in 
theory supposed to carry an identity booklet and emigration papers when they traveled, and 
immigration officers at Ugandan customs posts were allowed to request to see them. However, 
immigration officers could not legally refuse entry to persons who were not in possession of such 
documents. The best they could do, according to a 1958 circular from the Chief Secretary’s 
Office, was to lecture the undocumented migrant and inform him “that he will find things much 
easier both in Uganda and on his return to Congo [or Ruanda-Urundi] if he equips himself with 
the Belgian documents which he should have.”108 
The outbreak of war gave a new sense of urgency to the matter. Protectorate authorities 
became fearful that Kigezi might become embroiled in Ruanda’s troubles, and they were not 
eager to have homeless evacuees ambling about trading centers and sheltering on front porches 
and church pews. The folks from Shyira, furthermore, were not the only people who had fled to 
Uganda, and the growing number of displaced people seeking asylum in Kisoro and Kabale and 
the parishes along the border was beginning to draw attention, both at home and abroad. 
Displaced Rwandans were a spectacle, visible signs that something was amiss. Older Kabale 
residents today recall those days with an emphasis on sight and seeing. “Now those ones [were] 
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easy to differentiate and identify [as] refugees,” one person told me.109 “That’s when I saw what 
a proper refugee looks like,” said another.110 Government archives reflect a similar 
preoccupation with visibility. Chiefs wrote of going to the border to look for signs of trouble: 
they scanned horizons for tell-tale smoke, and they saw houses on fire at night. Refugees were, 
in short, not a problem that the British felt they could ignore. 
People outside Kigezi District were beginning to show interest, too, much to the central 
government’s dismay. By early December, the story of the Shyira evacuees was being reported 
across Protestant missionary networks as well as in the Uganda Argus, the New York Times and 
the London Times. East African politicians called on the UN to take over Ruanda-Urundi from 
the Belgians,111 while African leaders in Uganda accused the Protectorate of being more 
concerned about their relationship with the Belgians than they were victimized Africans. “It is 
plain that Belgium has abdicated her solemn trusteeship of Ruanda-Urundi,” wrote Julius 
Nyerere on behalf of the Pan-African Freedom Movement. “[T]he responsibility for protecting 
                                                 
109 Interview with G.K., Kabale, 11 July 2013. 
110. Interview with Godfrey Sabiti, Kinoni, Uganda, 20 February 2013. The following year, in 1960, Belgian 
refugees fleeing the Congo would also pass through Kigezi High School. These, however, Godfrey remembers 
differently: “And the following year, 1960, we saw the Belgians running away after independence of the Congo. A 
very pathetic situation. At that time, we could not believe that a white person could be a refugee also. But it was 
real! I mean, people came with their families and were ripping off their cars, beautiful cars, on the open market. 
Beautiful cars for practically nothing. Some were even selling clothes they were wearing to buy food. Those were 
taken quickly: their government came and took them. But the Rwandese had to be settled somewhere, and that took 
a bit of time.” Upon graduation from high school, Sabiti attended Makerere University in Kampala, where he 
continued to volunteer time to refugee work. He became a full-time employee of the UNHCR upon graduation from 
college.  
111 Special to The New York Times. "Emergency is set in Ruanda strife,” New York Times (1923-Current File), 13 
November 1959. http://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/114822555?accountid=14667; “Huge Watusi Tribesmen Fleeing Smaller Foes in 
Ruanda-Urundi,” New York Times (1923-Current File), 14 November 1959. 
http://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/114831414?accountid=14667;  
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the helpless population of that territory now rests fairly and squarely on the United Nations.”112 
Grace Ibingira, one of Uganda’s first African parliamentarians, agreed, asking British officials in 
a pointed editorial, “Where has [your] humanity fled?”113 
Members of the Banyarwanda diaspora in Uganda also felt compelled to throw in their lot 
with the refugees. The president of the Banyarwanda diaspora association, the Abanyarwanda 
Abadahemuka, wrote to the Uganda Chief Secretary in late November to express concern about 
the “great number of Banyarwanda refugees in Kabale” who were now “destitutes [in] need of 
every kind of help,” and to request permission to launch a public fundraising campaign.114 The 
Protectorate, however, was less than thrilled by Abadahemuka’s charity. The organization had 
close ties to the Mwami as well as the Ganda Kabaka, and many of its ranking members were 
also leading figures in the Church of Uganda and the Protectorate government. The Rev. Ezekiel 
Balaba, Frank Kalimuzo, and Festo Semagejye Higiro were only the best known. Their pro-
monarchy stance had been the source of a significant split within the Uganda-based diaspora, and 
the Protectorate’s intelligence community was now monitoring their meetings and 
communication, fearful that they might try to arm monarchist groups in Ruanda.115 Chief 
Secretary Hartwell’s response to their letter was accordingly cautious, even defensive. He 
claimed that he was “not aware” of any cases of “extreme hardship or suffering,” but that “the 
Uganda Government has provided funds for the refugees.” His administration could not support 
                                                 
112 “U.N. Urged to Take Over Ruanda,” Times [London, England] 5 December 1959: 5. The Times Digital Archive. 
Web. 27 July 2017. 
113 Grace Ibingira, “Pleas Against Repatriation of Batutsi,” Uganda Argus, 31 December 1959, 2. 
114 KigDA Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, “Boundaries - District”; F.S.G. Higiro to Chief Secretary Hartwell, 
“Appeal for Banyarwanda refugees,” 30 November 1959. 
115 TNA FCO 141-18430, Uganda: Developments in Ruanda-Urundi, 1960-1961; Uganda Special Branch, 
“Banyaruanda politics and Uganda,” 22 September 1960. 
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Abadahemuka’s appeal, moreover, because the Uganda Government was working closely with 
the Belgians to repatriate the refugees “as soon as possible.”116 In the eyes of senior officials like 
Hartwell, the refugees were a liability and source of political fodder for opportunistic 
organizations like Abadahemuka, and could not be swept under the rug quickly enough. 
The Belgian authorities were even more eager than their British counterparts to minimize 
negative press. Displacement was a source of considerable political embarrassment for the 
Belgians, who had spent decades trying to redeem themselves on the world stage, papering over 
histories of red rubber and famine with a positive record of schools and public health. They 
consequently wanted to label the November uprisings as a “domestic” issue that they alone 
would manage. When the violence spread to northwestern Ruanda in early November, they 
began hasty construction on a refugee camp in the southeast, in a swampy hollow of wasteland 
called Nyamata. Of the more than 5,000 people who left Ruhengeri between late 1959 and early 
1960, most went to Nyamata, transported in lorries provided by the government. Some were 
forcibly removed.117  
Refugees who crossed into British territory undermined these containment efforts, and so 
by mid-November, Ruanda authorities enlisted the help of the Uganda government to prevent 
people from fleeing the country. On November 18, the DC Kigezi announced that those who 
could not find permanent accommodation with the Ruanda Mission in Kigezi would be sent back 
immediately; those who did not feel safe returning to Ruhengeri, he said, would be taken to 
                                                 
116 KigDA Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, “Boundaries - District”; Chief Secretary Hartwell to the President of the 
Abanyarwanda na Abarundi Abadahemuka, Kampala, 5 December 1959. 
117 KigDA Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, “Boundaries - District”; Police Kisoro to Police Kabale, 15 December 
1959. 
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Nyamata.118 Returning to Shyira so soon after the uprising was, of course, out of the question for 
many evacuees, but the Ruanda Mission did not have the facilities to house (let alone employ) 
300 additional people. Receiving the DC’s announcement, Shyira missionary Doreen Peck, who 
had accompanied the caravan to Kigezi, telegrammed the Ruanda Mission’s Executive 
Committee in London for help.119 They responded by wiring the DC with an urgent appeal to 
delay repatriation efforts until one of their senior missionary doctors, Harold Adeney, could 
reach Kabale from Ruanda and discuss the matter in person.120 The DC and his superiors in 
Kampala agreed to this arrangement, and called off the repatriation plans for forty-eight hours.121  
In the meantime, the DC asked Kigezi chiefs to take down the names of the people who 
were seeking asylum. If he could not barricade the border, he would at least try to keep track of 
those coming and going. Rev. Sabune’s party was first documented by Chief Rukeribuga, who 
labeled them as “Abavuye mu Mission Shyria,” a Kinyarwanda phrase that literally means, 
“People who came from Shyria Mission.”122 To this list, the chief appended the names of an 
additional seven men, who he described as “abatware bakuru,” or senior chiefs. He then attached 
both lists to a brief cover letter and sent them to the DC. The letter read: 
Re: List yabantu bavuye mu Rwanda 
 
                                                 
118 Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, “Boundaries - District”; Adeney to DC Kigezi, 18 November 1959. 
119 CUA-1, Series Administrative/Governing Bodies, Box 254, Folder 1462, “Ruanda-Urundi and Bishop Brazier, 
1959”; Minutes of the Emergency Executive Committee held at Ibuye, 17 November 1959. 
120 Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, “Boundaries - District”; Adeney to DC Kigezi, 18 November 1959; 
Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, “Boundaries - District”; DC Kigezi to Provincial Commissioner [Kampala?], 5 
December 1959. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Kinyarwanda is spoken widely in Bufumbira. 
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“Nkoheleleje amazina yabantu, abatwale bakulu hamwe na bashomesha bavuye mu 
Ruhengeri na Shyira bahunze intambara nkoko nelekanye hepfo.”123 
 
The letter was received by the DC’s office the following day and was quickly translated 
by an unidentified clerk. That the clerk wrote the translation by hand in the margins of the 
original letter suggests the urgency with which the message was relayed. The interpretation 
reads: “Herewith refers names of refugees from Ruhengeri and Shyria. They include big chiefs 
and schoolmasters as shown.” The translator has combined two phrases—“bavuye mu 
Ruhengeri” [those who came from Ruhengeri] and “bahunze intambara” [running away from 
fighting/war]—into the English word, “refugee.” The chief, however, did not use the 
Kinyarwanda or Rukiga word for refugee (impunzi, empungyi/empungi), but instead described 
the circumstances that brought them to Uganda. This was the beginning of a long process of 
documentation and creative reclassification.  
The Ruanda Mission’s intervention bought the evacuees some time, but not much. Three 
days later, the DC was again discussing repatriation plans with his superiors in Entebbe.124 At 
this point, Rev. Sabune, who was still in Uganda assisting with the relocation efforts, offered to 
return to Shyira on his own and bring back a report of what he found. The DC again agreed, 
likely realizing that forcibly rounding up 300 people who were now scattered in churches and 
schoolhouses and private homes across southern Kigezi would have been a tremendous chore. 
The situation in northern Ruanda, however, had continued to deteriorate. While I can find no 
record of Sabune’s report, the DC Kigezi cabled L’Administrateur Ruhengeri two days later, 
                                                 
123 KigDA Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, “Boundaries - District”; Mutwale Gisoro [Kisoro], Bufumbiro to DC 
Kigezi, 18 November 1959. 
124 Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, “Boundaries - District”; Provincer Kampala to DC Kigezi, 23 November 1959. 
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requesting that he cancel the transportation arrangements that had been made for the refugees’ 
return journey.125 Evidently, the reverend’s news was not good.  
Thus, by the end of November, the Protectorate government found itself at a stalemate on 
the repatriation question. They had failed to convince the evacuees to return voluntarily, and they 
dared not risk the public scandal of repatriating them by force—far too many people were 
watching. The Governor could have decided to close the border to all future refugees—that 
might have at least helped the Kigezi administration get a handle on the situation—but this, too, 
would have been a political gamble. Their decision to close the border during the Ruzagayura 
famine had been extremely unpopular, after all, particularly with private employers in Buganda 
and Busoga (see Chapter Two).126 The Protectorate needed some way to monitor and control 
evacuees that did not involve outright border closures or the disruption of labor migration.  
They found their solution in Uganda’s earlier response to political violence in Kenya and 
the Sudan. The Protectorate lacked the bureaucratic infrastructure it needed to screen general 
African migration, but it had in recent years attempted to control the movement of political 
rebels across inter-territorial borders. In 1953, the Protectorate’s Attorney General called on his 
government to pass exclusionary legislation aimed at curbing the mobility of Mau Mau fighters. 
Although it had “always been, and I think always will be the policy of Government to allow 
Africans from the neighbouring territories to pass into our borders freely and at will,” the 
Attorney General expressed hope that the Governor would amend the law in order to protect the 
“loyal” people of Uganda from the “large numbers of...Kikuyu...[who] would have no hesitation 
                                                 
125 Ibid.; DC Kigezi to Administrateur-Ruhengeri, 8 December 1959. 
126 The Department of Labour estimated that one-quarter of Africans employed in Uganda were not from the 
Protectorate in 1959. See Uganda Protectorate, Labour Department Annual Report for 1959 (Entebbe: Government 
Printer, 1960), 6. 
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in coming to this territory in order to spread the poison which they spread throughout their own 
district.”127 The Governor went on to amend the 1947 Immigration (Control) Ordinance, a law 
that was originally designed to control the movement of Europeans, to include a provision 
allowing him to apply the law to specific groups of Africans as the need arose.128 The 
amendment, when applied to Kenyan immigrants, allowed immigration officers to interrogate, 
detain, and search anyone they deemed suspect of contravening the law. Persons guilty or 
suspected of “murder...or any offence for which a sentence of imprisonment has been passed for 
any term” could be declared a “prohibited immigrant.”129 
The Protectorate’s next step in exceptionalizing certain forms of African immigration 
came in August 1955, when the Governor applied the 1949 Aliens (Registration and Control) 
Ordinance to persons fleeing a military uprising in Equatorial Province in South Sudan. The 
Governor’s ruling cast all Sudanese in Uganda who were “ordinarily resident in the Sudan” as 
“aliens” rather than “refugees.” It allowed the Governor and those he authorized to detain and 
deport individuals without trial and required Sudanese migrants to apply for entrance permits 
upon arrival in Uganda. The Governor applied the Rules pre-emptively, as a precautionary 
measure in the event that violence in the Sudan resulted in mass displacement. The August 
military uprising did not, in fact, displace many people, and the Chief Secretary reported on 
September 1 that the “small numbers who have come across our border already have been 
capable of being dealt with.” However, he and the Governor feared that “until such time as order 
is restored,” mass displacement to Uganda remained a very real possibility. If Uganda’s drought-
                                                 
127 Uganda, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 7th Meeting, 33rd Session, 27 March 1953: Attorney General, 
“Second Reading of the Immigration Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1953,” p. 11.  
128 No. 8 of 1953—Immigration (Control) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1953. 
129 Ibid., Section 9(1). 
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prone Northern Province was to receive large numbers of Sudanese, the Chief Secretary 
predicted widespread food shortages, “large scale thieving and possible disorder,” and “problems 
of disease.”130 He therefore proposed a new bill before the Legislative Council, titled, “An 
Ordinance to make provision for the proper control of Refugees from the Sudan and for 
Regulating their return thereto, and for making provision for their residence while in the 
Protectorate,” or Control of Refugees from the Sudan Ordinance for short.131 The bill, which the 
Legislature enacted into law on September 2, 1955, defined a “refugee” as “any alien ordinarily 
resident in the Sudan who enters the Protectorate from the Equatorial Province of the Sudan 
after...the 18th day of August, 1955.”132 As with the 1953 amendment to the Immigration 
(Control) Ordinance, the 1955 Ordinance reflected the security concerns of the colonial state and 
allowed the Governor to impart far-reaching powers to appointed officers for the control of 
refugees.  
In short, Protectorate laws concerning African immigration were piecemeal before 1960 
and had no legal bearing on the first Rwandan asylum-seekers to reach Uganda in late 1959, yet 
they provided a precedent for British policymakers to follow. On December 22, the Governor of 
Uganda signed into law the Aliens (Batutsi Immigrants) Rules, which aimed to regulate the 
mobility and settlement of “African[s] of the Batutsi tribe ordinarily resident in Ruanda.” The 
Rules were applied retroactively to all “Batutsi” who came to Uganda on or after November 1 of 
that year, meaning that the Kahima family would have theoretically been legally classified as 
                                                 
130 Uganda Legislative Council Proceedings, 3rd Meeting, 35th Session, 1 September 1955, p. 3. 
131 Ibid., p. 2. 
132 Uganda, An Ordinance to make Provision for the Proper Control of Refugees from the Sudan and for Regulating 
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Batutsi immigrants.133 As such, they would have been required to register with local government 
and apply for a special permit granting them permission to stay in the Protectorate. The permit 
did not confer rights or protections to the migrant, but was instead a list of terms to which the 
migrant was obliged to obey.134  
The passage of the Batutsi Rules on December 24, 1959 added little clarity to the 
situation on the ground in Kigezi. Whereas government officials had previously described 
displaced persons as “refugees,” they now employed additional vocabulary to refer to Ruanda 
asylum-seekers as “Batutsi immigrants.” In an urgent memorandum titled, “Batutsi Immigrants,” 
sent to all Gombolola chiefs in Kigezi, the DC announced that he would be visiting each sub-
county “to explain the Government’s plans for the refugees.” He ordered the chiefs to “ensure 
that all adult immigrants, male and female, are present.” The memorandum included a Rukiga 
translation, which, following the ambiguous language employed in the English version, referred 
to both “Abatorokyi” (“migrants”) and Bahungyi (“those who fled”).135 The regular slippage 
between labels in official and informal discourse had a significant impact on documentation 
efforts, contributing, as we will see, to widespread confusion across all levels of government 
about the meaning and practical import of evolving refugee policy. 
                                                 
133. Legal Notice No. 311 of 1959: “The Aliens Registration and Control) Ordinance. (CAP. 44, Revised Edition, 
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Kahima and Joyce Build a House 
As the Protectorate scrambled to get ahead of the crisis at their border, evacuees with the Ruanda 
Mission caravan surveyed their options. The party remained at Seseme in Kisoro for a week after 
their arrival, at which point Mission staff decided to relocate some of the evacuees seventy-five 
kilometers east to the District headquarters of Kabale, where they had additional schools, 
churches, and people who might accommodate them. It appears that Kahima and Joyce, together 
with their eight children, decided to join this second group, even though Joyce had relatives near 
Kisoro. Why they made this decision is hard to say, but material considerations may have played 
a role. A family of ten would have been a considerable burden for the average subsistence farmer 
in Kigezi, and the Ruanda Mission had more resources. Furthermore, Kahima had lived in 
Kabale for almost as long as he had lived in Shyira, during his employment at the Kigezi Mission 
Hospital before World War II. It would be more familiar to him than Kisoro, and perhaps he 
might find work, either at the government hospital in Kabale or the new Anglican hospital in 
Kisizi.136 The only hospital in Kisoro was run by the Catholic Church, and seeking employment 
with them would have jeopardized his relationship to the Ruanda Mission and his Anglican 
networks.137  
Kahima’s body, however, was beginning to slow down. He was nearly sixty years old, 
and the pace of hospital work was beginning to overtake him. For the last several years, he had 
                                                 
136 The Ruanda Mission closed most of the Kigezi Mission Hospital in 1941, as noted above, but the site continued 
to serve as a dispensary for the next several years. In 1958, the Ruanda Mission re-opened Kigezi Mission Hospital, 
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woken each morning with tender swelling in his fingers and toes. It would dissipate after an hour 
or so, but it would always come back the next day. Over time, the swelling became more painful, 
and spread to his knees, elbows, and shoulders. The hike up and down Shyira hill had become 
more arduous, while in the hospital he struggled to make his fingers do the precision work of 
cleaning wounds, changing bandages, and taking blood samples. He was still a valuable 
employee at Shyira because of his institutional memory and language skills, but this was not the 
case in Kigezi. Plenty of people spoke Kinyarwanda in Kigezi, but the need for hospital staff 
who were native speakers was not nearly as great. Moreover, the Kigezi Mission Hospital was 
brand new, and unlike the old hospital, it was not located in Kabale, but in Kisizi, forty 
kilometers to the north. Many of the hospital dressers and nurses were young and had completed 
rigorous training courses in medicine. Kahima was old, and while he had received a practical 
education through the Mission, he had never attended formal schooling. Perhaps, after forty 
years of service, it was time to retire. The difficulty was determining what to do next.  
It appears that the Ruanda Mission, while unable to employ Kahima in their Uganda-
based ministries, found him a host near Kabale town. This was Rev. Aloys and his wife, Martha. 
Rev. Aloys was an Anglican deacon who had received his pastoral training with Rev. Sabune—
the two men completed their course at Ibuye (Urundi) in 1948.138 They were ordained the 
following year, at which time Rev. Sabune returned to Ruanda to work with Shyira Mission 
while Rev. Aloys continued on to Kabale. When the Ruanda Mission evacuated Shyira, they 
sought Anglicans in Kigezi who might take personal responsibility for one or two displaced 
families. Rev. Aloys and Martha took care of at least three different families over the next 
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several years, including Kahima and Joyce.139 For the next two years, Kahima and Joyce would 
live in Aloys’ village on a plot loaned to them by the Church of Uganda.140 There, the family did 
chores for neighbors to help raise money in that first year, and by their second year they were 
growing their own crops.141 The Gombolola chief recorded Kahima as possessing a permit under 
the Batutsi Rules.142  
From Tutsi Alien to Alien Refugee 
As Kahima and Joyce set about building their house, Protectorate authorities continued to 
experiment with new border control policies. The Great Lakes’ political landscape was changing 
rapidly, and Uganda officials became increasingly worried that escalating independence crises in 
Congo, the Sudan, and Rwanda might spill over into the Protectorate. In June 1960, just six 
months after the passage of the Batutsi Rules, Protectorate authorities found themselves faced 
with the very real possibility that independence in neighboring Congo, scheduled for June 30, 
might result in massive refugee flows of both Belgians and Africans to Uganda. The Protectorate 
government responded by discarding earlier legislation and replacing it with the Control of Alien 
Refugees Act (CARA). The Governor of Uganda, Sir Frederick Crawford, operationalized the 
law on July 13, 1960.143  
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The trouble with CARA, as with the Batutsi Rules, was that it provided neither specific 
criteria nor procedural instructions for determining refugee status. Instead, it authorized the 
Governor (after 1962, the Minister) to declare “any person being one of a class of aliens…to be 
refugees” on a case-by-case basis. He had unilateral authority to determine who was a refugee 
and who was not; his pronouncements, published in the Uganda Gazette, served as the legal 
instruments for determining refugee status. Unlike the 1951 Convention/Protocol or the later 
1969 OAU Convention, which defined “refugee” using a combination of subjective and 
objective criteria, CARA enabled the Governor/Minister to define refugees on the basis of 
objective criteria alone. This meant that a person who wished to be recognized as a refugee in 
Uganda had to demonstrate that he or she belonged to a scheduled refugee group; individual 
asylum-seekers did not need to demonstrate a “well-founded fear of persecution” before the 
officer hearing their case issued a refugee permit. Group membership, not individualized fears of 
persecution, was what mattered.  
What did this changing legal landscape mean for someone like Kahima? Initially, it 
meant very little. As the next chapter will demonstrate in greater detail, the Protectorate was not 
in a position to identify refugees under its new immigration laws; even when local officials did 
distribute refugee documentation, the significance of that documentation was unclear. Kahima 
registered as a refugee in 1961, but he continued to live on Anglican land next to Rev. Aloys for 
years. Rev. Aloys, moreover, provided more than material assistance: he served as a mediator 
between evacuees and the Ugandan government during a period of tremendous political 
transition. Between 1959 and 1964, changing Ugandan laws concerning migration and asylum 
transformed Kahima’s legal status from “evacuee” to “Tutsi alien,” and then from Tutsi alien to 
“refugee.” As an evacuee, and later as a refugee, Kahima was allowed to remain in Kigezi as a 
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private resident provided that he was “living with friends or relatives.”144 This provision was not 
a part of any law, but was instead an ad hoc practice adopted by different administrators at 
different moments as the government struggled to get a handle on displacement. It was partly a 
concession to the recent creation of these political borders, but it was also a way for a limited 
state to govern displaced people on a shoestring, and without a plan for the political future. The 
government understood that people from Ruanda had networks of care and support in Uganda, 
and would likely not become wards of the state if they were allowed to settle privately. Yet those 
who “self-settled” were still denied paths to citizenship under Ugandan law. People like Kahima 
needed sponsors like Rev. Aloys to be able to settle in Kigezi, yet this sponsorship had no end 
point: It was not a means toward naturalization. And, when the government changed its mind 
about self-settlement and decided, in early 1964, to require all refugees to live in camps, Kahima 
lost whatever tenuous legal connections he had to Kigezi.  
Conclusion 
In early 1964, the Kahima and Sabune families were again on the move: Kahima and Joyce and 
their children to a refugee settlement in southern Ankole, and Sabune and Ayirini and their 
children to Kampala, where Sabune had a new job with the Church of Uganda. Despite their 
shared faith and overlapping social histories, only one displaced family was able to secure 
citizenship in Uganda. Ayirini received citizenship through her husband, but Joyce was unable to 
pass her nationality to Kahima. The Uganda-Rwanda border, once a conduit in times of want and 
danger, emerged in that moment and for that family as an impassable barrier—for the moment. 
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In Kampala, Sabune and Ayirini built a house in the city’s growing suburbs. They 
enrolled their children in local schools and built a hostel for refugee high school students who 
were also attending classes in the city. Sabune began work as a chaplain to Rwandan migrants 
and refugees in the city, and served as the head of the Church of Uganda’s Refugee Service until 
the mid-1970s. While I can find no records concerning Sabune’s citizenship status, it is clear 
from church documents and oral histories that he had no concern about being categorized as a 
refugee. To his dying day, Rev. Sabune identified himself as Tutsi and maintained his loyalty to 
the institution of the Mwami (if not the person—Kigeri became increasingly unpopular in exile). 
His home village in Busanza had, at the time of his birth, been part of German Ruanda, and his 
father had been the local chief. But the redrawing of the border had profound consequences, and 
this is something to note: While Ugandan nationalists liked to dismiss the Uganda-Rwanda 
border as an arbitrary colonial construct, it was clearly meaningful—Sabune’s widespread 
acceptance as a “Ugandan” is evidence of this. Yet even here, identity is a funny thing. Recall 
that Sabune sold his land inheritance when he moved to Rwanda in 1945. The loss of family land 
in the father’s home village, followed by the loss of their home in Shyira, meant that the Sabunes 
lacked a proper family burial site. When Sabune died in 1976, he was buried in Kampala. 
Several of his children have also died, and they are scattered in graves across East Africa. To 
rectify this, Sabune’s surviving children have slowly reclaimed their father’s land in Busanza, 
buying it back bit by bit. Several years ago, they began work on a house. Sabune’s son, Charles, 
finds Busanza to be rather boring, and the house too large and echoing. But, he adds, it is a place 
to be buried. At the time of writing, the family is making plans to disinter the remains of Sabune 
and his deceased children and rebury them on the family’s plot in Busanza. When I ask why, I 
am told that the family never felt quite at home in Uganda, even though Sabune’s Ugandan-ness 
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had been a key factor in their original displacement. “My father was never quite Ugandan 
enough,” Petero tells me. “But he wasn’t Rwandan enough, either.”  
By contrast, Kahima had the misfortune of being caught in the wrong place at the wrong 
time. His forcible relocation to Oruchinga was a double-displacement: first from Rwanda, and 
then from his fledgling home in Kigezi. I do not know what happened to them after 1964, or how 
long they remained at Oruchinga (or indeed, if they even made it as far as the Settlement). As the 
next chapter will demonstrate, most refugees who went to Oruchinga eventually left, either to 
find work or education in Kampala or to take up farms in the countryside. For the Kahima 
family, the most likely scenario seems to be that they interned at Oruchinga for a time, only to 
return to Kigezi later—likely within the same year. Whatever happened, it is a chapter that none 
of the surviving children wish to speak about. While the eldest son, Hezekiah, shared with me 
the stories of his childhood flight from Rwanda and his early days in Kigezi, he was visibly 
surprised when I asked him what it was like to grow up in Uganda as a refugee. Sitting up 
straight in his chair, he was quick to correct me. “I told you I was chased–my neighbors know 
that. That doesn’t make me empungye [refugee].” Gesturing to his wife, who is bouncing their 
grandchild on her knee, he exclaimed, “My life is here!” 
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Chapter 5: Biography of a Camp: Oruchinga Refugee Settlement 
 
 
On May 11, 1962, the Secretary General for the Kigezi District Council received a formal letter 
of complaint from a group of self-settled Rwandan refugees who were then living in Kigezi, 
southwestern Uganda. Writing "with much sorrow," the authors expressed their dismay over the 
recent announcement that the government had decided to relocate all refugees to a camp in 
Ankole District, over 100 miles away. “We have been here since 1959 and we have never caused 
any trouble,” the letter begins, “[and so] we implore you to repeal or amend the order...” The 
authors then proceeded to list the ways in which they had already become “self-supporting.” 
They had found land and accommodation with “relatives,” and were growing their own food so 
as not “to bother the Government in giving us rations.” They had secured jobs and were earning 
wages, which enabled them to send their children to school with “school fees from our own 
pockets.” “[W]e are self-dependent,” they concluded, “[and] if we are forced to go, such [an] act 
will be overriding [our] fundamental human rights.”1 At the bottom of the typewritten letter, 
fourteen names are listed in a steady hand, each accompanied by a corresponding signature or, 
for those who could not write, a thumbprint. 
This extraordinary letter offers a glimpse into life on the border of the late Uganda 
Protectorate, just months before national independence in October 1962. Anti-Tutsi violence in 
the crumbling Belgian Mandate Territory of Ruanda-Urundi had, since November 1959, driven 
                                                 
1 KigDA Immigration Box 3, File ADM 23/1i, Control of Entry into Uganda of Refugees—Ruanda Refugees; 
Mushana, et al, to Secretary General for Kigezi District Council, 10 May 1962. 
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over 100,000 people into neighboring Congo, Tanganyika (Tanzania) and Uganda. Of these, an 
estimated 35,000 Rwandans were thought to be residing in the southern Ugandan districts of 
Kigezi and Ankole (Map 1). In response to the crisis, Ugandan authorities began construction on 
a formal refugee settlement in November 1961, in the Oruchinga Valley of southern Ankole. 
Initially, however, the government did not require refugees to settle in Oruchinga unless they 
needed assistance.2 Refugees who were able to manage on their own were permitted, for the time 
being, to stay where they were.  
The government’s laissez-faire attitude towards refugee settlement began to change in 
early 1962,3 when a series of border raids between Uganda-based refugees and Rwandan military 
forces led to accusations that the Uganda authorities were “harboring terrorists.”4 In response to 
these events, numerous government officials at the local and national level began to voice 
support for a policy of mandatory encampment, in which all refugees, regardless of material 
need, would be required to live in a refugee settlement as a condition of their protected status. 
Proponents of this policy argued that because “certain elements” among the displaced population 
were in favor of armed counter-revolution against the Rwandan government, all refugees should 
be concentrated in a single location where they could be monitored.5 Support for mandatory 
encampment grew in the wake of a particularly brutal episode in March, in which 
PARMEHUTU forces slaughtered an estimated 2,000 Tutsi men, women, and children in the 
                                                 
2 Articles 7 and 8 of the Control of Alien Refugees Act (1960 [1964]) state that authorized government officers may 
direct refugees to live in settlements. Mandatory encampment did not become formal policy until 1964. 
3 UNA COP Box 68, File S.10484, Rwanda Urundi Refugees, 1961-1964; Memo from Chief Minister, 18 January 
1962. 
4 UNA COP Box 22, File S.07584, Security Reports for Council of Ministers, 1961-63; “Uganda Monthly 
Intelligence Report, January 1962,” 1.  
5 UNA COP S.10484, Rwanda Urundi Refugees, 1961-1964; Memo from Chief Minister, 18 January 1962. 
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northern Rwandan province of Mutara, in retaliation for refugee raids.6 By early May, the 
Deputy Governor of Uganda capitulated to pro-encampment opinion and issued a proclamation 
ordering all “non-cattle owning refugees” residing in the border areas of Kigezi District to 
relocate to Oruchinga Settlement immediately.7 
The Deputy Governor’s announcement was met with immediate and widespread criticism 
from both refugees and their Ugandan kin. For refugees who had already acquired land and 
planted crops in Uganda, the removal to Oruchinga would leave them doubly displaced, forced to 
begin their recovery process from scratch. Many simply hated the idea of moving further away 
from Rwanda as they were convinced that they would soon be going home.8 Local government 
officials and residents were also unwilling to see refugees resettled. For many supporters in the 
government, the reasons were personal: they had family in Rwanda, or perhaps had even come 
from Rwanda themselves. Local politicians operating in communities with strong cross-border 
links felt compelled to welcome refugees, regardless of their personal opinion, if they wished to 
keep their jobs. Still others saw displaced Rwandans as a potential source of revenue, either in 
the form rent or taxes. “Local people do not want refugees moved,” reported one political leader 
                                                 
6 UNA COP Box 22, File S.07584, Security Reports for Council of Ministers, 1961-63; “Uganda Monthly 
Intelligence Report, April 1962,” 2. 
7 KigDA Immigration Box 3, File ADM 23/1i, Control of Entry into Uganda of Refugees—Ruanda Refugees; “The 
Control of Alien Refugees Ordinance, 1960 (No. 19 of 1960). Order (Under Section 8 of the Ordinance).” The 
government had only just begun the process of clearing the land for the Nakivale camp, and so could not move 
cattle-owning refugees yet. Oruchinga was not suitable for large numbers of livestock. 
8 UNA COP Box 68, File S.10484, Rwanda Urundi Refugees, 1961-1964; Cabinet Minute 40 (62): Refugees from 
Ruanda, 13 March 1962.  
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to a panel of Cabinet Ministers. “Some have land from the Muruka [parish] Councils and the 
District Council is considering taxation on settled refugees.”9  
The public outcry came as no surprise to central government officials, who knew that 
Kigezi and Ankole voters had significant ties to Rwanda through family, business, and faith 
networks. Many senior ministers, in fact, had resisted calls for encampment for months, fearing 
punishment from their constituents at the ballot box.10 The Deputy Governor, faced with 
mounting criticism, quickly suspended his relocation orders and called for the appointment of a 
special Ministerial committee to investigate alternatives to mandatory encampment.11 After 
touring the affected Districts and meeting with security agents, District officers, local community 
members and refugees, the committee decided that those who had already settled privately and 
were able to provide for themselves should be allowed to stay; new refugee arrivals, however, 
were to be forwarded immediately to Ankole for resettlement.12 The decision outraged security 
and intelligence agents, who believed self-settled refugees had been responsible for the recent 
border attacks.13 But for most concerned officials, the Ministerial committee’s compromise was 
                                                 
9 KigDA Immigration Box 3, File ADM 23/1i, Control of Entry into Uganda of Refugees—Ruanda Refugees; 
“Record of a visit by the Committee of Ministers investigating refugee problems to the Ruanda border areas from 
17th to 19th May, 1962.” 
10 UNA COP Box 68, File S.10484, Rwanda Urundi Refugees, 1961-1964; Cabinet Minute 40 (62): Refugees from 
Ruanda, 13 March 1962. In the words of one Cabinet Minister, “As the refugees did not want to move, and as they 
had considerable influence on voters, it would be unwise to force them to move immediately before the elections, 
particularly in the marginal constituency of South West Ankole. The refugees wished to remain near the border so 
that they could return to Ruanda if the Mwami [Rwandan king] was restored.” 
11 KigDA Immigration Box 3, File ADM 23/1i, Control of Entry into Uganda of Refugees—Ruanda Refugees; 
Extract of Kigezi District Team Meeting Minutes, 4 June 1962. 
12 UNA COP Box 68, File S.10484, Rwanda Urundi Refugees, 1961-1964; Cabinet Minute 65 (1962), Ruanda-
Urundi Refugees, 29 May 1962. 
13 TNA FCO 141/18433, Ruanda Urundi Reports; “Inspector General of Police, Michael J. Macoun, to the 
Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2 July 1962. 
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the only way forward. Life in the border was too tangled, and the fledgling state too weak, to 
expect anything more. 
This chapter explores the unfolding relationship between refugee camps and the creation 
of “the refugee” as a legal and social category in Uganda during the last years of colonial rule 
and the first years of national independence. It is organized around two key arguments. First, I 
demonstrate how the creation of the camp depended on the imaginative work of many actors, 
including refugees. Following the paths of different people as they move in and out and through 
Oruchinga Settlement, I argue that camp was not a material expression of state sovereignty, but a 
rambling collection of different interests and inputs—it was, in short, many things to many 
people, and no one completely controlled the vision for what the camp should be or how it 
should function. Second, I argue that the camp both reflected and reinforced deeply entrenched 
disagreements about what it meant to be a citizen of the newly independent state of Uganda. 
Government officials had hoped that Oruchinga would help them isolate refugees from the 
Ugandan citizenry, but the camp’s size and open design allowed for what Anna Holian calls, 
“spatial indeterminacy,” or the interpenetration of refugee and Ugandan spaces.14 Instead of 
molding “the refugee” as a recognizable, generalizable social and legal category, Oruchinga 
blurred the boundaries between citizen and noncitizen. The spatial indeterminacy of the 
settlement was only enhanced by government indecisiveness on the question of encampment, on 
the one hand, and the complicated social lives of refugees and Ugandans, on the other. 
This chapter is organized into four parts. Part one provides an overview of the “camp” in 
refugee studies literature, and details my conceptual framework. The early days of Oruchinga 
                                                 
14 Anna Holian, “The Ambivalent Exception: American Occupation Policy in Postwar Germany and the Formation 
of Jewish Refugee Spaces,” Journal of Refugee Studies 25:3 (2012), 452-73. 
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form the basis for part two, and here the emphasis revolves around how camp sites were selected, 
built and populated. Part three considers the utility of the camps, and the ways different actors—
refugees, local residents, aid workers, businessmen, and politicians—used the camp for their own 
purposes. Finally, I conclude.  
Part I: What is a camp? 
Two tropes dominate refugee studies literature on the camp. The first trope, built on Foucault, 
frames the camp as a “vital device of power”15 that enables the state to categorize people through 
spatial organization. The camp, in this framework, serves both carceral and therapeutic ends. It 
controls human mobility and disciplines individual subjects; it molds concentrations of 
individuals into identifiable “populations”; and it provides the necessary elements to keep that 
population alive and healthy.16 The second trope, building on the work of Agamben, takes 
Foucauldian visions of the camp a step further. Here, the camp is not simply a device that the 
state uses to organize populations and discipline subjects: It is the ultimate material expression of 
sovereignty, the space in which the state is able to exclude people from the body politic through 
radical, carceral inclusion. The camp defines the exception, and it is against this exception—this 
Other—that the state defines itself.  
While Foucault and Agamben provide useful ways for conceptualizing the extreme 
power inequalities that shape contemporary citizenship regimes, their theories on the camp are 
unhelpful for thinking through the history of twentieth century refugee encampment in Africa. 
To begin, they have not challenged scholars to push beyond Eurocentric genealogies of the 
                                                 
15 Liisa H. Malkki, “Refugees and exile: from "refugee studies" to the national order of things,” in Annual Review of 
Anthropology 24 (1995), 498. 
16 See for example Jennifer Hyndman, Managing displacement: refugees and the politics of humanitarianism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).  
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camp, which trace the origins of the institution to the Nazi concentration centers and the 
displaced persons (DPs) camps of postwar Germany. Yet the camp as both humanitarian and 
carceral device was already a commonplace technology in much of the colonized world by the 
start of World War II. Spanish, American, and British forces all experimented with encampment 
as a counter-insurgency technique during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The British, in 
fact, had introduced the phrase “concentration camp” to the English language during the South 
African War (1899-1902).17 The British incarcerated over a quarter million Afrikaner and 
African women, men, and children in squalid camps scattered across the Cape, Orange River, 
Transvaal and Natal colonies.18 In light of such histories, Aidan Forth argues that a better 
genealogy of the camp might be “framed less by the exception experiences of Germany and the 
Soviet Union but by the recurring use of camps in liberal polities” such as the British Empire.19 
Theoretical frameworks anchored in questions about discipline, biopower, and 
sovereignty have also lead some scholars to think of the camp as a closed unit of analysis, rather 
than an open nexus of converging relationships. Liisa Malkki, in an otherwise brilliant study of 
Burundian refugees in Tanzania, attributes far too much power to the space of Mishamo camp to 
organize human relationships and communal narratives (“mythico-histories”). She argues, 
specifically, that two perceived features of the settlement—its “location...in a forested 
                                                 
17 Smith, Iain R., and Andreas Stucki. 2011. "The Colonial Development of Concentration Camps (1868-
1902)". The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History. 39 (3): 417-437. 
18 A selective amnesia surrounds this transnational history of concentration camps. On the one hand, comparisons 
between concentration camps in South Africa and Nazi Germany are not new. Hannah Arendt (and later, Georgio 
Agamben) made this connection in 1968. On the other hand, little work has been done to illuminate “the 
contributions of British imperialism and of liberal empire more broadly” to the twentieth century phenomenon of the 
refugee camp. See Aidan Forth, "An Empire of Camps: British Imperialism and the Concentration of Civilians, 
1876-1903” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2012), 356. 
19 Forth, “An Empire of Camps,” v. 
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nothingness, a green wilderness” and its regulated borders—had profound consequences for 
refugee identification work, driving “camp refugees” to imagine themselves as wholly separate 
from “town refugees” who had settled illegally outside Mishamo. Thus “camp” and “town” 
emerge as discrete rather than interpenetrating spaces.  
Part II: An Unexpected Choice: The Move to Oruchinga 
Assumptions about what a refugee settlement was and what it should do grew out of a global 
tangle of ideas about security, humanitarianism, and development. But once the British decided 
to build a settlement for Rwandan refugees, they still had to decide where and how to build it. 
Analysis of this process reveals the importance of local officials, local African governments, and 
refugees themselves in determining the geography of Uganda’s first refugee settlement. This 
localized process ultimately resulted in the creation of a massive settlement in Oruchinga Valley, 
southern Uganda, in late 1961. This was a surprising development, given the history of the place. 
Oruchinga was not an ideal choice for a refugee settlement. The Protectorate had, throughout the 
1950s, spent considerable time and resources trying to develop the valley into a productive 
agricultural settlement. The project ended in complete failure and was finally abandoned in 1958, 
largely because the government could not persuade African farmers to take up land in the valley. 
Oruchinga suffered from poor drainage, resulting in alternating periods of flooding and drought. 
It was heavily infested with tsetse fly and mosquitoes, making it a potentially dangerous location 
for both humans and their livestock. Even the Ministry of Agriculture doubted the valley's 
potential as a site for agricultural development, given the marginal soil quality of the area.20 
                                                 
20 Refugee Officer to DC Kigezi, KigDA Immigration Box 3, File ADM.23/1i; Control of Entry into Uganda of 
Refugees—Ruanda Refugees, 1961-62. 
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Establishing a refugee settlement in the Oruchinga Valley therefore required a radical 
reimagining of the landscape as a site of technocratic possibility. 
Reimagining Oruchinga 
Oruchinga lies in what is now Isingiro District, in a region formerly known as Ankole.21 
Roughly ten miles in length, the wide, shallow valley runs perpendicular to the Tanzania border, 
beginning at Lake Nakivale in the north and then sloping gently down to the Kagera River basin 
in the south. In the days before the Protectorate, Oruchinga was part of the heartland of the 
Nkore Kingdom. It served as a highway between Nkore and the rival kingdom of Karagwe 
during much of the nineteenth century, and was often used by raiding parties from either side. 
Despite the perennial cattle raid, Oruchinga nevertheless supported a settled agrarian community, 
at least until the 1890s. Both Emin Pasha and Henry Morton Stanley reported visiting a thriving 
agricultural settlement called "Mavona" at the northern end of the valley during their treks across 
the region in 1889 and 1891, respectively. Noting with evident admiration, Stanley wrote that 
"Mavona produced abundantly...peas, beans, tomatoes, potatoes, manioc, cucumbers, banigalls, 
bananas, and plantain."22 
The success of Mavona was not to last, however. The last decade of the nineteenth 
century witnessed widespread famine that devastated Nkore, including the villages in Oruchinga 
                                                 
21 “Ankole” is the Anglicized version of "Nkore," the name of the pre-colonial kingdom The Nkore kingdom likely 
emerged as a regional power during the sixteenth century. The British Protectorate granted semi-federal status to 
"Ankole" (Nkore) in 1901, from which point it was known as both Ankole kingdom and Ankole district. Here, I use 
Nkore when referring to the precolonial kingdom, and Ankole when discussing the twentieth century 
kingdom/district. Ankole has since been subdivided into several districts, but the area is still known colloquially as 
Ankole. 
22 Henry Morton Stanley, In Darkest Africa, or, The Quest, Rescue and Retreat of Emin, governor of Equatoria, v. 2 
(London: S. Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, 1890), 352. 
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(see Chapter 1). Many who survived the first disaster succumbed to the epidemics that followed: 
Smallpox, jigger fleas, and (in cattle and wild animals) Rinderpest. 
The absence of settled agrarian communities in the valley opened up the land to yet 
another scourge, the tsetse fly, which gradually took over large cuts of Nkore (Ankole) territory 
in the early years of colonial rule. Tsetse flies belong to a genus of large, bloodsucking flies that 
serve as a vector for trypanosomes, a type of parasite that can, depending on the species, induce a 
deadly brain infection in both human and animal hosts. This infection is known as sleeping 
sickness in humans and trypanosomiasis in livestock and wildlife, and it is fatal without 
treatment.23 Tsetse flies thrive in hot, subtropical climates like those found in southern Uganda, 
but only if they have access to shady vegetation where they can find moisture and escape the 
worst of the noonday heat. They are surprisingly fragile in this regard, and often cannot survive 
in places of permanent human settlement. Human activities like farming, grazing livestock, 
clearing forests, and burning grassland tend to destroy the fly's habitat, and with it, the fly. 
Human occupation must be continuous, however, because tsetse flies are highly opportunistic 
and will spread quickly into new territories as soon as conditions allow. Once land is infested 
with the fly, it can be very difficult to reclaim. 
The depopulation of southern Nkore at the turn of the century set the stage for a massive 
tsetse infestation by the early 1910s. Without people present to clear the land, the once-
manicured gardens, groves, and pastures of Mavona gave way to thick brush and tall grasses—an 
ideal environment for the fly. British veterinarians positively identified their first case of animal 
                                                 
23 Different species of trypanosome are harmful to different hosts. Trypanosoma duttonella vivax, for example, can 
cause deadly infection in livestock and wildlife, but not people. Similarly, while Trypanosoma brucei rhodesiense is 
typically fatal in human beings, it produces no symptoms in cattle. See Kirk Arden Hoppe, Lords of the Fly: 
Sleeping Sickness Control in British East Africa, 1900-1960 (Westport and London: Praeger, 2003). 
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trypanosomiasis in southern Ankole in 1909. By 1910, the disease had wiped out a large 
percentage of Ankole cattle, reaching 85 percent mortality rates in some kraals. People did 
manage to save some of their animals by relocating to hilltops, where higher elevations and 
cooler temperatures kept the fly at bay, but these areas could only support a small fraction of the 
herds.  
The fly infiltrated Oruchinga Valley by the start of World War I, facilitated in its spread 
by the increase in military traffic between Uganda and German Tanganyika.24 Thankfully, and 
for reasons still not fully understood, the Ankole infestation did not result in any sizeable 
outbreak of human sleeping sickness, but it did have deleterious consequences for livestock, 
which died in large numbers. For the next fifty years, vast areas of the kingdom were virtually 
off-limits to pastoralists, with the District Commissioner (DC) writing in 1949 that the 
infestation was “without question of doubt the most serious [problem] facing the development of 
the district...”25  
District authorities, working in cooperation with the Director for Veterinary Services, 
pursued a host of experimental eradication methods throughout the 1930s and ‘40s, ranging from 
costly brush-clearance projects, to insecticide-spraying schemes, to prophylaxis. These efforts 
were moderately successful in Ankole, but significant challenges remained, with regular 
outbreaks in the northeast and central regions that threatened both private herds as well as the 
District’s substantial investments in growing the cattle industry. In 1959, the District 
administration ordered the evacuation of cattle from Nyabushozi county while the Game 
                                                 
24 Ford, The Role of the Trypanosomiases, 153-54.  
25 DC Ankole, quoted in Uganda, Annual Reports on the Eastern Province, Western Province, and Northern 
Province for 1949 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1950), 100. 
238 
 
Department conducted systematized shooting campaigns to eliminate the wild animals that were 
capable of carrying trypanosomiasis into previously cleared areas.26 The problem with each of 
these methods, however, was that without permanent human settlement, the territorial gains 
made against the fly were only temporary. 
Government approaches to tsetse eradication shifted in the immediate post-World War II 
years, from an emphasis on brush-clearance to a more robust program of planned resettlement 
schemes. This shift corresponded with changing development concerns in neighboring Kigezi 
and Ruanda, which colonial demographers and agronomists described as dangerously 
overpopulated.27 The Ruzagayura famine, a disaster that claimed the lives of 300,000 people in 
northern Ruanda during World War II (see Chapter 2), was, the experts warned, an example of 
the consequences that Belgian and British territories could expect if they did not address their 
overpopulation “crisis.” Convinced of the science, Kigezi authorities responded by relocating 
20,000 Bakiga farmers to less populated regions in the district, as well as to sites in neighboring 
Toro and Ankole. In 1956, the DC Kigezi requested that the Ankole government open up land in 
Oruchinga Valley for a new Bakiga settlement.  
For the next two years, Ankole and Kigezi officials worked closely to develop Oruchinga 
into an attractive site for Bakiga farmers. They knew that the incentives would have to 
substantially outweigh the costs of relocation for prospective settlers; otherwise, the settlement 
would remain empty. Malaria posed the biggest health risk, but this could conceivably be 
addressed through quinine distribution, insecticide, and the provision of a local clinic. The 
                                                 
26 DC Ankole, quoted in Uganda, Annual Reports on the Eastern Province, Western Province, and Northern 
Province for 1959 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1960), 67. 
27 For a historical critique of “over-population,” see Emily Klancher Merchant, “Prediction and Control: Global 
Population, Population Science, and Population Politics in the Twentieth Century” (PhD diss., University of 
Michigan, 2015). 
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primary deterrent for Bakiga farmers, however, was Oruchinga’s water. The valley’s soils were 
relatively fertile, but they suffered from poor drainage, which in turn led to flooding and 
erosion—an impossible situation for subsistence cultivation. In 1958, after the settlement site had 
failed to attract more than sixty-three settlers, the government put a moratorium on the project 
pending the results of a Protectorate-sponsored irrigation trial at one end of the valley. Officials 
remained hopeful for a technological solution that would allow for the transformation of 
Oruchinga into a productive site of economic growth, but in the late 1950s, the prospects seemed 
dim. 
The Ankole Local Government had its own complicated relationship to the land that 
would become Oruchinga Refugee Settlement. The kingdom recognized at least half a dozen pre-
colonial sites in and around the valley as historically significant, most especially the royal burial 
grounds at Ishanje, on the southern shores of Lake Nakivale (see Map 2). Many of these sites 
were in danger of destruction, either through resettlement schemes, tsetse eradication efforts, or 
simple neglect owing to lacking political interest.28 In a 1956 article for the Uganda Journal, 
H.F. Morris, the former District Commissioner for Ankole, argued that the Protectorate had a 
duty to preserve the remaining sites “of tribal significance,” but in order to do so, the British 
would first have to "instill[...] into the people the need to preserve, where practicable, what 
remains...”29 What Morris failed to realize was that few Ankole residents had any interest in 
preserving the old vestiges of the monarchy, an institution that had grown increasingly unpopular 
during the 1940s and ‘50s. The Omugabe (king) signified an undesirable past for many 
Banyankole, one in which an ethnic minority—the Bahima—had presumed to rule over the 
                                                 
28 H.F. Morris, "Historic Sites in Ankole," Uganda Journal 20:2 (Sept. 1956), 177. 
29 Ibid. 178. 
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majority Bairu. As the District prepared for Ugandan independence—a process that included 
democratization of key leadership positions at the local level and elections for new parliamentary 
seats at the national level—many people in Ankole were ready to leave the kingdom and its 
relics behind.  
Consequently, when Protectorate officials approached the Ankole Local Government in 
1961 with a request for land for refugee resettlement, the latter had few attachments to sacred 
sites in Isingiro. The General Purposes Board, which would have overseen the negotiation with 
the Protectorate authorities, was made up of elected officials, most of whom would have been 
more interested in tsetse fly eradication and livestock development programs than historic 
preservation. Precise details surrounding the Protectorate's acquisition of the land for Oruchinga 
remain murky,30 but according to one source, Ankole officials agreed to give up their claims to 
parts of the valley in exchange for better plots owned by the Protectorate government in 
Nyabushozi County, just north of the valley.31 Nyabushozi was considered prize pastureland, but 
for the presence of tsetse fly. Having permanent human settlements in Isingiro, fully paid for by 
the central government, would help Ankole authorities guard Nyabushozi against further fly 
infestation, at least from the south. Local leaders in Isingiro would benefit directly from both 
tsetse eradication and (they hoped) an influx of new potential taxpayers into the sparsely 
                                                 
30 I have yet to find archival record of this deal. The Ankole District Archives were largely destroyed in the Uganda-
Tanzania border war of 1979. 
31 Emmanuel Bagenda, Angela Naggaga, Elliot Smith, "Land Problems in Nakivale Settlement and the Implications 
for Refugee Protection in Uganda" (Kampala: Refugee Law Project, 2003), 4. The article cites an interview that the 
authors conducted with an unnamed Mbarara District Registrar of Titles in 2002, but I have not found corroborating 
evidence on the matter.  
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populated areas of southeastern Ankole.32 On October 3, 1961, Ankole representatives 
announced that Oruchinga was available for refugee settlers.33 
The interests of local African governments had direct consequences for refugee 
settlement in Uganda. In the case of Oruchinga, the Protectorate authorities offered the Ankole 
administration a deal it couldn’t refuse: free fly abatement, plus better land. Local officials were 
not always so accommodating, however, and their refusal to cede land for refugees had the 
power to redirect the entire resettlement process. This was made clear the following year, in June 
1962, when the Uganda government—now less than three months from independence—
approached Ankole with a request for more land. Oruchinga had already reached capacity by 
early 1962, sending Uganda officials on a frantic search for new sites. A particularly challenging 
issue was that over the past year, Rwandan refugees had brought nearly 20,000 head of cattle 
with them. Crowded into temporary camps along the border, refugee livestock competed with 
local herds for grass, water, and space, leading to violent confrontations between Ugandan and 
Rwandan herders. For veterinary officials who had dedicated their careers to eradicating 
Rinderpest, bovine pleuro-pneumonia, and trypanosomiasis from the Protectorate, the sudden, 
uncontrolled influx of refugee cattle threatened to undo decades of work. Ugandan refugee law 
(see Chapter 4) technically allowed government officers to confiscate and even destroy refugee 
livestock, but authorities knew from long experience that they could not wrest control of cross-
                                                 
32 It is perhaps significant that the M.P. for South East Ankole, the Hon. F. Kangwamu, was the official who moved 
that the Ankole General Purposes Committee should contain refugee settlement to Isingiro. As an elected officer 
whose constituency included Isingiro, Kangwamu stood to gain from resettlement scheme. See KigDA Immigration 
Box 3, File ADM 23/1i, Control of Entry into Uganda of Refugees—Ruanda Refugees; Record of a visit by the 
Minister of Community Development to the Ruanda Refugee Camps Resettlement Area from the 13th to 16th June 
1962. 
33 UNA COP Box 68, File S.10484, Rwanda Urundi Refugees, 1961-1964; Ruanda Refugees: Note of decisions 
taken at the meeting in Mbarara,” 3 October 1961. 
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border cattle movements through blunt force (in Chapter 1). The only answer was to build a 
second camp for refugee cattle-owners and their stock. Informed beforehand by the Engazi (the 
Ankole Prime Minister) that Ankole Local Government was sure to look favorably on their 
request, Ministers from central government approached the District’s General Purposes 
Committee with their proposal: a second refugee settlement for cattle-owners, to be located in 
northern Ankole, far from the Rwanda border. 
In a decision that shocked the Ministerial delegation, the Ankole General Purposes 
Committee rejected the request, insisting that the refugees would remain in Isingiro.34 The 
decision demonstrated the shift in local political authority on the eve of independence: Neither 
the central government nor the Engazi were in a position to challenge the ruling, at least not 
directly. The Minister for Community Development begged the Committee to reconsider, 
arguing that the resettlement scheme would be a boon to local development while also 
preventing conflicts between refugee and Banyankole pastoralists, but he ultimately had to 
concede defeat.35  
Funding Oruchinga 
The question of who would pay for Oruchinga was an extremely sensitive one. When 
anticolonial violence in neighboring Congo drove 4,000 white Belgians into western Uganda in 
July 1960, Brussels had immediately offered to reimburse the British Protectorate for all costs 
associated with housing, feeding, and transporting these white refugees. The British had 
therefore hoped that similar support would be forthcoming for the black refugees fleeing Belgian 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 KigDA Immigration Box 3, File ADM 23/1i, Control of Entry into Uganda of Refugees—Ruanda Refugees 
Record of a Meeting of the Refugee Co-Ordinating Committee,” June 27, 1962. 
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territory. Requests for assistance with displaced Rwandans, however, met with stony refusal. The 
Belgians did not believe they were responsible for what happened in their former territory, nor 
were they willing to recognize the asylum claims of their former African subjects. The racial 
disparity was clear: “Belgians”—even those who were born in Congo—were to be repatriated to 
the metropole, while “Africans”—even those with Belgian parentage—would remain “home” in 
Africa.36 The Belgians, already alienated by the international community in the wake of the 
Congo crisis, blamed the United Nations for their loss of Ruanda-Urundi, arguing that if the UN 
had not ordered the national referendum and elections in 1962, the Belgians would have been 
able to regain control of the Territory. Having complied with UN orders, the Belgians denied any 
responsibility for what happened next. 
Belgium’s recalcitrance posed serious questions for the exiting British administration. In 
less than three years (1959-62), the Protectorate had spent more than half a million dollars on 
Rwandan refugees,37 at a time when the country barely had the resources to cover ordinary 
services like public education and road building. The Director of Refugees for Uganda, R.N. 
Posnett, believed it was time to appeal to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) for aid, despite the fact that Uganda was not, at that time, within the scope of the High 
Commissioner’s mandate (Chapter 4). He believed that the Uganda Council of Ministers—the 
advisory council to the Governor, comprised of African and European Ministers—agreed with 
him. The British Foreign Office, however, was loath to see the UN enter into “British business,” 
a development that could very likely embarrass their government. Many senior officials in 
                                                 
36 B.L. Jacobs, Administrators in East Africa: Six Case Studies (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1965), 11. 
37 L.W. Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time—The Work of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 1951-1972, v. 2 (Meutchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, Ltd, 1975), 1223-4. 
244 
 
London saw Felix Schnyder, the High Commissioner for Refugees at that time, as “something of 
an empire builder,” who wanted nothing more than an excuse to involve his offices in the affairs 
of colonial Africa. As one of the UN’s most important donors and most powerful members, 
Britain believed that the cost of Schnyder’s ambition would ultimately fall on the shoulders of 
the British taxpayer. For Uganda-based officials, the Foreign Office’s resistance to UN aid added 
a new layer of diplomatic complexity. In the end, the Council of Ministers opted to send one of 
their Ugandan members, Benedicto Kiwanuka, to the UNHCR offices in Geneva to plead their 
case, allowing British officials like Posnett to feign ignorance.38 
The UNHCR made its first major donation to Uganda in May 1962, contributing 
$100,000 out of its emergency fund to help establish Nakivale, the country’s second refugee 
settlement site.39 Over the next decade, the High Commissioner would continue to funnel 
donations to Kampala, along with advisory staff. Humanitarian organizations like the Red Cross, 
USAID, and Save the Children provided operational support, along with monetary donations and 
gifts in kind. The bulk of refugee assistance, however, was born by the British Protectorate and, 
after independence, the Ugandan government. 
Setting up camp 
Oruchinga was not a singular “camp,” but a sprawling agricultural settlement consisting of 
dozens of organized “villages” spread out over forty square miles of rural countryside.40 Its size 
and open structure, combined with a lack of adequate staffing and the ruggedness of the local 
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39 Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time, 1224. 
40. CUA-5 ABP Box 76/1, Ankole/Kigezi Diocese: Correspondences, 1962; World Council of Church Information 
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terrain, made it exceedingly difficult for Uganda officials to monitor and control human 
mobility. Buffalo, leopards, tsetse flies and mosquitos proved a far greater deterrent that security 
forces or refugee laws to people seeking to enter or exit the valley without permission.41  
Initially, the government intended refugees to live on cooperative farms, with fifty or so 
families sharing a large communal plot between them. This plan was abandoned in late 1962, 
following Rwanda’s first national elections that brought Michel Kayibanda’s openly anti-Tutsi 
government into power. It was at that point that the Protectorate government realized what most 
refugees were refusing to accept: The crisis in Rwanda was far from over, and those displaced by 
the new nation’s xenophobic visions would not be welcomed back anytime soon. Long-term 
settlement would require more space than a communal plot could provide, because families were 
constantly growing; the space of the camp needed to accommodate processes of social 
reproduction that continued even in exile. Consequently, camp authorities doled out plots to 
individual families from late 1962 onwards.42 As the year of independence came to a close, 
Oruchinga valley was filled to capacity: 12,000 people spread across seventy-four villages, with 
more refugees waiting in makeshift camps at the border. 43 
Central government officials viewed Oruchinga as a means for securing the border and 
consolidating aid distribution, but for the District officers, Red Cross workers, and local chiefs 
and security personnel who managed its day-to-day operations, the camp functioned like any 
                                                 
41. Interview with Frank Mirenge, former camp commandant for the years 1962-65, 29 July 2013. At various points 
in time, camp officials and district administrators did try to control movement in and out of the valley using a permit 
system. These were successful in keeping certain people out (like the rule-abiding UNHCR representative), but not 
in controlling camp residents.  
42 KigDA Agriculture Box 9, File 2, Agricultural Reports, Ankole District; Ankole District Agricultural Report, June 
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other resettlement project. Government staff requisitioned for refugee work continued to operate 
within their bureaucratic structures, with Assistant District Commissioners, agricultural officers, 
health inspectors, social workers, and veterinarians all reporting to their respective offices and 
ministries. The Agricultural Officer for Ankole District listed “Oruchinga” as one of several 
“schemes” he had to monitor over the course of every month, along with Bakiga settlements, 
prison gardens, coffee-spraying stations, and cooperative farms. District officers, while “on loan” 
to Oruchinga and stationed at the reception center, could still be called in to headquarters to 
assist with special matters that arose, such as elections.44 Growing organically out of Ankole’s 
established administrative machinery, Oruchinga took on many of the traits of “ordinary” 
postwar development projects.  
The process of establishing a new refugee village followed protocols set down for the 
Bakiga resettlement program. New refugees would be directed to a reception camp at the north 
end of the valley, where they would receive food, blankets, and first aid. During the day, all able-
bodied men would be expected to leave the reception center under the supervision of a headman 
(often, a fellow refugee), who would lead them to the land that had been assigned to them. Each 
man would receive a plot of land and a set of basic tools—a shovel, a pickaxe, a saw, machete, 
and bucket—and would then be instructed to go collect materials in the nearby thicket such as 
poles, reeds and grass that they could use to construct a rudimentary hut. When the hut was 
finished, the man would collect his family from the reception center and move them to their new 
“village” home. At first, each village consisted of fifty families situated on 200 acres of land. 
Once the government decided to assign individual plots to each family, villages consisted of ten 
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families settled on ten acres of land. Families would continue to receive rations during their first 
year, giving them time to break the soil and prepare their fields. It was hoped that, after the first 
harvest, refugees would be fully “self-sufficient” and no longer in need of government-issued 
supplies.45  
This was the government’s plan, anyway. In practice, refugees were not always so 
accommodating, nor were they particularly invested in helping their hosts “develop” Oruchinga. 
Many were keeping an eye to the south, waiting for positive news from Rwanda. Why expend 
energy on the backbreaking work of clearing new fields, if they were only to go home before the 
harvest? Still others resented the pressure to take to digging, a vocation that they felt was beneath 
their education and class. Government reports from those early years repeatedly bring up the 
difficult work of “transforming” pastoralists into cultivators, and camp officials often turned to 
coercive measures to get the job done. Men who refused to build their huts, and families who 
refused to till the soil, saw their meager rations of maize flour and dried beans reduced. In his 
monthly report for October 1962, the Agricultural officer wrote with satisfaction that the move to 
ration reductions had brought about “very good results.”46  
The civilizing aims of the Oruchinga project were perhaps most clearly demonstrated in 
the attitudes of government officials and humanitarian workers towards the settlement’s 
population of young black men. In the minds of many pro-encampment parties, young men 
represented a double threat to the peace and prosperity of the new nation: On the one hand, they 
were concerned that refugee “youth,” dislocated from school and family and healthy forms of 
leisure, could easily become “demoralized,” a subjective state that could, over time, lead to 
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laziness and dependency on “hand-outs.” Paradoxically, government and humanitarian agents 
also feared young men, left to rot in impoverished rural settlements, were easy converts for 
radical guerilla groups. Both fears—of the lazy, dependent “Native” and of the violent, 
politicized “Warrior”—turned on a pathologizing discourse surrounding black masculinity. 
Dependent men grew bored, and the government feared this, because they believed boredom 
(emasculation) was the root of political radicalization. 
Government and church agents sought to prevent male boredom—and therefore 
radicalization and dependency—through the development of vocational training programs that 
were akin to those established in both Britain and Uganda to assist with other categories of 
welfare candidates. In the words of one CMS missionary, Stephen Carr, refugees suffered from a 
lack of “morale and self respect” that could be best overcome “by enabling them to become self 
sufficient, instead of being the passive recipients of aid.”47 
Despite the deprivations of settlement life, refugees worked hard to maintain their 
connections to the outside world. Young men on bicycles were the primary sources of news in a 
land without radios, and they were often seen traveling up and down the dirt road that led from 
Oruchinga to the Tanganyika border. Intelligence officers embedded in the camp were aware of 
these movements, but unless they suspected terrorist activity, they remained quiet.48  
Refugees also built relationships with nearby residents. Oruchinga was sparsely 
populated but people still lived in the area, often on hill ridges that kept them above the valley’s 
swampy, mosquito-ridden floor. For them, Oruchinga was, initially, a boon: It meant more roads, 
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dispensaries, and possibly even schools. From a very early date, Catholic and Protestant 
missionaries (both Ugandan and European) set up open-air primary schools for refugee children, 
and these attracted children from neighboring communities—a sign that local public service 
delivery was not meeting the basic needs of Ugandan residents in Isingiro.49 Local traders and 
lorry drivers, contracted by the District Commissioner to transport weekly allotments of food 
from Mbarara town to the reception center at Oruchinga, also provided refugees with an outlet to 
the wider community. These regular deliveries of beans, salt, and powdered milk provided 
sustenance, but they also provided an opportunity for refugees to trade their ration of USAID-
provided maize flour—a food they found unpalatable—for clothing, sugar, tobacco, and other 
more desirable items.50 Traders, in turn, would sell the flour in town for a profit. 
The boundaries of Oruchinga expanded and contracted over time, swelling to more than 
12,000 residents in difficult periods and then dwindling to several thousand or less in quiet years. 
Refugees arrived, built huts, and grew crops before they eventually moved on, sometimes to try 
their luck back home, but more often because they found better accommodations elsewhere in 
Uganda. Refugee youth, in particular, were prone to leave when jobs, scholarships, and marriage 
proposals gave them a clear exit. Many who left maintained connections with those who stayed 
behind, however, returning to the settlements for holidays and to manage family affairs. 
Oruchinga was not the sole locus of refugee life, but one site in a dynamic landscape of 
displacement and recovery. 
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Part III: Oruchinga’s many uses51 
Oruchinga provided an option—rather than a predetermined destination—to people displaced by 
war. This is evident in the fact that, by the late 1960s, Ugandan authorities and the UNHCR 
believed that only a third of the country's estimated 180,000 refugees resided in camps, meaning 
that over 100,000 people had found alternative living arrangements to Oruchinga. The Director 
of the British Red Cross in Uganda reported that the camps were beset by “starving 
Banyaruanda” who had spent “many months” “wandering” the Ugandan countryside in search of 
food and work, and only reported to the official refugee reception centers when they had 
exhausted all other options.52 Even those who spent time in one of the government settlements 
often did so on their own schedule, in response to their own needs and desires, rather than in 
compliance with refugee law. Families would try to maximize their options by sending some of 
their members to the settlement, while the rest would take their chances outside. Many who 
registered their presence at a camp did not stay there permanently, but left when better 
opportunities allowed. Often, government officials on the ground acknowledged the “slow 
exodus of people [from] the camps,” but did little to discourage it.53 
Getting to Oruchinga was a process, in other words, one that was critically shaped by a 
person's access to material resources and their position within social constellations. The stories 
of three girls—Amelia, Thèresse, and Mukatanzi—highlight the winding routes by which 
Rwandan asylum-seekers found themselves in the camp. Amelia and Thèresse were teenagers 
when they arrived in the settlement. They both had relatives in Uganda who could offer them 
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refuge outside the camp, but for a variety of reasons their respective families decided to send 
them to Oruchinga. Amelia only stayed for a year, at which point she decided to leave the valley 
to go stay with an aunt in central Uganda. Thèresse, on the other hand, met and married a white 
aid worker, and the two of them spent the next decade working in various positions across the 
country's expanding camp network. In contrast to Amelia and Thèresse, Mukatanzi and her 
parents were brought to Oruchinga by force in 1964, during a highly controversial border sweep. 
Before this, however, she and her family had been staying with a Kinyarwanda-speaking migrant 
family in Kamwezi, some 100 miles away. Mukatanzi’s story demonstrates the significance of 
family connections and the power of local officials to determine refugee experience.  
Amelia 
Amelia fled Rwanda in December 1963, when she was eighteen years old. She was from 
Byumba Province in the north, but had been attending a teacher training college in Kigali at the 
outbreak of the war. Her parents managed to remain in Byumba for a time, but a period of 
intense fighting in 1961 had convinced them to take their younger children to Uganda. Amelia 
stayed behind to complete her education, and even moved back to Byumba when the local 
security situation began to show signs of improvement. Her parents had made arrangements for 
her to stay with a Catholic mission school near the family home, believing that their eldest 
daughter would be safer there than in a refugee camp. For the next eighteen months, Amelia 
worked as a primary school teacher at the mission and lived in the school dormitory with several 
other young women teachers who were in similar situations.  
Life outside the mission compound was uncertain and often frightening, but not yet 
impossible. On Saturdays, a Catholic priest would escort Amelia and her roommates to the 
nearby trading center to do their grocery shopping for the week, and to visit with friends and 
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family. Amelia had several uncles who had stayed in Byumba, and they would keep her abreast 
of local developments—the understanding being that she would go with them if they decided to 
flee the country. 
Occasionally, Amelia’s uncles would have a letter for her from her parents, who by then 
were living in Oruchinga. Such letters were difficult to procure, given the breakdown in security 
and most forms of public transportation, but every few months one of Amelia’s uncles would 
brave the journey on foot. If he were lucky, he would be able to secure a ride from the border to 
Oruchinga on a commercial lorry that brought foodstuffs to the settlements.54 Oruchinga, like all 
refugee settlements in Uganda,55 was officially closed to non-refugees, and persons wishing to 
enter or exit the settlement were required by law to apply for a permit.56 In practice, however, the 
Ugandan government did not have the manpower to enforce this rule, and camp commandants 
were aware of the fact that people came and went without much resistance from government 
agents.57  
On holidays, Amelia would leave the mission to stay with relatives. She was staying with 
her father’s oldest brother during Christmas 1963, when a joint militia of refugees from Uganda 
and Burundi launched a joint assault on Rwanda in yet another attempt to take back the country. 
The fighters were quickly routed and President Kayibanda, in turn, used the invasion as 
justification for a brutal crackdown on all suspected sympathizers, resulting in the death of 
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thousands of Rwandan citizens—many of them Tutsi—and the displacement of many thousands 
more. Amelia’s uncle decided it was time for the remaining family to leave when local police 
arrested his neighbors in early January. “He was very scared,” Amelia recalls, “He was saying 
‘No, next it will be us!’ So we had to organize and leave.” 
The family traveled by foot to the Kizinga border post that marked the boundary between 
Byumba Province and Ankole District. There, Amelia remembers waiting with her aunts and 
female cousins while her uncles deliberated with the Ugandan guards. After what seemed like 
hours, the family was allowed to cross. They remained in Kizinga for several days until the 
Ugandan government arranged for their transport by lorry to Oruchinga, where Amelia was 
reunited with her parents and younger siblings. 
Amelia quickly grew restless in the settlement. As a college graduate with teaching 
experience, she was eager to work and to move on with her life, but employment opportunities in 
Oruchinga were limited. Fortunately, in mid-1964 Amelia’s parents arranged for her to go to live 
with a distant maternal relative who had, decades earlier, migrated to Luweero, in central 
Uganda. When asked if she had received written permission to leave the settlement, Amelia 
hesitated, and then laughed. “There was a Commandant,” she said, nodding. “We used to call 
him a commandant. I think they used to get permission from him. But for me, I left, like that 
[Sweeps hand dismissively]. With my Auntie, without any paper.”  
Amelia would not share further about the circumstance of her departure from Oruchinga, 
or whether her aunt had sought official permission from the Camp Commandant. What is certain 
is that Amelia was not alone: Between February and October 1964, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs reported that over 1,100 people had mysteriously “escaped” from Oruchinga, and were 
254 
 
thought to be living in other parts of Ankole District, Kampala, and even Tanganyika.58 The 
Refugees Officer for Western Region, Frank Mirenge, acknowledged in a circular to all Police 
Commanders and Community Development Officers that “the situation” had become 
increasingly complex, and that “at times one does not know what to do.” The various ministries 
involved in providing for refugees and asylum seekers were failing to cooperate, he explained, 
resulting in much confusion on the ground.59 
Amelia’s story breaks the narrative of desperation and chaos that is so often attributed to 
refugee histories. It helps us to see displacement as a process, a series of everyday decisions and 
exchanges that culminate in crossing borders. This was often a collective process, as witnessed in 
the deliberations between Amelia, her parents, the white priests, her paternal uncles, and her 
mother’s relatives. Her journey from Kigali to Byumba, and then from Byumba to Oruchinga to 
Luweero, tracked with past migrations of kith and kin. Displaced from the physical space of 
home, she nevertheless remained embedded in social networks.  
Thèresse60 
At the start of the Rwanda Revolution, Thèresse was fifteen years old and living with her 
paternal uncle, Kizito, in Butare, southern Rwanda. Her father had been dead for several years, 
and her mother had gone to live with her relatives in northern Rwanda, in Mutara, taking 
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Thèresse’s younger siblings with her. Kizito had insisted she stay with him when her father died, 
so that he could ensure that she went to school. 
When the war started, Thèresse and Kizito left Rwanda almost immediately, heading 
north to Lubaale, southern Ankole. There they found accommodation with Kizito’s elder brother, 
Michel, who had migrated to Uganda during the early 1930s. Thèresse’s mother soon joined 
them, and for a time the family stayed together in Michel’s village. Kizito, however, worried for 
Thèresse: She was “a big girl,” no longer a small child, and he feared she would not complete her 
education if she remained in Lubaale. “He knew that staying with the Bahima, they would marry 
me off since I had started growing big,” she explained, describing her conspicuous position in 
the small community. She spoke neither Runyankole nor English, meaning that local schools 
were not an option for her. For this reason, Kizito decided to send Thèresse to Oruchinga in 
1961, where she would be able to enroll in a refugee school that offered instruction in French and 
Kinyarwanda. Kizito had a friend from university who had gone to the settlement, and he was 
sure that Thèresse would be welcome in his home. 
That was how Thèresse found herself in the back of a crowded lorry, en route to 
Oruchinga without her family, her uncle’s introductory note folded neatly in her pocket. Kizito 
had accompanied her as far Lubaale trading center, which at that time doubled as a refugee 
transit camp. There, refugees wishing to go to the settlement could board lorries contracted by 
the Ugandan government for free transport to the reception center at Oruchinga. As they said 
their goodbyes, Kizito repeated his instructions to Thèresse one final time: Immediately upon 
arrival at the settlement, ask for a man named Karamajyi. “That is how I was helped,” she 
explains. “There was something special with a girl child. Finding a girl without her parents—she 
was handled with care. And so people had to care [for] and protect you.” 
256 
 
One should not see in Thèresse’s experience a simple story of kinship and hospitality, 
however. Thèresse’s vulnerability as an unaccompanied teenage girl was an important part of her 
story. “Girl children who never had a family—life was not easy at all. That is why my father 
[uncle] decided to put people to look over my well-being.” Throughout her interview, she made 
repeated reference to the father figures in her life—her uncles, her uncle’s reliable friend, 
Karamajyi, the Catholic fathers who taught in the settlement schools. Her performance as a 
dutiful daughter was critical to her survival and success, and the importance of this performance 
is evident throughout her narrative. “If you were a girl, you would follow the upbringing that was 
preferred by parents. It is true that there is no girl that has a successful life living on her own 
without family protection.”61  
And so Thèresse went to live with Karamajyi and his family, who welcomed her “as their 
own daughter.” She completed her primary education in Oruchinga, at which point Karamajyi 
found her a position as a clerk in the reception camp. It was there that she met and eventually 
married a white aid worker, with whom she had several children. She shares very few details 
about her late husband—not even his first name—but she is careful to mention that no less a 
figure than Kosiya Shalita, the Church of Uganda’s first African bishop, gave his blessing to 
their relationship: 
“He would at times meet in the camp as well as outside and he would ask me how I was. 
That is when he one time met with my boyfriend and I never hid it from him since I had 
decided he was the one to be. He later advised us to handle things with care and to do it 
as they are supposed to be, and he even called him alone and advised him accordingly.” 
 
Bishop Shalita serves as a stand-in for Thèresse’s paternal kin, who would normally have 
been expected to oversee her engagement and marriage. In their absence, and given the 
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exceptional circumstances of life in exile, Thèresse finds alternative means of demonstrating her 
virtue and self-respect, highlighting the contributions of different father figures in her life.  
Mukatanzi62 
The stories of Amelia and Thèresse bring attention to the ways that families could use the camp 
advantageously, to secure access to education or to find shelter in moments of immediate danger. 
The camp provided a new space for reimagining kinship in the context of displacement. These 
histories are important, because they demonstrate the relational, everyday work of reconfiguring 
life in exile. It is also important, however, to understand how and when the state had the power 
to disrupt, dislodge, label, and confine. The following story is about a girl named Mukatanzi, 
who was only eight or nine when she and her parents and five siblings staggered across the 
Uganda-Rwanda border in early 1964. Like Amelia, Mukatanzi’s family was running away from 
the violence sparked by the refugee invasion of late 1963.  
Mukatanzi’s parents spoke no Runyankole, and so they had to move from homestead to 
homestead in search of someone who understood Kinyarwanda. That was how they found Joy's 
family, and that was why Joy's family opened their home to them.  
Mukatanzi and her family only stayed for a short time—Joy remembers it being only a 
week—before local authorities ordered their removal to Oruchinga. “I cried when they took her 
away,” Joy recalls. “They put her on a lorry. I never saw her after that.” Having grown up in 
Kamwezi during the late 1950s and ‘60s, Joy would have witnessed many thousands of people 
pass by her homestead as a child. In early 1960, before Oruchinga existed, refugees built a large 
camp in Kamwezi, where they were able to keep close eye on events in Rwanda. Joy remembers 
                                                 
62 Interview with Joy K., Bukinda, September 25 and October 5, 2013. 
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hearing about Oruchinga from her parents, who described the settlements as “squeezed places” 
where people lived on “posho [maize flour] and beans alone,” sometimes “d[ying] as a result of 
failing to cope with such food... They would die of diarrhea.” 
Filtered through Joy’s childhood memories, there are many important details missing 
from Mukatanzi’s story. But the memory, as delicate as it is, still points to a common feature of 
refugee administration in 1960s Uganda: the level of power enjoyed by the local chief in 
determining a person’s legal status. As discussed in the previous chapter, refugee status 
determination procedures afforded tremendous discretion to low-ranking chiefs, who were 
responsible for reporting new arrivals to District authorities. In Joy’s words, this system allowed 
chiefs to “kill an eye” when they were willing to let a refugee settle in his jurisdiction. It also 
could, at various moments, afford chiefs an opportunity to remove unwanted people from his 
area, and persons labeled as ‘refugees’ had no formal right to an appeal. In the aftermath of the 
1964 border clearance, for instance, central government authorities received numerous 
complaints that police and local officials in Kigezi and Ankole had used the operation as an 
occasion to exact revenge on old rivals. In a particularly remarkable incident, an elderly man by 
the name of George Nyirimbirima—a former Kigezi chief (see Chapter 1)—was declared a 
refugee and forced onto the back of a lorry bound for Oruchinga. He was only returned to his 
home in Bufumbira when Bishop Shalita contacted the Office of the Prime Minister on his 
behalf.63 The 1964 border clearance was an exceptionally aggressive intervention into the lives 
                                                 
63 UNA COP Box 68, File S.10484, Rwanda Urundi Refugees; PS/OPM to PS/Ministry of Internal Affairs, 28 
February 1964; KigDA ADM.23, Control of Alien Refugees; Bishop Shalita to DC Kigezi, 7 February 1964. 
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of borderland residents, but the ability of local chiefs to act as gatekeepers was a common feature 
of refugee status determination. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the genealogy, conception, and early days of the twinned camps of 
Oruchinga Refugee Settlement in southern Ankole, Uganda. It has shown how and why different 
actors responded to, participated in, and actively resisted the creation of the settlements. It has 
also attempted to demonstrate the permeability of the settlement’s fluctuating borders by 
detailing the ways in which different actors moved in and out of Oruchinga at different times. 
The camp was a dynamic site, incorporating the imaginative labors of many people over time. 
 
260 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Uganda today is one of the most important refugee host states in the world. It has provided 
asylum to some of the largest, most diverse populations of displaced people on the African 
continent since the late colonial era. As of January 2018, it supports an estimated 1.3 million 
refugees.1 The country is an imperfect refuge, certainly, but its continuous support for hundreds 
of thousands of refugees per annum stands in stark contrast to the dwindling refugee quotas of 
far wealthier nations like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. In the era of 
Trump, Brexit, and Syria, it is critical to remember that, in between the bombastic xenophobia of 
American and European governments, countries like Uganda, Kenya, Palestine and Jordan 
remain responsible for the majority of the world’s displaced and dispossessed.  
This dissertation has explored the history of Rwandan migration and resettlement in 
Uganda and the relationship between colonial governance and post-independence refugee 
management. It is, in many ways, a history about a place of refuge as well as the people who 
inhabited it. As a refuge, the postcolonial state in Uganda cannot be understood apart from its 
colonial formation. I have argued that the Uganda Protectorate was not invested in knowing its 
subjects, and that the country in fact benefitted from migrant illegibility. Unwilling to jeopardize 
their access to Rwandan labor, colonial authorities turned away from more ambitious 
classificatory regimes and instead tried to channel migrants towards areas of greatest demand. 
                                                 
1 UNHCR, Global Focus: 2018 Planning Summary, Geneva: UNHCR, accessed January 21, 2018, 
http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/5129#_ga=2.25652093.130244102.1516580940-716845809.1506304533.  
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The central administration’s strategic withdrawal from immigration management facilitated 
Uganda’s rise as a major destination for Rwandans seeking political and economic alternatives to 
Belgian and Tutsi governance, but it also laid the groundwork for future citizenship struggles. 
The work of gatekeeping fell to the lowest ranks of the customary authority, who became 
responsible for identifying, policing, and taxing migrants. And because control over land lay in 
the hands of private owners rather than state agents, landlords acquired tremendous power over 
migrant settlement (Chapter Two). The structure of colonial migration management allowed the 
Protectorate to absorb impressive numbers of foreign migrants over a brief period of time. 
Audrey Richards warned British officials in 1954 that their decentralized approach to Rwandan 
integration could lead to considerable political conflict after independence, but her words (and 
the results of her team’s research) went largely unheeded.  
In the wake of the Rwandan Revolution and Congo crisis, a panicked British 
administration sought to impose unprecedented restrictions on African mobility through the 
introduction of new laws and documentation practices. These interventions, however, did little to 
alter the distribution of gatekeeping power at the local level. Low-level chiefs were again called 
upon to do the hard work of identifying, classifying, and tracking new arrivals in their 
jurisdiction. The result, predictably, was a highly localized documentary regime with little to no 
central oversight. This meant that many Rwandans arriving in Uganda after November 1959, 
regardless of what motivated their departure, could still access land and wages using the same 
channels that migrants had been using for decades.2  
                                                 
2 For an autobiographical account of one refugee family’s self-settlement in Masaka, see Patricia Bamurangirwa, My 
Mother’s Dreams (Leicestershire: Matador, 2014). The family rented land from a Muganda woman who had been 
renting out plots to migrant farmers for many years. 
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This does not mean that the development of a new refugee category was without 
consequence—far from it. As seen in Chapters Four and Five, the creation of laws, practices, and 
camps introduced new barriers for many people, particularly those who lacked the material and 
social resources they needed to (re)establish their bureaucratic relationship with the state. A man 
like Alonso Kahima, born into an ordinary peasant family in southwestern Uganda, struggled to 
“prove” his Ugandan origins after spending many years working in Rwanda. His wife, whose 
Ugandan origins were apparently never in question, could not sponsor his citizenship because of 
the patriarchal assumptions of Ugandan law. Kahima and his family were eventually forced to 
relocate to Oruchinga. Meanwhile, Andereya Sabune, a man of equally complex origins, could 
still use his familial connections and political resources to demonstrate his Ugandaness even as 
he openly identified as a Tutsi. And, because Uganda’s new citizenship laws allowed Ugandan 
men to pass their citizenship on to their wives, Sabune’s Congolese partner, Ayirini, was able to 
relocate, as well.  
Uganda’s emerging refugee regime, in short, was inherently contradictory and gave rise 
to contradictory outcomes. It granted decision-making power to central authorities without 
providing for the infrastructure that enforcement would require. Many displaced people were 
consequently able to evade detection, but the cost of getting caught could be steep. Those who 
did manage to settle privately still had to live with the uncertainty that new categories created.  
These contradictions lay at the heart of Uganda’s formal refugee settlement program. 
When the late colonial and early independent governments tried to isolate refugees into rural 
camps, the boundaries of these spatial orders proved impossible to govern. People might 
sometimes be forced to go to the camps, but the government could do little to make them stay. 
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Like territorial borders and state categories, the camps were porous and inextricably connected to 
the larger community.  
The history of Uganda as a site of refuge, then, is one of many overlapping and 
interpolated boundaries. It cannot be understood by reference to categorical orders alone—we 
must also follow the journeys of those who moved across these shifting frameworks. To this end, 
I have adopted biography as a method for charting pathways across the confusing shuffle of a 
government administration in the midst of decolonization. Each chapter has highlighted the 
migrations of individual men and women, not because they are necessarily representative of a 
more generalized experience, but because they demonstrate the many different routes that people 
took and the kinds of connections they forged in the process.  
Uganda’s postcolonial refugee regime has facilitated the rapid absorption of displaced 
people over time, even as larger questions about citizenship remain unresolved. Mamdani and 
others have shown that Uganda’s “citizenship question” was of paramount importance to the rise 
of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a militia of primarily second-generation refugees who invaded 
Rwanda in 1990.3 Mamdani argues that the RPF invasion constituted an “armed repatriation” of 
refugees, one that essentially allowed the Ugandan government to “export” its “crisis of 
citizenship and indigeneity” to Rwanda.4 Without question, Uganda’s troubled political history 
                                                 
3 On the linkages between Ugandan citizenship issues and the RPF, see Filip Reyntjens, Political Governance in 
Post-Genocide Rwanda (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Elijah Dickens Mushemeza, The Politics 
and Empowerment of Banyarwanda Refugees in Uganda, 1959-2001 (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2007); 
Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 159-184; Ogenga Otunnu, “An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the 
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA),” in The Path of a Genocide: The Rwandan Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, ed. 
Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, 31-50 (London: Routledge Press, 1999); Rachel van der Meeren, “Three 
Decades in Exile: Three Decades in Exile: Rwandan Refugees, 1960-1990,” Journal of Refugee Studies 9, no. 3 
(1996): 252-267; Catherine Watson, Exile from Rwanda: Background to an Invasion (Washington DC: US 
Committee for Refugees, 1991).  
4 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 160. 
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and exclusionary treatment of refugees contributed significantly to refugee radicalization and 
militarization during the 1980s. Yet, as my research suggests, radical militancy—which was 
essentially the reification of the native/foreign binary—was not the only viable option for 
Rwandan migrants. Many Rwandan refugees and migrants remained in Uganda after 1990 
despite the structural hardships and social discrimination they faced.5 They are, to borrow 
Malkki’s term, “emplaced” in Uganda.6 Malkki originally coined the term to reference people 
who remain in place while those around them are forced across borders, but it is also applicable 
to resettled refugees and migrants who have, over the years, transformed their exile into home. 
Emplacement, as the counterpart to displacement, is tied to the same historical processes that 
engender refugees.7 Asking why, and how, some people leave and others remain allows us to 
flesh out the irregular contours and intersectional specificities of place-making and political 
exclusion.  
Refugees in African History and African History in Refugee Studies 
 More than twenty years ago, Terence Ranger suggested that historians of Africa were 
well-suited to the study of displacement. The field, after all, was built on innovative approaches 
to difficult source material, and thus might have wisdom to share with refugee studies scholars 
who faced similar methodological challenges. For Ranger, however, the aim for Africanists 
                                                 
5 For reasons explored throughout this dissertation, exact numbers are impossible to calculate, or even estimate. 
However, the commonplace assumption in Uganda is that Rwandans (migrants, refugees, and their descendants) 
continue to constitute a sizeable percentage of the population. See Lucy Hovil, A Dangerous Impasse: Rwandan 
Refugees in Uganda (New York: International Refugee Rights Initiative, 2010). 
6 Liisa Malkki, “Refugees and Exile: From ‘Refugee Studies’ to the National Order of Things,” Annual Review of 
Anthropology 24 (1995b): 495-523. 
7 Pamela Ballinger, “Borders and the Rhythms of Displacement, Emplacement, and Mobility,” in A Companion to 
Border Studies, ed. Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan, 389-404 (West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2012). 
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should not be to isolate refugees as a separate category or subfield, but instead to situate them 
into the flow of social history. “The refugee…situation,” he wrote, “is only partly unprecedented 
and very largely precedented.”8 Indeed, histories of labor migration demonstrate that the social, 
political, and economic challenges associated with displacement and human mobility more 
generally are hardly new in Africa.9 Interpreting postcolonial displacement in light of the 
colonial past, and incorporating refugee histories into a more general understanding of twentieth 
century Africa, “remind[s] us not to make too great a distinction between ‘normality’ and 
‘crisis,” and to see continuities in social and political responses across the apparent ruptures of 
displacement. 
Few scholars took up Ranger’s advice initially. Until recently, in fact, few historians of 
any regional focus showed interest in questions about displacement, for reasons that are difficult 
to parse. Tony Kushner suggests that acknowledging the contributions of refugees to national 
pasts undermines popular conceptions of what a nation is or should be, and that this makes 
historians reticent to engage.10 Peter Gatrell posits that historians are still fixated with the nation-
state, despite the successes of global history.11 Perhaps refugees, framed in terms of crisis and 
                                                 
8 Terence Ranger, “Studying Repatriation as Part of African Social History,” in When Refugees Go Home: African 
Experiences (Geneva: UNRISD, 1994): 291. 
9 See for example Patrick Harries, Work, Culture, and Identity: Migrant Laborers in Mozambique and South Africa, 
c. 1860-1910 (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1997); Belinda Bozzoli, Women of Phokeng: Consciousness, Life Strategy, 
and Migrancy in South Africa, 1900-1983 (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002); Megan Vaughan, The Story of an 
African Famine: Gender and Famine in Twentieth Century Malawi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987); Jean Penvenne, Women, migration and the cashew economy in southern Mozambique, 1945-75 (Woodbridge, 
Suffolk: James Currey, 2015); Thaddeus R. Sunseri, Vilimani: labor migration and rural change in early colonial 
Tanzania (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002). 
10 Tony Kushner, Remembering Refugees: Then and Now (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006): 18. 
11 Peter Gatrell, “What’s Wrong with Refugee History?” Journal of Refugee Studies 30:2 (2016): 170-189. See also 
Roger Zetter, “Refugees and Refugee Studies—a Valedictory Editorial,” Journal of Refugee Studies 13:4 (2000): 
349-355 and Claudena Skran and Carla Daughtry, “The Study of Refugees before ‘Refugee Studies,’” Refugee 
Survey Quarterly 26:3 (2000): 15-35. 
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emergency, are not regarded as historical subjects, as Lubkemann suggests (see introduction). 
Then again, given the nation-state origins of the discipline and the prevalence of national 
archives, historians may be simply reproducing the system that forged their profession. None of 
these explanations is particularly convincing, however, since historians have long been interested 
in questions that interrogate nationalism and decenter the nation-state.12 And, as Ranger notes, 
historians of Africa learned long ago about the necessity of reading against (and along) the 
archival grain—we have the tools to move beyond national categories.13 But whatever the case, 
despite the centrality of refugees to the history of the state, they have remained minor topics in 
the historiography.14  
Refugee Studies scholarship, when it has addressed historical questions, has focused 
almost exclusively on refugee crises in Europe and North America and the formation of the 
UNHCR.15 African states, according to this narrative, only developed refugee crises after 
independence, prompting the UNHCR to expand its mandate to include the former colonial 
world. Africa thus becomes an afterthought of a Eurocentric regime, a second chapter in the 
history of the global refugee.16 This literature, while aspiring to study displacement on a global 
                                                 
12 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993); Immanual Wallerstein, The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins 
of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974). 
13 Ann Laura Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance,” Archival Science 2 (2002): 87-109. 
14 On the centrality of refugees to the formation of states (and vice versa), see Nevzat Soguk, States and Strangers: 
Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 
15 Tony Kushner and Katharine Knox, Refugees in an Age of Genocide (London: Routledge Press, 1999); Gil 
Loescher and John A. Scanlan, Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America’s Half-Open Door, 1945-Present (New 
York: The Free Press, 1986); Michael Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985); Jacques Vernant, The Refugee in the Post-War World (London: George 
Allen Unwin, 1953). 
16 Alexander Betts, Gil Loescher, and James Milner, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection (London: Routledge Press, 2001). 
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scale, has failed to recognize how and in what ways “the refugee regime developing in [1940s] 
Europe was only one part of a larger picture.” As Anna Holian and Daniel Cohen argue, 
historians today need to “put the early history of UNHCR…‘in its place’.”17 In response to this 
challenge, historians have produced provocative works on displacement in the Middle East, 
Russia, China, South Asia, and North Africa.18 They have called attention to the politics and 
ambiguities of the refugee label and the historical “multiplicity of national and regional 
arrangements [that] existed side-by-side” with the UNHCR.19 Still others have moved further 
back in time to trace the genealogies of the UNHCR and the many false starts of global refugee 
protection.20 
The history of refugees in Africa, however, remains largely unexplored.21 This 
dissertation contributes to a small but growing body of literature that attempts to bring the study 
of African refugees back into social history. What studies do exist have gravitated toward 
discursive analyses of categories, which have illuminated the production of difference but often 
                                                 
17 Anna Holian and G. Daniel Cohen, “Introduction,” Journal of Refugee Studies 25, no. 3 (2012): 316. 
18 Key texts include Laura Madokoro, Elusive Refuge: Chinese Migrants in the Cold War. (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2016); Janet Chen, Guilty of Indigence: The Urban Poor in China, 1900-1953 (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University 
Press., 2012); Peter Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2011); Ilana Feldman, “Difficult Distinctions: Refugee Law, Humanitarian Practice, and Political Identification in Gaza,” 
Cultural Anthropology 22:1 (2007), 129-169; Vazira Facila-Yacoobali Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern 
South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories (New York: Columbia University, 2007); Andrea Smith, Colonial Memory and 
Postcolonial Europe: Maltese Settlers in Algeria and France (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006); Pamela Ballinger, 
History in Exile: Memory and Identity at the Borders of the Balkans (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
19 Holian and Cohen, Introduction, 316. 
20 Pamela Ballinger, “History’s ‘Illegibles’: National Indeterminacy in Istria,” Austrian History Yearbook 43 (2012): 
116-137; Jessica Reinisch, “Internationalism in Relief: The Birth (and Death) of UNRRA,” Past and Present 
Supplement 6 (2011): 258-289. 
21 Notable exceptions include Liisa Malkki’s work as well as Zolberg’s classic study. See Aristide Zolberg, Astri 
Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World (New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). See also Jill Rosenthal, From ‘Migrants’ to ‘Refugees’: 
Humanitarian Aid, Development, and Nationalism in Ngara District, Tanzania, 1940-2000 (PhD diss., Emory 
University, 2014); and David Newbury, “Returning Refugees: Four Historical Patterns of ‘Coming Home’ to Rwanda,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 47:2 (2005), 252-85. 
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ignored the more mundane bureaucratic histories that underwrite these same categories. I have 
shown that the postcolonial citizenship crisis in Uganda is a product of the colonial state, but not 
in the way that Mamdani has claimed. Instead, I have, following Breckenridge, stressed the 
relationship between colonial population management and the indeterminacy of citizenship 
categories today.22 
Finally, by bringing refugees back into the flow of African social history, this dissertation 
also makes an important contribution to global histories of citizenship. If refugee indeterminacy 
today is a product of colonial state formation, then the prevalence of self-settlement in Africa is 
not an aberration of global norms or an antithesis of refugee management in Europe. It is, 
instead, a consequence of twentieth century global political history. Even as European 
governments scrambled to regroup their own scattered populations in the aftermath of world war, 
their colonial administrations were laying the groundwork for future displacement crises. 
Bringing African refugees into the analysis does more than simply diversify the field: It 
complicates our genealogy of the twentieth century, the Century of the Refugee. 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Keith Breckenridge, The Biometric State: The Global Politics of Identification and Surveillance in South Africa, 
1850 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
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